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ABSTRACT 
THE ORTHOGENETIC PRINCIPLE AS AN ETHICAL DEFINITION OF 
DEVELOPMENT 
FEBRUARY, 1990 
NATHANIEL BENJAMIN NEEDLE, B.A., WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY 
Ed. M., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Ed.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor S. Philip Eddy 
The author defines development, or growth, as the ethically 
desirable direction of change. Is there a principle which can 
express what all developmental changes have in common, and 
what makes them desirable? 
The orthogenetic principle defines development as change 
towards increasing INTEGRATION with complementary 
DIFFERENTIATION of people with respect to their environment. 
Heinz Werner and Bernard Kaplan first articulated this idea. It 
characterizes the portrayal of development by Jean Piaget, 
Lawrence Kohlberg, and John Dewey. None of these authors, 
however, Justify orthogenesis as an ethical definition of 
development across a global range of experience. The author 
attempts this here, giving educators a tool for criticizing or 
justifying education having development as its aim. 
The author analyzes Integration and differentiation into 
three aspects: CO-ORDINATION of DISTINGUISHED elements in the 
environment; AUTONOMOUS choice from a DE-CENTERED or 
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objective perspective; IMMUNITY from environmental vicissitudes 
alongside an OPENING of and openness to the environment. 
Advancing these qualities is justified as ethically desirable in two 
ways. It overcomes the problem of egocentrism and habit- 
attachment which gives meaning to the notion of development 
across human experience. It also meets formal ethical criteria of 
universalizability, universality, and prescriptivity. 
Educators can use the orthogenetic principle to examine 
assumptions about development within psychological theories to 
see how these might themselves influence development. This 
enables educators to make eclectic use of psychologies within an 
ethical framework. The principle is also used to generate 
guidelines for thorough and objective inquiry into what is most 
growthful for a particular person at a particular time. The 
author argues that the principle cannot prescribe any educational 
course in advance of such inquiry into unique situations. 
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PURPOSE AND NATURE OF THE THESIS 
A. Origin and Function of the Orthogenesis Concept 
The concept of orthogenesis is defined as change in an 
organism in the direction of increasing differentiation and 
hierarchic integration (Werner, 1957). It has gained currency 
within developmental psychology as a definition of 
development, [l] Functioning as "an heuristic principle. . .itself not 
subject to empirical test" (p.126), the concept has been used to 
distinguish changes which are developmental from those which 
are not. 
The orthogenesis idea has its roots within the "organismic 
stream of developmental psychology. [2] The two dominant 
theories within this stream are those of Heinz Werner (who, with 
Bernard Kaplan, first used the term "orthogenesis"), and Jean 
Piaget. [3] 
Organicism, as typified by these authors, explains the 
development of human perception, consciousness, cognition, 
personality, and moral judgement in terms which evoke the 
BIOLOGICAL heritage and context of these phenomena. Such terms 
(e.g., adaptation, regulation) are analogous to those used for 
1 
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describing non-intelligent change in biological systems, including 
both the evolution of species (phylogenesis) and the life-span of 
individual organisms (ontogenesis). Organismic models do this 
without in any way reducing the properties of intelligent systems 
to non-intelligent ones. They do this by positing a hierarchy of 
discrete systems. These may have common FUNCTIONAL features: 
e.g., the first fish crawling upon land, a baby’s attempts at 
language, and Einstein's theory of relativity all represent the 
organism's effort to expand its environment. Nonetheless, they 
have different STRUCTURES with distinct sets of rules. The system 
of intelligence is hierarchically superior to, for example, the 
system of instinct used by bees, or the systems of homeostasis 
within the human body. 
A core theoretical question for organismic developmental 
psychology is "what are the criteria for judging some systems to 
be hierarchically superior to others?" Now, organismic psychology 
analyzes structures with an eye to their origin and function 
(Piaget, 1975,p.83). It seeks to explain the structural features of 
existing systems by examining how they came into being 
(genesis), and also the purposes towards which these changes are 
"directed" (Werner, 1963, pp. 133-136). Hierarchically superior 
systems are considered to have evolved from inferior systems, 
largely as a result of the very functioning of the lower systems 
(Piaget, 1971, 1978, 1980). Therefore, organismic psychologists are 
interested in plotting the "functional continuity" between systems 
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having different structures: between, for example, the thought of 
the child and that of the adult. The adult’s thought structure is 
held to carry out the same fundamental functions as the child’s, 
but in a superior way. Since this function is continuous and 
invariable, organismic psychologists are interested not only in a 
static structural comparison of different systems, but also in 
defining the common properties which characterize the ongoing 
DIRECTION of movement (what Piaget calls the VECTOR, 1965, 
p.386) from lower to higher systems. 
Finally, the radical changes accompanying the development 
of new systems are considered to grow out of the incremental 
changes that take place within existing systems. Thus organismic 
theorists also ask: "what characterizes the direction of ALL 
change deemed to be from 'lower' to 'higher', whether intra- 
systemic or trans-systemic?" It is the function of the concept of 
orthogenesis to provide a standard for assessing hierarchies of 
change, whether change is described as a vector or as a series of 
discrete states. 
fi Preliminary Statement of the Thesis 
I propose that the orthogenetic principle is susceptible of 
being transformed from a principle whose only value is held to be 
its value for scientific inquiry, into an ethical principle which can 
serve as a definition of development as the aim of education. 
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As a component of a psychological theory, orthogenesis is 
associated with a series of explanatory assumptions regarding the 
mechanisms by which change occurs, as well as other 
assumptions associated with the organismic world-view. An 
ethical theory of development, however, is concerned with 
justifying certain changes as being "for the better", ultimately in 
terms of their consequences for human welfare. I propose that 
the core conceptual features of orthogenesis can be abstracted 
from their organismic psychological-theory setting, and put to 
work in the construction of an ethical theory. This theory may 
borrow additional notions from the organismic view which are 
congenial to its internal ethical logic. It may, on the other hand, 
omit other organismic notions which are irrelevant or 
uncongenial to the justification of such a theory. Such selective 
abstraction is possible because the aims of a valid and useful 
theory of explanation are not identical to those of a valid and 
useful theory of justification. I propose that the orthogenesis idea 
can endure such a transplantation without distortion of its 
essential features. 
c Definition of Terms 
EDUCATION is defined as the intentional art of promoting 
development in oneself and others. Dewey uses a "persuasive 
definition" of this term (Stevenson, 1944, pp.210-217; 1963, pp.32- 
54), when he says that in order "to be worthy of the name 
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EDUCATION", the activity must be one of growth (Dewey, 1938a, 
p.90). I use the term in the same spirit, except to say that while 
all education promotes growth, not all growth is a result of 
education. 1 wish to preserve a distinction for education as a 
consciously refined practice, while allowing for the notion that 
growth may occur as a result of experiences which are unplanned 
and unpromoted. EDUCATORS are people who hold the practice of 
education to be their primary purpose or function with regard to 
some particular activity or context. 
I do not wish to construe education as being restricted to 
specific institutional contexts (e.g., schools) nor do 1 wish to 
assume that education is what is going on in those contexts. 
Likewise, people can act as educators without having specific 
social roles (e.g., as professors or schoolteachers), and I do not 
assume that people holding those roles are necessarily educators. 
I do wish to construe education as aiming at a relatively 
global development of others or oneself, as opposed to TRAINING 
(for skill) or TEACHING (for knowledge), which might refer to 
action having a more narrow aim. For example, someone who 
teaches a sport with an eye to a student’s personality 
development, and to the contribution made to society by people 
adept at co-operative teamwork, is more of an educator than 
someone whose teaching interest is limited to the development of 
physical skill. An educator sees his contribution to a particular 
developmental path against the background of the student’s 
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overall development, which is his fundamental interest. The term 
STUDENT is used loosely to define the object of an educator's 
practice; it is not meant to be age- or context-specific. 
DEVELOPMENT is defined as the consistent direction of 
psychological change (the term PSYCHOLOGICAL being used in its 
broadest possible sense of incorporating all mental life) held to be 
of supreme value, synonomous in this respect with Dewey's 
notion of GROWTH. While "development", in Kohlberg’s work is 
limited to definition in terms of cognitive-structural stage 
advance, my meaning is rather synonomous with Dewey's 
broader view of "growth". In this thesis, development is assumed 
to be the sole aim of education. It is argued in this thesis that 
development or growth ought to be defined as being characterized 
by ORTHOGENESIS. 
ORTHOGENESIS is defined as complementary INTEGRATION 
and DIFFERENTIATION of an ORGANISM with respect to its 
ENVIRONMENT. The term refers to an abstract principle as well as 
a material psychological process. Phrases such as "orthogenetic 
principle", "orthogenesis idea", or "orthogenesis concept" will be 
used when clear reference to a formal abstraction is desired. The 
term "development" will be used when clear reference to a 
psychological process is desired. 
ORGANISM and ENVIRONMENT are mutually defining 
abstractions which represent poles of a systemic, interactive, and 
mutually fashioning relationship between the subject of 
development and everything with respect to which this subject 
can be said to develop. 
7 
ENVIRONMENT is used here in keeping with Werner's 
concept of "Umwelt" (l%3, p.133). Environment is a field of 
interaction which includes the physical/geographical world, as 
well as the social, cultural, and historical context (especially 
flesh-and-blood others). It also refers to thoughts, feelings, 
imagination, ego, "self-concepts", and physico-chemical body 
states. The term INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT will be used when 
specific reference to this latter category of environment is 
desired. 
Environment is defined by its impingement and influence 
upon changes in the organism. It is also defined by the potential 
objects of the organism’s attention, concern, thought, or action. 
Thus it is referred to as "the organism's environment". To the 
extent that something is far removed from both the organism's 
concern, imagination, or action, AND any actual influence upon 
change in the organism, it can be said to simply not be part of 
that organism's environment. A faraway star, unless one believes 
in astrology, is not part of an infant's environment, while it may 
be a major aspect of an astronomer's environment. A war which 
makes it impossible for an infant to receive food is, to an 
objective observer, part of the infant's environment even if the 
infant has no idea of the war. 
8 
Further clarification of what is meant by internal 
environment seems prudent. People can influence, and be 
influenced by, their thoughts and feelings. They can also 
potentially influence, detach from, and otherwise change ego, 
self-concept, and habits. Hormones and body organs affect 
change, and can in turn be affected by actions as diverse as 
taking drugs and perfecting yogic practice. In defining 
environment as an abstraction, it is not necessary to reserve 
some fixed "core” self which, when everything else is abstracted 
out, is "left" to be the organism. 
ORGANISM refers to whomever is being considered the 
subject of development, the one who is developing, in a particular 
discussion. It is not necessary or possible for this to be defined in 
some fixed way. Organism is not "self” when the discussion 
revolves around "construction of a self (or selves)"; in that case 
self is a feature of the environment. On other occasions, various 
habits or thought patterns, which might otherwise be examined 
qua environment, may be momentarily collapsed into what is 
considered to be organism when the discussion focuses upon some 
other feature of the environment. 
The term organism conjures up the image of an amoeba 
rather than a human being. Therefore, the terms INDIVIDUAL or 
PERSON will be used in speaking of the organism most of the 
time. However, it is possible for an actual individual to be 
considered now the organism, now an aspect of the environment. 
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All actual individuals are in fact both organism and someone 
else's environment. The term organism refers to the one who is 
our immediate subject of developmental concern, in contrast with 
any named aspect of the universe which either impinges upon 
the organism, or can be affected by the organism, or both, and 
which therefore is the organism’s environment. I think that 
context and specifying remarks should render it obvious whether 
individuals are being discussed qua organism or qua environment. 
Strictly speaking, I consider development to be an attribute 
of the organism only, evaluated ultimately in terms of individual 
EXPERIENCE (see below). Therefore, if I speak of the 
"development" of the environment or social context, this is 
shorthand for "consistent direction of change in the environment 
which promotes the development of the organism”. This is not to 
be construed as an inversion whereby the "development" of 
history, culture, species, society, or some other idea is seen as 
the purpose of individual development. 
INTEGRATION of the organism with respect to the 
environment combines three qualities. First, there is CO¬ 
ORDINATION, whereby differentiated elements are linked and 
unified within a more stable yet flexible plan of thought, action, 
etc. A concept is an example of an integrative act, co-ordinating 
birches, elms, etc., under the notion of "tree". Integration is 
referred to as "hierarchic" (Werner, 1948, p.44) because the 
integrated system confers co-ordinative power over the 
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differentiated elements within that system. Our concept of tree 
enables us to see what birches and elms have in common, as well 
as to perceive better what makes a birch unique. Second, the 
notion of power through co-ordination implies the notion of 
AUTONOMY or independent self-direction. Example: for Piaget, 
(1965, pp. 163-173) to decide not to lie because you hold the same 
respect for others that you would like them to have for you, is 
morally more autonomous than refraining from lying because 
mommy said not to. Third, the idea of IMMUNITY or INTEGRITY 
follows from this; even if mommy told you that you could or 
should lie, the more integrated your morals, the more immune 
you would be from such environmental contingencies. 
Now we might imagine a person becoming increasingly self- 
directed, adept at co-ordinating or controlling his environment, 
and immune from all kinds of influences. Certainly this is a 
dangerously incomplete vision of development; it might describe a 
heartless megalomaniac! 
DIFFERENTIATION complements the integrative aspect of 
development. Three qualities of differentiation complement the 
integrative qualities just described. First, there is the notion of 
DISTINGUISHING elements out of a previously more diffuse and 
global environment. Werner (1948, p.87) charts the process 
whereby infants gradually develop from manifesting two or three 
diffuse emotions to having the rich palette of emotional shades of 
which most adults are capable. In the moral realm, the 
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developing individual becomes more able to distinguish intention 
from behavior; in judging the "badness” of breaking cups, the 
number of cups broken becomes less important than whether the 
cups were broken on purpose. Distinguishing complements co¬ 
ordination in development. For example, developing moral 
principles allow not only for the increasing distinguishing of 
intention from behavior, but also the increasing co-ordination of 
the two, both functions being mutually reinforcing. 
Second, the concept of autonomy is complemented by that 
of DE-CENTERING (Piaget, 1950, p.72; 1967, p.66). To de-center 
means to break free of a distorting "centrism" caused by some 
sort of attachment to anything ranging from a sensory perception 
to an "ethnocentric" world-view. A child who knows a ball is 
under a chair even when he can’t see it has de-centered from his 
immediate perceptual experience. A person who does not lie 
because he does not wish to hurt others has de-centered so as to 
be able to adopt another's perspective. The perceptually de- 
centered child gains autonomy; he can direct his own actions 
towards finding the ball instead of depending upon its physical 
presence. The morally de-centered person gains autonomy both 
by not being dependent upon external authority, and by not 
being driven by immediate selfish desires (internal environment). 
Third, differentiation implies an OPENING, or an expansion- 
extension of the environment. To differentiate-distinguish a new 
concept and field of knowledge, such as "history", out of a more 
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diffuse notion of the past, and to further be able to adopt the 
perspective of people who lived in other times, (a de-centering 
from one’s embeddedness in the historical present) involves a 
consequent enlarging of one’s environment. The opening-quality 
of differentiation and the immunizing-quality of integration 
complement one another in a developmental process. Thus, an 
experience that is "opening" for one person may be overwhelming 
(disintegrating) for another who cannot control or co-ordinate the 
changes forced upon him by the experience. Conversely, 
immunity from fear of death permitted Gandhi to engage in a 
path of non-violent resistance wherein he was prepared to open 
himself to mortal danger before he would hurt another. 
Repeated examples and analyses throughout the thesis will 
flesh out the bare outline given above. The terms integration and 
differentiation should each be considered as a synthesis of their 
triune qualities; when I wish to emphasize a particular quality, 
and context will not provide clear definition, I will refer 
synecdochically to the quality, or use a hyphenated term, e g., 
integration-autonomy. 
ADAPTATION is defined as a value-neutral term which 
includes any kind of behavior directed at the resolution of 
problems within organism-environment interaction. It includes 
Dewey’s notion that there is not only adaptation in terms of 
internal organismic change in response to environmental 
pressures, but also active adaptation of the environment by the 
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organism to suit its needs (1916, p.47). Such adaptation is not 
necessarily developmental; development is defined here as the 
PROGRESSIVE form of adaptation, the form which resolves 
problems by increasingly transcending or overcoming their basic 
terms or context. This would be opposed to REGRESSIVE 
adaptation, where the terms of the problem are increasingly 
succumbed to or reinforced, or STATIC adaptation, where there is 
no change in the problematic nature of the relationship. 
Example: If a man has a phobia of leaving his house, a 
static adaptation might involve having all his food delivered to his 
door, this "solves" the problem of his obtaining food. A progressive 
adaptation would be to overcome his fear, thereby actually 
transcending the very terms of the problem. 
While both EVOLUTION and development are defined as 
examples of progressive adaptation, the term evolution will be 
herein restricted to its phylogenetic meaning, leaving ontogenetic 
progressive adaptation, my sole interest here, to be described by 
the term development. 
UNIVERSALITY and PRESCRIPT1VITY are used as analogues of 
integration and differentiation (following Kohlberg, 1971, p.184) 
when applied to the formal analysis of ethical principles such as 
orthogenesis (As such, they are tools for asking whether 
orthogenesis qua formal principle meets its own standards of 
integration and differentiation). For Kohlberg, universality is a 
formal map of integration. As one's justice reasoning develops, a 
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wider range of objects becomes co-ordinated within one moral 
scheme. Example: extending the right to life first to one's loved 
ones, then to one's countrymen, then to all humanity represents 
increased universality. The more universal scheme also has more 
integrity; it is more immune to self-contradiction and thus more 
self-consistent. Prescriptivity is a map of differentiation in that 
the autonomous "ought" becomes, with development, more 
distinguished from the heteronomous "is". Example: to decide that 
one has a duty to save a person's life even if one doesn't Know 
him, then even if one hates him, then even if everyone hates 
him, and finally even if one might be in turn disliked, ostracized, 
or put to death for saving him, represents increasing 
prescriptivity, and an increasing distinguishing of what one ought 
to do from circumstances which are increasingly held to be 
irrelevant to the moral issue. 
It should be clear from the above examples that 
universality and prescriptivity are as intertwined as are 
integration and differentiation. Integration could just as well map 
into prescriptivity, since the more prescriptive the judgement, 
the more integrated-autonomous-immune it is with respect to 
the environment, including both external circumstances and 
inner emotions. The more universal the judgement, the more 
differentiated-de-centered-open it is (we expand rights to include 
more people as we can adopt their perspective). 
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ETHICAL prescriptivity refers to statements about what is 
right or good in a general sense, and is to be distinguished from 
HEURISTIC prescriptivity, which refers to rules laid down with 
regard for their value to inquiry only. [4] Thus, my definitions of 
evolution and adaptation are heuristically prescriptive. It serves 
inquiry to limit the number of synonyms for development, and 
to make distinctions between different kinds of change. My 
definition of development as orthogenesis is meant to be ethically 
prescriptive. People ought to use it as a guide for what is 
generally desirable. 
The term FORMAL, used here, refers to conceptual 
abstractions judged by criteria such as logical self-consistency 
Formal concepts are held to have a natural origin and function as 
"maps" of EMPIRICAL reality, (although some mathematical 
models may be so formal as to attenuate this function) where 
empirical is defined in its broadest sense as being founded on 
experience and verifiable through shared experience or 
observation. 
EXPERIENCE as defined here hews closely to the Deweyan 
view (1938a, Ch.3). Experience represents not merely the content 
of thoughts, feelings, memories, etc., but the most inclusive 
context within which all these play a part. It is that which 
represents the continuity of the subject, since it is a 
characteristic of experience that it grows out of past experiences 
and prepares the ground for future experiences. At the same 
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time, it is not a fixed entity, but a "moving force" representing 
the moment-to-moment point of interaction between organism 
and environment. Experience might best be seen as the medium 
of development. 
]L_Qrth.Qgenesls and Values: Werner. Piaget. 
Kohlberg. and Dewev 
The question of the value presuppositions within 
orthogenesis has been an abiding source of confusion for the 
organismic view. Both Werner and Piaget have displayed an 
almost painful ambiguity on this subject. On the one hand, they 
both firmly and repeatedly disavow the presence of any view of 
the "good" implied by this direction of change. Werner asserts 
that orthogenesis is "not value bound because the theoretical 
requirement is for objective rather than evaluative means of 
assessing change and stability" (Langer, 1970, p.745). Piaget 
wrestles with "the problem of setting up such degrees of 
organization as will enable us to establish some objective and 
independent hierarchy, untainted by any value judgement" 
(1971, p.122). While Werner is content to speak of "progressive as 
opposed to "regressive" development (Langer, ibid.), Piaget, in his 
desire to "avoid this ambiguous word 'progress'", opts to use the 
phrase "evolutive vection" (p.123), which simply gives us the no 
less ambiguous word "evolution"! 
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Yet Werner links orthogenesis to Goethe’s idea of "perfection" 
(Werner, 1948, pp. 40-41, also Kaplan, 1986, p.94), while Piaget 
makes numerous prescriptions for education (1965, pp. 404-405, 
1973, pp.90-91, 111-112, pp. 131-139) based on conformity with 
this "vector", which he sees as "implying the existence of ideal 
norms immanent in the human spirit" (1965, p.397). Both men 
strive mightily to project a scientist's neutrality regarding 
orthogenesis. Both are aware of the fallacy of deriving ethical 
precepts from a psychological phenomenon on the basis of its 
"immanence" or "naturalness". Being scientists, they see their 
role as the explanation of facts, and neither man attempts to 
provide a separate justification for orthogenesis as an ethical 
principle. Still, it is hard to escape the conclusion that they had 
faith in its desirability as a guide for human "progress".It 
remained for Lawrence Kohlberg to address the ethical 
implications within the orthogenetic vector, specifically as 
embodied in Piaget’s "cognitive-structural" order of stages. 
(Piaget, 1950, Ch.5; 1967, Ch.l). He attempted to make explicit 
how development, defined as a progression through an invariant 
order of stages or cognitive structures, could, and ought to, serve 
as the aim of education (Kohlberg, 1972). Kohlberg recognized that 
in order to prescribe an order of stages as the aim of education, 
he would have to provide separate ethical justification for the 
vector implied by this sequence: "the justification of education as 
development requires a philosophical statement explaining why a 
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higher stage is a better or more adequate stage- (p.167). Such a 
statement could not be derived or deduced from any facts about 
development; to do this would be to commit the “naturalistic 
fallacy" by using psychological explanations to justify ethical 
prescriptions. At the same time, since development is conceived 
of as a psychological process, it requires expression in 
psychological terms: "before one can define a set of educational 
goals based on a philosophical statement of ethical, scientific, or 
logical principles one must be able to translate it into a statement 
about psychological stages of development" (p.167). 
Kohlberg holds educational practice based upon 
psychologically-defined developmental goals, justified by a 
progressive ethical framework, to be more logically consistent, 
potentially effective, and morally superior to the other 
educational models. [5] This view, which I accept, provides a 
launching point for my thesis. There is, I believe, room for 
improvement in Kohlberg's definition of development which will 
render it more useful to educators in a practical context. Not 
only can such improvement be undertaken without deviation 
from the view expressed in the first sentence of this paragraph, 
but it can be undertaken while remaining true to Kohlberg's 
"internal standard of adequacy", which is that of orthogenesis. 
Kohlberg invokes the orthogenetic principle in his definition 
of what constitutes development: "development is not just any 
behavior change, but a change toward greater differentiation. 
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integration, and adaptation”. (1972, p.157) Unlike Werner and 
Piaget, Kohlberg is quite clear that orthogenesis is a desirable 
direction: "Implied in the term ’development' is the notion that a 
more developed psychological state is more valuable or adequate 
than a less developed state" (p.151). 
Yet manifestly unlike Werner, who applies the notion of 
orthogenesis to the widest possible range of aspects of mental life: 
personality, creativity, relation to one's culture, etc., Kohlberg 
frames his view of development strictly in terms of Piaget’s 
invariant cognitive stage sequence (1972, pp. 131-2). Now, 
Kohlberg’s particular interest in the development of justice 
reasoning is perhaps well served by this cognitive-structural 
psychology. But I question whether framing orthogenesis solely in 
terms of this model either fully exploits the potential applications 
of the concept, or creates a sufficiently comprehensive set of goals 
for education (See Rationale, below). 
Within the realm of justice reasoning, Kohlberg takes great 
pains to provide independent ethical justification for why 
orthogenesis constitutes change for the better. His method of 
doing this is to appeal to a formalist analysis, arguing that an 
increase, with each successive stage, in psychological integration 
and differentiation can be justified as better in terms of the 
increasingly universalizable and prescriptive nature of the moral 
judgements produced at that stage (1971, pp. 184-185). 
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Eddy (1986) surmises that Kohlberg's reliance on formalism 
is an effort to avoid the naturalistic fallacy, yet he points out 
that the price of this effort is a failure to ultimately justify moral 
norms in terms of their "adaptive consequences", their "impact 
on human welfare", which can only be judged by "a kind of 
inquiry which is in principle empirical" (p.75). The need for 
justification in these terms becomes obvious when we consider 
that "the natural origin and function" (ibid.) of moral norms is 
their regulation of what goes on in the material world. I accept 
Eddy's position, and will attempt a justification of orthogenesis 
which rests upon a genetic-functional view, yet which is also 
checked against a formal analysis. [6] 
In trying to justify orthogenesis as a suitable definition for 
development as the aim of education, the need for such an 
approach becomes all the more urgent. Like Kohlberg's reliance 
upon cognitive-structural psychology, his reliance upon formalist 
philosophy may be somewhat appropriate when dealing with the 
analysis of judgement itself. As Eddy notes, (p.76), "Conceptual 
tools at the level of abstraction that Kohlberg and Piaget focus on 
are almost by definition formal". Yet most of us would wish to 
judge education in terms of its effect upon individual experience 
and social behavior, and not merely upon the formal adequacy of 
cognitive structures, "moral" or otherwise. Kohlberg does not 
even address the justification of orthogenesis in the areas of 
personality, social context, attitudes towards learning, or other 
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areas of arguable concern for education having development as its 
aim (See Rationale, below). 
Although Kohlberg claims to adhere to John Dewey's 
philosophy of development, (1972, p.128) 1 question whether an 
interpretation of increasing integration and differentiation which 
is limited to an analysis of the formal adequacy of cognitive 
structures generates a definition of development in keeping with 
the spirit of the Deweyan ideal. 
Dewey's notion of "growth", like Kohlberg's notion of 
"development", is unequivocally ethically prescriptive. In fact, it 
is Dewey's ultimate moral principle. He does not attempt to define 
growth in terms of a specific set of organized abstractions, in the 
way Werner does. Nonetheless, although he does not appeal to 
orthogenesis as a formal definition of growth, its presence is felt 
strongly in many of his references to growth. 
For example, Gouinlock (1976) interprets Dewey as follows: 
"growth is the process by which the individual is increasingly able 
to engage his energies with his environment in a manner that 
creates consummatory experience" (p.90). If we relate this to 
Dewey's statement that "with every differentiation of structure 
the environment expands" (1938b, p.25), we obtain a portrait of a 
process wherein the organism, with increasing differentiation, 
gains an expanded environment with which he is capable of 
interacting while preserving his autonomous capacity to solve 
problems and attain goals. Integration, which for Dewey is "an 
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achievement”, involves the co-ordination, or "unification" of 
diverse habits, thoughts, and feelings (in Gouinlock, pp. 100-101). 
Yet such integration is only growthful against a background of 
"discord" which "induces reflection", thereby setting up a 
"rhythm of loss of integration with environment and recovery of 
union". 
Three distinctive features of Dewey's conception of growth 
are of particular importance to an ethical interpretation of 
orthogenesis. They are: 
1) the co-extensiveness of the growth-material with that of 
ALL experience. 
2) the inextricability of individual growth from "the larger 
growth-process", (see Green, 1976) i.e., the socio-historic context, 
including "all political institutions and industrial arrangements", 
which are judged according to "the contribution they make to the 
all-around growth of every member of society" (Dewey, 1950, 
P 147). 
3) the rejection of any notion of a "final end" or "highest 
stage" of growth (Dewey, 1916, p.50). Growth is an open-ended 
process, where each new step creates new conditions which 
frame the next step. 
Green (1976,p.360) argues that Dewey eschews a formal 
definition of growth, preferring to rely upon bountiful examples 
and general guidelines, so as not to denigrate this key principle to 
"a set of rules to be applied like drugstore prescriptions or 
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cookbook recipes”. Furthermore, since Dewey viewed growth as 
"inextricably contextual" (p.361), he was concerned that a more 
precise definition would limit its universality, making it culturally 
and historically bound. 
Green argues further that the lack of a formal elaboration 
does not render Dewey's conception of growth vague or trivial, 
that it is sufficient as a guide to conduct and education. I am 
inclined to agree only to the extent that if one takes the time to 
glean Dewey's definition of growth from a careful contextual 
reading of the various writings throughout which it is dispersed, 
a rich and unambiguous picture emerges. Yet I believe that a 
more compact and precise definition of development than is 
provided by Dewey would be of greater use to educators, and that 
such a model is not necessarily pernicious as long as it: 1) can do 
relative justice to the full range of individual experience, 2) is 
sensitive to context as shaping and being shaped by both growth 
itself as well as our ideas about what growth is, and 3) avoids 
defining growth in terms of a fixed end. 
In summary, neither Werner nor Piaget provide an ethical 
justification for orthogenesis. Kohlberg does, but it is limited to 
what he defines as the realm of moral judgement, and it lacks a 
well-elaborated genetic-functional rationale even within that 
realm. Dewey justifies growth as a moral aim, using essentially 
orthogenetic criteria to define growth, but he does not provide a 
precise, explicit, well-organized gathering of many varieties of 
growth under a single integrating orthogenetic concept. 
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E„ Final Statement of the Thesis and its Rationale 
My thesis is that the orthogenetic principle is worthy of 
preference as an ethically prescriptive definition of development 
where development is construed to be the aim of education. It is 
worthy of preference because: l) it can command both a formal 
and a genetic-functional justification; 2) it furthers educational 
inquiry by taking a wide range of experiential factors into 
account as both subject to and influencing growth, 3) it can 
ethically co-ordinate the use of a variety of psychological models. 
Let us briefly examine these criteria in turn. In speaking of 
a formal justification, 1 am adhering to Kohlberg’s basic idea. To 
justify a principle formally means to demonstrate its logical self- 
consistency in terms of its universalizability, universality, and 
prescriptivity. 
Now Kohlberg is trying to justify a structural hierarchy of 
justice judgements, while I am justifying a DIRECTION of 
development across ALL experience. So my criteria should be 
defined so as to match this task. 1 aim to justify orthogenesis, as 
a standard for what kinds of changes constitute developmental 
ones, as universalizable for all humans in all cultures, over a 
wide range of aspects of experience-in-context. I aim to justify it 
as prescriptive in the sense of being distinguished from, and 
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independent of: 1) evidence of the percentage or number of people 
who manifest a certain course or degree of orthogenetic 
movement, or level of orthogenetic "attainment"; 2) what 
changes people in a given culture do in fact value; and 3) 
scientific debate over the validity or heuristic worth of a 
particular explanatory model. [7] 
Formal ethical models are useful in education because they 
increase the precision, clarity, and consistency of our aims. Any 
formal abstraction requires justification in terms of formal, non- 
empirical criteria. Yet these criteria as well as the models they 
judge can be best seen as problem-solving "maps", generated by 
thought in its adaptive search for a resolution to material 
conflicts. To finally justify an ethical principle, then, we must 
seek, out its GENESIS through an analysis of the basic conflict 
which generated it, and examine the thoroughness with which it 
does, in fact, fulfill its FUNCTION of addressing this conflict in a 
progressively adaptational way. This is what I mean by a 
"genetic-functional" justification. Our formal maps are ultimately 
justified by the extent to which they reflect this empirical 
reality. 
To address our second criterion, a definition of development 
ought to enable educators to speak of growth with respect to 
affective attachments, inclinations and impulses, the co-existence 
of a variety of cognitive/affective habits or structures within an 
individual (Werner, 1963, p.137), the structure of the social 
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context, and the nature of the educator-student relationship, for 
a start. It should enable educators to consider the influence of 
each of these factors upon the others. 
It should do this because, in the absence of incontrovertible 
evidence to the contrary, it is prudent to assume that these 
aspects do interact with one another to influence an individual’s 
overall experience and behavior. We might be tempted to simplify 
things by limiting our definition to the development of cognitive 
structures, and assuming that once a person is capable of 
reasoning in a certain way in a particular situation, that this will 
suffice to bring all experience and action "in line" with this 
reasoning. But before we assume that no other forces play a key 
role in shaping experience and action in all situations, we'd better 
be sure it's so, or else we risk pretending to have achieved 
something we haven't. Even if we found that securing a cognitive 
structure is the best way to ensure growthful experience in 
general, we'd need to be sure that growth in other ways played a 
minimal role in the securing of that structure. [8] Finally, we’d 
have to be sure that securing that structure was not only 
necessary, but also sufficient, to advance all the paths of growth 
we might value, such as imagination, creativity, practical skill, 
aesthetics, and compassion, to name a few. 
Unless all our practical and experimental experience 
convinces us otherwise, a definition of development that puts all 
its eggs in one basket is of limited use to education. A more 
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differentiated and integrated definition, on the other hand, 
permits educators to hold distinct aims for different "growth- 
paths”, yet see connections between them, and co-ordinate them 
within a unified educational plan. 
Finally, a useful definition of development ought to be able 
to make use of a variety of psychological frameworks, and co- 
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ordinate their various conceptions of change within a unified 
ethical framework. This follows from the previous point, if one 
observes that different psychological models pay more or less 
attention to different aspects of experience. Psychological theorists 
have the luxury of selecting the angle from which they wish to 
study humanity; educators are confronted with a global array of 
goals, situations, and complexities. A cognitive-structural model 
may be the best tool for explaining why students reason in 
certain ways in democratic school meetings, why adults and 
teenagers don’t reason the same way, or why a science program 
based on concrete experiments works best for 7th graders. But it 
may be a cumbersome or simply inadequate tool when it comes 
to explaining why positive reinforcement helps students to make 
use of any reasoning structure at all instead of their fists. 
Artificial intelligence models, psycho-therapeutic models, 
and ecological models are all of potential use to educators in 
specific circumstances. No matter what model one uses, however, 
one is still left with having to justify changes explained by these 
models as serving developmental ends. An overarching ethic 
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enables us to make use of a mechanistic model, for example, 
without thereby raising the specter of treating people like 
machines. 
The two preceding points have emphasized the need for 
universalizability in a definition of development useful to 
educators. It is worth making a final point about the need for 
prescriptivity in such a principle. In pursuing an agenda for 
education at great variance with that which is usually pursued in 
one's culture, it is easy to allow, if only from force of habit, the 
encroachment into one's work of all kinds of practices that 
contribute little to development, or that detract from it. A 
strongly prescriptive definition of development not only provides 
justification for practice that may oppose cultural trends, but 
permits a solid critique of practices that cannot enlist such 
justification. Perhaps most importantly, educators are faced with 
a host of individual and social realities which frequently represent 
regression or stagnation rather than progression. To retain a 
vision of an autonomous ideal process which can be expressed not 
just as a far-off goal, but as an immediate next step in that 
goal's direction, cannot but exert an inspiring influence. 
F. Limits of the Inquiry 
1. I will not undertake a defense of the position that 
development, as opposed to transmission of the culture, or 
preparation for adult life, or some other idea, ought to be the 
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aim of education. I will consider this defense to have been 
adequately presented by Kohlberg (1972) and Dewey (1916, 1938a). 
I will limit myself to the defense of a particular way of defining 
what constitutes "development". 
2. I accept Kohlberg's position rejecting value-relativism and 
value-neutrality as educational philosophies (1972, pp. 138- 
139,144; 1971, pp. 156-163). I also accept his definition of a 
"formalist" defense of an ethical position. 
3. I will make no case for a particular set of explanatory 
mechanisms or cause-and-effect relationships regarding how or 
why development happens or doesn’t happen ("theories", following 
Reese and Overton, 1970, p.124). To the extent that my ethical 
theory rests upon concepts borrowed from psychological "models" 
(again following Reese and Overton’s definition, p.117), 1 will 
attempt to provide an ethical rationale for their use. 
4. I will make no case for a particular educational model or 
set of educational practices. To determine precisely what sort of 
educational intervention will be most developmental for a 
particular individual or group, within a particular culture, at a 
specific historical moment, requires the weighing of many 
factors, including who the educators are. 1 shall show how my 
definition of development in fact leads one to reject the usual 
habit of deciding what our practice will be in advance of weighing 
all these factors. 
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5. I will not make a case for orthogenesis as a path of 
spiritual development sui generis. To the extent that spiritual 
development is immanent in the development of all realms of 
human experience, it will be served by a discussion of those 
realms. To the extent that spiritual growth alludes to that which 
transcends ideas, feelings, time, or change, it would not be well 
served, in my view, by a conceptual treatment here. 
6. It is not my intent to make a case for orthogenesis as 
relevant to a wide range of human experience by compiling a 
comprehensive encyclopedia of the varieties of such experience. 
Rather, 1 will provide examples of aspects of experience which are 
of sufficent number and contrast so as to illustrate my point. 
Those aspects will be emphasized which have the most pressing 
ethical significance within education. Therefore, the development 
of sensori-motor perception, for example, will not be referred to 
extensively, except by way of analogy. 
G. Strategy of the Inquiry 
The dissertation is presented in five chapters, of which this 
is the first. 
The second chapter is an analysis and interpretation of the 
orthogenetic idea as found in the works of Heinz Werner, Jean 
Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, and John Dewey. Many concrete 
examples of orthogenetic change, taken from the works of 
Werner, Piaget, Kohlberg, and Dewey, are provided in this 
chapter. 
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The third chapter begins with my own summary of the 
orthogenetic principle, and a summary of the claims which I 
make and do not make for it. I then proceed to a justification of 
orthogenesis on both genetic-functional and formal grounds, with 
an explanation of the relationship between the two modes of 
justification. 
The fourth chapter explores how the orthogenetic principle 
may aid in the formulation educational problems and their 
solutions. In the first part of this chapter I construct, 
extrapolating from the orthogenetic principle, a partial 
framework of ethical assumptions which the educator ought to 
make or refrain from making about the nature of development. I 
argue that such a framework can be employed by educators to 
ethically co-ordinate the eclectic use of a variety of 
developmental theories. In the second part of the chapter I 
introduce a partial set of considerations, also deduced from the 
orthogenetic principle, which educators can use to further the 
development of their inquiry into the nature of educational 
problems and solutions. 
The fifth chapter sets forth recommendations for further 
research and action. In particular, I make a plea for a more 
developed relationship between developmental science and 
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education, and for the creation of more educational enterprises 
conceived of as "developmental contexts." 
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Notes 
1. This Holds Tor models tnat make a clear theoretical distinction 
between change" and "development". Some authors define 
development" through a more tenuous theoretical "screen". 
Spiker (1966), for example, defines it as "those changes in 
behavior which normally occur with an increase in the 
chronological age of the child"; "...the term ‘developmental’, 
used in this way, is no more or less abstract or theoretical 
than the terms ‘behavior’ or ‘chronological age'." (p.41) 
2. For analyses of the organismic paradigm, with comparisons of 
it to other paradigms, see Dixon and Lerner, 1984; Hayes, 
1985; Reese and Overton, 1970, and Overton and Reese, 1973. 
Dixon and Lerner separate developmental psychology into five 
genealogical branches, all descending from Darwin: * 
organismic, psychoanalytic, mechanistic, contextual, and 
dialectic. 
3. In keeping with Dixon and Lerner's typology, I have 
distinguished the organicism of Werner and Piaget from the 
maturationism of psychologists such as Gesell, and also from 
the psychoanalytic theories of Freud and Erikson. While 
Piaget does not make use of the term "orthogenesis" per se, 
his use of integration and differentiation as defining terms of 
development is virtually identical to Werner's (Piaget, 1971, 
p.72, p.356). 
4. Thus Lerner and Kauffman (1985), in seeking a possible 
integration of organismic and contextual developmental 
psychology, argue for "prescriptive" (p.324) definitions of 
development of use to both paradigms. They cite the 
orthogenetic principle as one example of such a definition 
(p.317). Yet they hold such a prescription to be of heuristic 
value only. They explicitly disavow any larger ethical 
implication in such a prescription: "our intent is to be 
neutral here in regard to the issue of the role of ideal 
progressions or categories in defining development" (p.319). 
5. l will not recapitulate Kohlberg's argument for preferring 
progressivism as an educational ideology over cultural 
transmissionism, industrial psychology, or romanticism 
(1972). The notion at the heart of progressivism is that the 
search for progressive adaptation to problems in experience 
defines the essence of both ethics and education. 
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6. As Eddy points out (personal communication), Kohlberg does 
make use of a genetic-functional (or adaptational) argument 
when he argues for universal and prescriptive principles as 
promoting the process of "coming to agreement" among 
people. This may be what Eddy is referring to as the "germ" 
of a genetic-functional Justification which "lies dormant" in 
Kohlberg’s theory, but which "for various reasons..is never 
allowed to grow" (1986, p.75). It is this aspect that will 
receive clarification and strengthening in this thesis. 
7. For example, research might discredit the notion that people 
move through an invariant sequence of stages, without 
discrediting the standard by which a sequence was deemed 
developmental. 
8. Certainly Kohlberg acknowledges the influence of historical 
context (1971, p.178), empathy (p.220), and the structure of 
the immediate social environment (p.190) in shaping 
cognitive experience and development. 
CHAPTER II 
THE IDEA OF ORTHOGENESIS IN THE WORKS OF HEINZ WERNER, 
JEAN PIAGET, LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, AND JOHN DEWEY 
A. Heinz Werner's Concept of Orthogenesis 
1. Introduction 
My aim in this section is to summarize the notion of 
orthogenesis as originated by Heinz Werner and his principal 
collaborator, Bernard Kaplan. Kaplan and Werner co-author a 
number of the texts cited (1956; 1963a,b,c,d), and are assumed to 
share the views therein. 
Werner uses orthogenesis as a "formal regulative 
principle.. .not designed to predict developmental courses in their 
specificity" (1957, p.130). It is an abstraction designed to allow us 
to compare developmental processes in their "manifold 
manifestations" (p.125) across the widest possible variety of 
domains. Within developmental psychology, it provides a 
"conceptual framework" for perceiving "characteristics common to 
any kind of mental activity in the process of progression or 
regression" (p.126). It is a standard by which we can judge 
change as progressive or regressive. 
It is not clear whether Werner intends orthogenesis to be an 
ethical idea, prescribing the direction of desirable change. Werner 
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certainly provides no philosophical justification for orthogenesis. 
In his later, independent work, Kaplan asserts that "development, 
as distinct from change, has been and ought to be an axiological 
and normative notion" (1983a, p.204). Yet Kaplan makes no 
claims for the orthogenetic principle as an ethically prescriptive 
definition of development. 
2. The Form of Orthogenesis 
a. Four Descriptive Concept-Pairs 
Werner uses four bi-polar opposites to explicate the form 
taken by increasing differentiation and integration. Orthogenesis 
involves movement from the SYNCRETIC to the DISCRETE, from 
the DIFFUSE to the ARTICULATE, from the RIGID to the FLEXIBLE, 
and from the LABILE to the STABLE. 
The differentiation side of orthogenesis is reflected in the 
syncretic-discrete and diffuse-articulate pairs. On the functional 
side, as individuals develop, they move from modes of thought, 
action, feeling, and perception which are fused with one another, 
to modes in which the various functions and purposes of the 
organism can be separated out at will. For example, in dreams, 
which represent a return to a less developed mode, people who in 
waking life would be perceived as separate may be lumped 
together into a single person. A child's mind will not separate out 
various sensory impressions, giving rise to statements such as 
"the leaf smells green”. A developing person would cease to 
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confuse his own feelings with those he imagines to be held by 
other people, or by God. A child can actually consider (as opposed 
to the way an adult would poetically imagine it) a "few wisps of 
straw to be a doll or a bit of wood to be a horse" because "the 
affective and motor behavior of the child impresses itself upon 
the world and fashions it" (1948, p.65). There is no distinction 
made between the imagined world and a more "factual" reality. 
The syncretic-discrete pair is used to describe the content, the 
"acts and meanings" (p.54) of the individual as they appear to 
him. 
The diffuse-articulate pair refers to a formal assessment of 
the whole structure being employed. While the process of 
becoming more discrete involves the distinguishing of a single 
function from the fused, syncretic whole, the concept of 
articulation looks at the degree to which a structure is divided up 
into component parts. The first pair focuses on the "singling out" 
of the one, the second on the "dividing up" of the whole. 
Therefore, a notion of music which includes distinguishable notes, 
harmonies, etc. is more articulated than one which consists of 
diffuse "sliding tonal movements" (p.54). Generally, a child is less 
able to distinguish nuances (p.98) of tone, color, emotion, and so 
on, than is an adult. Syncretic-discrete and diffuse-articulate 
appear to be two angles from which the same basic phenomena 
are described by Werner's model. 
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Linking the two concept-pairs associated with differentiation 
to the two associated with integration are the notions of 
"HIERARCHIZATION" and “SUBORDINATION*' (p.55). It is not merely 
the separating out of individual functions from others, nor the 
division of an overall structure into distinguishable parts, but the 
control of some functions by others, and the co-ordination of 
articulated parts by a centralization within the "gestalt”, that 
denotes development. For example, one becomes able to separate 
the aesthetic experience of "ugly" from the ethical experience of 
"bad" as one’s conceptual schema are able to override aesthetic 
reactions: "just because he's ugly doesn't mean he's bad". 
The pairs rigid-flexible and labile-stable are used to 
characterize the movement toward increasingly integrated 
systems of thought, emotion, and so forth. Rigidity and lability 
are seen as interdependent attributes of less developed systems. 
This is because the rigidity of the system is related to the 
syncretic and uncontrollable (not subordinated) attachment of 
aspects that would be distinguishable in a higher system. As one 
aspect changes, the other is forced to change also. There is no 
freedom of movement, no independence. Thus rigidity, rather 
than promoting stability, is associated with instability or lability. 
Werner gives the example of the "all-or-nothing schema of 
young children, who see a whole series of ritualized (rigid) action 
related to getting fed, or getting dressed, or going to bed, as an 
inseparable whole, and will go into hysterics (become unstable) if 
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there is any deviation from the pattern (pp.206-7). He further 
gives the example of the boy whose idea of someone’s personality 
was attached to their clothes; if his father appeared in unusual 
attire (e.g., a tuxedo), he thought that his father had become his 
grandfather! (p.445) 
Movement in the direction of increased stability, on the 
other hand, involves increased flexibility; it means that one can 
distinguish essentials from non-essentials, and not allow the latter 
to influence one's attitude toward the former. To overcome 
racism, for example, is to attain to stability of respect for 
personality without being thrown off by the color of someone's 
skin, one is simultaneously freed from the rigidity of stereotypes 
based on race, and can flexibly deal with each person as an 
individual (this is an example of my own invention). 
Flexibility implies "the use of one rather than another of 
several potential means" based on either "free voluntary choice" 
or on a response to a situation where "the normally preferred 
means for the attainment of an end is blocked" (1963a, p.135). It 
also implies the ability to make use of and directly experience 
earlier stages even though they are subordinated under later ones 
(see p.6 above). Associated with stability and flexibility are the 
notions of FIXITY and MOBILITY of developmental level. Increasing 
stability involves an increasing fixity of mental operations, a 
tendency to routinize various patterns, and to extend, or 
differentiate "horizontally" (1957, p.138) the routines of a given 
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stage of development across a variety of interactions. In order for 
this necessary movement towards "automatization of response” to 
avoid becoming "rigidity of behavior", it must be 
"counterbalanced by the polar principle of mobility" (p.138). This 
involves the increasing ability of the organism to employ a 
greater vertical" differentiation, or the application of a wider 
variety of developmental levels, primitive as well as advanced, to 
a particular situation. This idea is intimately connected with the 
underlying assumption of spirality, whereby "one has to regress 
in order to progress" (p.139). An example of fixity and mobility 
acting harmoniously might be found in any creative work, which 
relies upon automatic habits of skill and thought, yet where 
original and fresh vision also depend upon an ability to "de¬ 
differentiate" those very constructions. Mobility is not the same 
as lability, since it is intentionally co-ordinated by the individual, 
and contributes to an even larger stability by providing a range 
of options for problem-solving and expression. 
A key assumption connected with flexibility, and integration 
in general, is "autonomization" (1963b, p.487), which involves 
autonomous control and choice. Werner gives many examples of 
"synaesthesia", (1948, Ch.2) wherein children, adults in primitive 
cultures, schizophrenics, or people under the influence of drugs 
"hear" colors, "feel" sounds or shapes drawn on paper, and so 
forth. What characterizes the less developed state is the 
CONSTRAINT due to an INABILITY to make any distinction 
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between color and form; the example is given of the 
schizophrenic who could use the alphabet only by means of an 
accompanying color and personal association (with an object or 
place) (p.91). As development progesses, one gains the ability to 
make such distinctions, gaining greater stability and flexibility. 
One of the problems of increased fixity at the level of 
symbolic thought is that one pays a price; one loses the ability 
to experience the world synaesthetically. This accurately describes 
the condition of most adults in Western society. It would 
constitute further development to be able to make fuller use of 
synaesthesia for artistic or other purposes, yet not be at its 
mercy. In keeping with Werner’s dialectical model, such further 
development would represent a spiral synthesis of the original 
synaesthetic mode and the more developed, yet antithetical, 
"geometric-technical" or rational-logical mode. 
b. The Concept of Prlmltlvltv 
Werner studies development within a bi-polar framework 
which compares an "original state" to a "final state". Primitivity 
represents the "original state". The term refers to a complex of 
thought, feeling, behavior, and perceptual schema which are 
characterized by syncretism, diffusion, rigidity, and lability in 
comparison with functionally analogous schema which are more 
discrete, articulated, flexible, and stable. 
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Werner (1956, pp. 88-94) takes great pains to avoid "five 
closely interwoven confusions" regarding his use of the concept of 
primitivity. First, Werner does not attach any "moralistic and 
normative connotation to the word. Leaving aside Werner's 
putative claim that orthogenesis, or development, itself has no 
value-implications, primitivity as a force may help as well as 
hinder overall development: "instrumentally, primitivity may 
function now to prevent the organism from achieving certain 
ends, or again to enable the organism to achieve other ends" 
(p.89). This is in keeping with the previous discussion of stable 
flexibility and spirality. Werner makes a point of acknowledging 
"the instrumental necessity of primitive processes for certain 
highly valued activities of Western man" (p.93). 
Second, primitivity, like orthogenesis, is not time-bound. 
While, empirically speaking, the passage of time generally brings 
movement from primitive to less primitive schema, it is 
orthogenesis, and not time, which defines the movement as 
progressive. 
Third, the word primitivity may be used in its capacity as 
"an ideal construct", or it may be used to describe "the typical 
mode of functioning" of an actual individual or culture. When it 
is used to describe actual occurrences, it is strictly because the 
phenomena conform to the concept, not because one has an idea 
in advance that certain people or groups are "primitive . 
Further, by giving examples of cultures in which most people 
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think and act in a primitive manner, Werner does not assume in 
advance that all individuals in that culture would be incapable of 
further development. 
Fourth, the concept does not imply any statements in 
advance of empirical inquiry about the conditions which give rise 
to or maintain primitivity. It is not assumed in advance of 
inquiry, for example, that a society which uses less sophisticated 
technology will exhibit general primitivity in their mental life. 
Nor is this assumed of, for example, a preliterate society. 
These would be hypotheses subject to empirical test. 
Finally, it is not assumed that there are two "types of 
mentality", primitive and non-primitive. Primitivity as a term 
may be applied to specific features of mentality, leaving open the 
possibility that someone who exhibits primitivity in some respects 
may not in others. Also, it leaves open the possibility that 
primitive schemata operate in individuals at all ages, in all 
cultures. A "primitive culture" would be one in which most 
people operated "homogeneously on a primitive level" (p.93) over 
the range of mental life. In Western culture, "the mentality of 
members. . .is more likely to be stratified, and to show a wider 
range of forms of thought" (ibid.), including primitive forms. 
Werner draws formal parallels between primitivity as 
characterizing the dominant schemes employed by adults in 
primitive cultures, children in advanced cultures, mentally ill 
adults in advanced cultures, and normal adults in advanced 
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cultures when under the influence of drugs such as mescaline or 
LSD. Parallels are drawn further between these schemes and the 
primitivity of auxiliary schemes employed by adults in advanced 
cultures, which of course may either reflect a holdover from 
childhood or a belief persisting in the culture (for example, 
otherwise rational adults may hold to pet superstitions, especially 
in times of stress). 
Werner is careful, however, to remind us of key differences 
between these various categories of people as regards primitivity. 
It is by no means his intention to equate the healthy adult of 
primitive culture with the children or mentally ill of our own 
culture. Children in our culture are changing and developing 
within the context of "an alien world of adults" which they will 
someday join. Primitive adults have arrived at a relatively fixed 
level of development within a world similarly fixed by tradition 
which is their own. (1948, p.26). 
Further, the primitive adult "lives in a world to which he is 
admirably adjusted", (p.34) while the mentally ill person in 
advanced culture suffers within a world to which he has become 
maladjusted. Also, the mentally ill person, having "retrogressed" 
from previous developmental gains, will show "signs of the higher 
level" which remain. Werner’s example here is the comparison of 
the primitive man and the aphasia sufferer who have no ability 
to use the concept of "knife". In the primitive man's case, the 
notion of "knife" is completely bound up with the specific kind of 
45 
knife, and perhaps the specific thing to be done with it, or 
material upon which it is to be used. He may have dozens of 
words instead of one, or a word for each single concrete object. 
The aphasiac, on the other hand, has experienced a loss of 
language, and may use a substitution, such as "something-to- 
cut-with” plus a gesture, to compensate for the loss, while 
retaining certain traces of the abstract thinking from which (he) 
has degenerated" (p.35). The mentally healthy child who has no 
such concept is of course surrounded by those who do, and 
through interaction with his world will construct his own concept 
in the normal course of events. In the following examples, 
comparisons may be made between these various "sources" of 
primitivity, so it is important for Werner's distinctions to be kept 
in mind. 
3. The Content of Primitivity 
cl .Strategy..of.. Presentation.. 
Werner's strategy for describing the content of orthogenesis 
was to present examples of primitivity within children, 
psychopaths, and primitive adults, and contrast these with more 
developed modes. (This is in contrast with the approach of 
Kohlberg, for example, who would show orthogenesis through the 
life span of a given individual.) It will therefore be most efficient, 
as well as most evocative of Werner's method, to adopt a 
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comparable strategy here. Examples of primltivity will be 
presented, followed by examples of how development out of 
primitivity represents movement in the direction of increasing 
integration and differentiation. 
b. Examples of Prlmltlvitv 
i. Primitive thought 
Primitive language and thought is seen as highly syncretic, 
diffuse, labile, and rigid in a number of ways, as compared to 
advance language and thought: 
For the primitive Trobrianders, there is one word for a 
"good gardener", one for a "bad gardener"; each concept is "self- 
contained", (1956, p.96) incapable of being further modified (e.g., 
by adjectives) without changing the entire concept. There is also 
no way to connect two states of the same object in time by 
means of a co-ordinating concept which posits the object as 
having an independent temporal existence; a yam that changes 
to a different state of ripeness is called something else, and is 
considered an entirely different object. 
This is linked to a style of thought in which objects are not 
differentiated from their contexts. A concept refers to an entire 
"tableau", wherein the object, the use of the object, the person 
using the object, etc. are all collapsed into the same concept. The 
Navaho, for example, has one idea of "give" for giving things that 
are bundled up, and one for giving things that are bulky and 
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round, etc. (1956, p.103). The idea of a hypothetical or 
representative concept apart from concrete reality is absent. A 
primitive adult asked to translate the phrase "the white man 
shot six bears in one day” was simply unable to do so because, as 
he explained, a white man could not possibly shoot six bears in 
one day! 
Primitive language, or the language used by children or the 
mentally ill, is less differentiated from other modes of 
communication or experience. Gesture and tone cannot be 
divorced from the meaning of the word, as it is in advanced 
written language. Written language among primitive people or 
the mentally ill is closely bound up with a pictorial or physically 
suggestive representation. The symbols (for primitive adults) or 
letters (for the patient) are closer to being expressions of 
emotionally-charged physical acts. 
Drawing to a large extent upon Piaget's work, Werner shows 
how primitive thought is incapable of conceiving of objects in 
anything but an immediate concrete fashion, and how it is 
incapable of co-ordinating two ideas within a subordinating 
symbolic concept, as shown by children's responses to "double 
relationship" problems: 
'"Edith is lighter than Suzanne; Edith is darker than Lily. 
Which is the darkest - Edith, Suzanne, or Lily?' These are 
typical answers: Fo (9:4), 'You can't tell because it says 
that Edith is the lightest and the darkest.' Gu (13:9), 
"Once Suzanne is the darkest and once Edith is, so 
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Suzanne is the same as Edith, and Lily is the lightest 
(1948, p.317) 
The diffuse, concrete mode of thought" (ibid.) involves a 
one-track, relationship": the child focuses on one aspect of the 
problem, and ignores others. This leads to a lability, or 
inconsistency, regarding solutions to problems. If the problem 
given above were re-worded, without in the least changing the 
facts, the child would be likely to come up with a different 
answer. 
ii. Primitive aesthetic and sensory experience 
Werner gives the label of PHYSIOGNOMIC PERCEPTION to 
ways of seeing the world which impute color, emotion, sound, 
tactile sensation, movement, and even taste or smell to thoughts 
or external objects which do not emanate those properties 
perceived from a "matter-of-fact", objective, "geometric- 
technical" perspective. (1948, p.69) Such perception, while present 
in some adults of advanced cultures, is dominant in primitive 
adults, children, and some of the mentally ill. It also can come to 
the fore under the influence of drugs: 
* A picture of a parallelogram is perceived by a child as 
being "cruel". Another child sees a cup lying on its side, and says, 
"poor, tired, cup!" (p.73) 
* A schizophrenic looks fearfully at some swinging doors 
and exclaims, "That door is devouring me!" (p.8l). 
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* An experimental subject under the influence of mescaline 
sees one tree as "showering down" and another as "striving 
upwards . Baudelaire, under the influence of hashish, comments 
that that which in the brain of the poet would be only a 
completely natural simile becomes a fact. In the tree one’s 
passions, longing, or melancholy come to life; its sighs and 
tremblings become one's own, and soon one is the tree itself." Of 
course, the advanced adult under intoxication is in the peculiar 
position of being able to comment rationally on an experience 
after or even during it. Werner's point is that what is being 
experienced is a reversion to an earlier mode of seeing the world. 
iii. Primitive emotions 
Primitive emotions are themselves less articulated from one 
another. The small child begins with a tiny and diffuse repertoire 
of emotions, consisting of distress, delight, and undifferentiated 
excitement. The wide variety of shades of emotion comes only 
with development. As mentioned above, the same principle holds 
for the articulation of sensory and motor abilities and 
experiences. 
Emotion and physical experience are closer knit in 
primitive thought. Melanesians express shame by saying "my 
forehead is biting me"; "her bowels long for it is an expression 
following loss for the Australian Arandas. Werner makes the point 
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that for these people, these are not merely idioms, but actual 
experiences. 
iv. Primitive action 
Primitive action is characterized by the rigid and labile "all- 
or-nothing" schema previously mentioned: "Many aborigines are 
unable to begin their songs at any point in the text, but always 
have to commemce anew at the very beginning or fail 
completely". Such rigid schema are also bound up in a magical 
view of the world: "ritualistic activities are known as 
indissoluable totalities.... any disruption of the form... a 
stumbling, a stuttering, or even a pause - often occasions a 
magical inadequacy". This applies to the rites of primitive tribes 
steeped in ancient tradition as well as to the idiosyncratic rites of 
children associated with meals, bedtime, etc. 
In children and the mentally ill, as well as primitive adults, 
objects are frequently seen and described as "things-of-action" 
(1948, p.59). An infant given a round rattle instead of his 
customary square one "tried in vain to find and bite the 'corners' 
of the round rattle" (p.65) since his perception of the rattle was 
not so much optical or tactile, but bound up in the action 
performed with it. The rattle is a "something-to-be-bitten", non¬ 
existent as a thing outside that "motor-affective" schema. A 
schizophrenic patient was unable to "recognize a key presented to 
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him as an isolated object", yet recognized it as soon it was used 
to turn a lock. 
In very young children, motivation is limited to responses 
to "vital drives", or "concrete signals of the milieu"; there are no 
"genuinely personal motives" (p.194). It is only as a result of 
development that a child begins to exercise choice independently 
of such forces, and "experience a desire to solve some particular 
task confronting him" (p.195). Similarly, the more primitive the 
thought, the less there is any kind of involvement with external 
objects in any purposeful way. At first, infants are unable to 
execute movements specifically organized with the intent of, for 
example, removing a cloth from the face. As children mature, 
their next actions are limited to objects in their immediate 
presence. Only with further development are children able to use 
planning to execute a foreseen end, such as building a tower of 
blocks. The inability of primitive thought to engage in planning 
has to do with inability to differentiate self from object, as well 
as an inability to integrate (or co-ordinate) a notion of something 
not immediately present in time and space with the concrete 
reality. 
v. Primitive relationship to Nature (the physical 
universe) 
Perhaps the core attribute of primitivity is the fusion of 
subject and object. "The world is separated only slightly from the 
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ego, it is predominately configurated in terms of the emotional 
needs of the self (egomorphism). But, conversely, the ego, seen 
from the opposite angle, is highly susceptible to the emotional 
stimulation from the milieu” (1948, p.361). 
The view of the world that is fashioned by a primitive mind 
which cannot distinguish that world from its own needs and 
impulses is labeled MAGICAL by Werner. This view manifests itself 
in a variety of ways, which are all characterized by: 1) a 
syncretic fusion of the individual’s cognitive-affective-sensory- 
motor needs and the properties of the world; 2) a diffuse or 
unarticulated view of the world's laws of functioning (e.g., 
causation); 3) a labile conception of the world and objects, 
wherein these change according to the needs of the subject; and 
4) a rigid adherence to a traditional, superstitious, or 
idiosyncratic formula for interacting with the world: 
* ANIMISM and PERSONIFICATION are aspects of the magical 
world. These are to be distinguished from the "genuine realistic 
personifications" (p.77) of the poet or even the average advanced 
person. (Lots of people give their cars or computers personal 
names, but fundamentally know that they are inanimate 
objects). "A 5-year old girl is asked by her mother during a 
thunderstorm: 'What does the thunder look like?' The child 
replies: "He has a head, but no eyes and no nose or mouth.' 
'Then how does he look?' 'Oh, he looks like this...' and the child 
makes an angry face and draws her brows together" (ibid.). 
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* The anthropomorphization of nature is coupled with the 
naturalization of the personality” (p.353) in magical thinking A 
medicine man, in order to bring rain, "transforms himself into 
nature , in this case, the thunder and lightning, performing 
actions to simulate their activity (ibid.); "the need for the magic 
control of natural events may lead to an anthropomorphic 
presentation of nature, or,... man himself stands for nature, 
actually becomes it" (p.354). 
* "The sphere of a fictitious, POETIC reality appears to be 
less differentiated from the reality of everyday life in the case of 
the child" (p.394, emphasis in original). Children may actually 
believe in "a far-off fairyland", for example. As they develop, 
children may still believe in such things, but begin to distinguish 
them from the everyday reality: "Is that just in fairyland, or is 
it really where we are?" (ibid.) 
* "We again encounter the DIFFUSENESS of the 
schizophrenic thought process in the psychotic conception of 
causality. As in the case of primitive man, differentiation 
according to cause and effect, according to condition and 
consequence, is supplanted by.. .THINKING IN TERMS OF FATE" 
(p.335, emphases in original). The mentally ill will perceive 
happenings in the world as omens, or signs of personal destiny. 
Such a scheme "precludes any self-contained single things and 
events within a causal complex". It is impossible for the primitive 
mind to separate single events from the "global quality-of-fate" 
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(p.336). Someone who believes that evil is pursuing him, for 
example, will see signs of this pursuit within all manner of 
events. 
* The obverse side of this fusion of ego and world is the 
notion that one s own actions affect everything. Werner refers to 
this as "achievement magic" or "creative magic", which is a 
'magic by analogy" (p.365). Sacrifices, oracles, and magic 
talismans or amulets are all examples of an individual believing 
that a particular act or achievement, or failure to perform such, 
will have larger consequences. Werner stresses that this does not 
"entail the use of any sort of remote symbolism": the catatonic 
patient who "keeps the 'wheel of the world' in motion by circular 
movements of his own body" is living a "concrete reality", 
influenced by a "real magical event, one stripped of the 
metaphorical" (p.372). 
* Magic objects, as in voodoo, have the power to influence 
faraway events. The individual may also be influenced by being 
close to magical objects. Werner gives the example of the 2-year- 
old child who believes that by combing himself with a black comb 
that he will get "nice black hair" (p.366). Objects from a magical 
perspective are labile in that they conform themselves to the 
subject's wishes and fears. Werner gives the example of the 
mentally disturbed who sees an advertisement in the newspaper, 
and twists its meaning to conform to his compulsion for self- 
destruction, taking it to be an instruction to kill himself. Lability 
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and rigidity go hand in hand, since the "fixed magical ideas" are 
what force the objects to conform. 
Werner is careful to distinguish the magical world-view 
from that of the religious MYSTIC in advanced culture (p.352). 
The attitude of the mystic is precisely to consider mysterious and 
outside the scope of ordinary knowledge a supernatural or 
spiritual realm as distinct from the realm of everyday 
occurrence. For the primitive mind, magical events are not 
something mysterious, but the simple facts of life. A religious 
person may offer prayers to a supernatural deity, believing that 
this deity has the power and discretion to hear these prayers and 
influence earthly events in accordance with them. But this is a 
developmental step up from the primitive person who directly 
and completely confuses his own needs and actions with unrelated 
objects and events in the material world. 
vi. Primitive relationship to others and society 
Primitive personality, as well as primitive ideas about the 
self and others, is also marked by syncretism, diffusion, rigidity, 
lability, and lack of hierarchization. The individual is not 
separated from the world, from the social order, or from a set of 
visible, concrete characteristics. 
Primitive tribes characterize members of other tribes as 
having a single attribute. For example, if a tribe practices 
cannibalism, they are considered to be descended from jaguars, 
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and the personality trait of "jaguar" is all that is necessary or 
admissible for their designation. (1948, p.419) STEREOTYPY of 
personality, or labeling of a person by a single trait, is dominant 
even within one’s own tribe. 
Personality is not differentiated from magic objects. A 
part of someone can be considered to reside within an object 
associated with that person in a magic rite, for example. 
Personality may also reside in a person’s property as well as in 
the person’s body: "if a tree is uprooted by a gale of wind, its 
owner will fall sick" (p.423). Werner uses the term "EGO-HALO" to 
refer to the diffusion of the individual's ego among family 
members, property, clothing, animals, etc. Voodoo depends on 
the idea that body excretions, nails, hair, etc. are all vital 
aspects of the personality. 
Personality is considered dependent upon social ceremonies. 
In primitive cultures, there is no gradual transition, through 
adolescence, from childhood to adulthood. At a certain age, there 
is a ceremony, and the personality is considered completely 
transformed from the child-being to the adult-being at that 
moment, (p.421) The lability of the personality is also manifested 
by the fact that a change of name is considered to affect it. For 
example, a small child asked its parents to change his sister’s 
name so that she could become a little boy (p.446). 
Primitive views of life after death highlight the way in 
which the personality is considered to be inseparable from the 
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entire social and physical environment. In the "happy hunting 
ground of some Native Americans, for example, people will 
essentially continue the same activities that occupied them in 
life. Paradise is a projection of earthly existence", since "only in 
his proper environment may the person be preserved in his 
totality" (p.423). 
There is little differentiation between intention and action. 
Werner appeals to Piaget's research to show how children consider 
the objective consequences of an act (eg., how big an ink blot is 
made on the tablecloth) as more important than whether the act 
was done purposefully, or with "good intentions", or by accident 
(p.444). The notion of intention as an essential aspect of right and 
wrong action is simply not differentiated out from the global, 
concrete quality of the act. Similarly, the example is given of the 
woman in a primitive culture whose son's life was demanded in 
recompense when the child of another family was burned to 
death in a fire that the woman had built outdoors to heat water. 
The fact that the woman had not the slightest intent to cause 
harm made no difference, (p.426) 
There is little differentiation between the physical and 
psychological or spiritual aspects of the individual. This is why, 
for example, in primitive cultures, washing oneself is considered 
to cleanse away evil qualities, not in a symbolic sense, but in a 
concretely real sense. Similarly, eating the flesh of a courageous 
animal is thought to impart courage. The purpose of "scalping" a 
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human enemy is to gain the bravery inherent in it. (pp. 427-433) 
It is crucial to distinguish the actual primitive conception from 
the recent trend in our culture to perceive interconnections 
between mind and body. The mystically-oriented American who 
participates in a "sweat-lodge" ritual may do so believing that the 
process of sweating and chanting will have an effect on his 
psychic life, but he does not believe that his psychic life is 
actually contained in his sweat droplets. 
The fact that personality is not distinguished from concrete 
action and physical substance makes it a "logical consequence" 
that people are not distinguished from animals, except perhaps as 
a "primus inter pares" (pp. 426-427). Animals certainly commit 
concrete actions and possess physical attributes; since this is all 
that is required for personality, animals are considered to have 
language like humans, as well as "personality"; "in the (primitive 
Brazilian Indian's) eyes the animal is as much a person as he is 
himself" (ibid.). This makes it quite plausible that an unpleasant 
person, for example, might actually be half human and half 
shark, or be a human by day and a wolf by night, etc. 
There is little INDIVIDUATION in the primitive personality, 
in that the person is not differentiated from his social milieu, or 
from concrete others. If a person gets sick, his relatives as well 
as he are expected to undergo a cure (p.433). A primitive man 
may actually fall sick because his wife is sick (p.434). Werner 
points out that waking life exhibits the same characteristics as 
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dreams, wherein people do not have stable identities, but are 
interchangeable with various "alter egos". In some African tribes, 
a child is not considered to have a personality separate from his 
father's until the rite of circumcision is performed. 
The syncretic structure formed by the unity of personality 
and milieu may refer to a relation not only between individual 
and individual, but also between individual and SUPERORDINATED 
SOCIAL UNITIES" (p.436, emphasis in original). Practically all of a 
primitive individual's actions are governed by the "powers of the 
social group", and not in the form of an distinct individual in 
contrast with a "superior social organism", but in a thoroughly 
"fused" way. Personal inclination or intimate bonds are not as 
important in determining behavior and thought as the fixed 
customs of the entire group. Obversely, the individual is 
considered to contain the totality: punishment for a crime 
committed by one person may be visited upon an entire clan. 
Marriage agreements bind not individuals, but entire families 
(p 437). 
The most important thing to the primitive individual is his 
status within the structure of custom, his PRESTIGE. His very 
personality is completely defined by this. Again, this is to be 
ditinguished from the egoistic or insecure individual in advanced 
culture whose sense of well-being is tied up in cultural approval. 
Even this person would have a notion that someone could, for 
example, "be a good person" yet not have a lot of social status. 
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There would also be a notion of oneself as a private individual 
standing in distinction from a superior social order. The primitive 
hunger for prestige, according to Werner, is Ma token of 
EGOCENTRISM , i.e., of a low degree of differentiation between 
individual and society, between the private and specifically social 
goal (p.440). 
Related to this view is the lack of any conception that the 
social order is changeable. "Where there is a rigid, immutable 
social pattern into which the individual is born and in which he 
must live without conflict or prospect of change, a true 
contradistinction between individual and social ends resulting in 
specific individuation is greatly hindered" (p.440). 
Werner (like Piaget) rejects the idea (epitomized, as it is for 
Piaget, by Durkheim's work) that the social order is the actual 
source of personality, and that the individual personality, 
through development, "emerges" from it, embodying the views of 
that order. To the extent that the primitive personality is 
"socialized", the social order is "personalized": it is not seen as 
something separate onto which personal desires are "projected". 
Rather, as with all egocentrism, the social milieu is "blurred"; it 
does not stand out as something with its own life any more than 
individuals stand out as having "rights" apart from the 
maintenance of custom. All is simply fused or collapsed into the 
person’s own desires and activity. With development, BOTH the 
individual and society "emerge" as reciprocal and polar elements. 
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through contradistinctive processes of differentiation" 
Characteristics of primitive personality formally similar to those 
seen in adults of primitive cultures can also be seen in children: 
the ego-halo , the lack of physical and psychical differentiation, 
the attachment of the personality to the action and feelings of 
family members, especially the mother, the egocentric "blurring" 
of the social milieu, and the rigid and labile view of rules, based 
on fear of punishment and pronouncements by authority. 
Further, in cases of psychopathology, particularly schizophrenia, 
there is analogous confusion of the self with others, with parts of 
the body, etc. 
As a transitional step up from the lowest primitive forms, 
higher primitive cultures, as well as developing children, manifest 
the notion of a "split" personality, wherein a "good" or “higher" 
self is distinguished from a "bad" or "lower" self. In certain tribes, 
for example, the belly is perceived as the seat of desire, while the 
eye or the chest give rise to "nobler feelings" (p.431). A small 
child may have a "naughty self", who he admonishes to be good, 
and blames for doing naughty things. A child might thereby talk 
"of himself, so to speak, simultaneously in the first and thrid 
person" (p.451). This initial differentiation, of course, does not 
entail a complete integration of the personality as would be 
achieved by further development, but it does entail an initial 
"centralization" of personality, a preliminary sort of integration 
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still based on ’magical" rules, whereby there is potential to bring 
the "bad self" under the domination of the "good self". 
The primitive personality, as defined by the individual's 
intentionality, self-perception, and view of others, goes hand-in- 
hand with the primitive view of the physical and social world. 
The central term used to describe the primitive personality is 
EGOCENTRISM. This term, like primitivity itself, has a highly 
specific meaning, developed and shared by European 
developmentalists like Werner and Piaget. In egocentrism, the 
views of "society", as conveyed by persons closest to the 
egocentric individual, are intimately bound up within the ego; at 
the same time, "the ego is the vividly dominant element standing 
out against a more or less blurred social background" (p.453). The 
egocentric individual cannot conceive of a world beyond that 
which immediately impinges upon his vital needs; at the same 
time, he is incapable of formulating a set of rules or standards 
apart from those given by the intimate authorities in control of 
his life, who are themselves only gradually perceived as existing 
independently. 
Egocentrism is not to be confused with egoism, which 
involves a "strongly individualized response that characteristically 
overrides the demands of the personal surroundings". The egoistic 
person is perfectly capable of understanding that there is a world 
and others apart from himself, and that there are things he 
wants which are separate from the wants of others or the 
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demands of the overall social situation. For Werner, "such a 
response is anything but childlike" (p.452). 
Werner points to certain "crises" in the development of the 
child which serve to increase the differentiation between ego and 
world. When the infant is weaned, an intimate link is severed 
which renders the world less immediately accommodating to the 
infant s impulses. During ages 2-3, the tendency of the world to 
exhibit an irreconcilable solidity" in the face of these impulses 
(based on gradual ego-world differentiation), "reaches its peak". It 
is the tension between more articulated and discrete ego-impulses 
and a reality which does not "magically" conform to these that 
provokes so much of the turmoil associated with this period. It is 
in this period that the child adapts by creating a code of "blind 
obedience" to authority, which remains egocentric in the sense 
that it is governed by the desire to promote personal pleasure and 
avoid pain and punishment (p.453). 
The egocentric personality becomes somewhat more 
sophisticated during childhood, as the individual needs become 
increasingly articulated. Identification with heroes, boasting, and 
approval of or affection for people based on instrumental ("what 
they can do for me") attitudes, come to the fore. But further 
development out of egocentrism is somewhat dependent upon the 
nature of the social milieu itself. In primitive culture, where the 
role of authority is immutable, egocentrism remains the rule 
throughout life. In cultures where authority is progressively 
64 
relaxed, children build upon co-operative experiences they have 
with their peers to elaborate a sense of the world which is more 
individuated, more uniquely "personal property". 
This provokes the third crisis, that of puberty or 
adolescence. The crisis is expressed as overt or secret mutiny 
against old authorities, a severing of the intimate bonds linking 
the child with the family, a withdrawal into a personal, secret 
life (p.456). Werner, rather than seeing this as entirely 
negative, perceives this crisis as "a preliminary for the 
establishment of a new relation between personality and society." 
However, the "expanding consciousness of personal responsibility" 
is what causes "the eternal conflict of generations within our own 
culture" (ibid.). 
4. Aspects of advanced mental life and the direction of 
orthogenesis 
a. The general character of orthogenetic movement. 
With increasing integration and differentiation, mental 
activities become increasingly DISCRETE. That is, they become 
distinguished from each other. Thought is distinguished from 
emotion, thought and emotion from perception, different modes 
of perception from each other, one's own thoughts and feelings 
from one's interpretation of another's, etc. Mental activities 
become increasingly ARTICULATED, i.e, capable of making finer 
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shades of distinction because they are possessed of more actual 
components. Examples are the greater variety of emotions, 
perspectives, symbolic categories, etc. Mental activities become 
more STABLE, i.e., more immune to the vicissitudes of 
environmental change, more autonomously motivated, and more 
centralized or co-ordinated. At the same time they become 
increasingly FLEXIBLE. They are more able to adjust to 
environmental changes without disintegration or uncontrolled 
regression, more capable of interacting with a extended range of 
environmental possibilities, and more autonomous from rigid 
internal habits of thought, emotion, etc. 
As a result of orthogenesis, the individual is more capable of 
making distinctions yet able to co-ordinate those distinctions 
objectively. What is essential is distinguished from what is non- 
essential. He is more autonomous, individuated, and self-directed 
yet more open to and able to incorporate a variety of 
perspectives. He can more easily and completely maintain 
integrity in the face of a greater variety of internal and external 
changes, yet also flexibly engage in a wider range of interactions 
with both the internal and external environment. In Werner's 
words: 
"... increasing subject-object differentiation involves the 
corollary that the organism becomes increasingly less 
dominated by the immediate concrete situation, the person 
is less stimulus-bound and less impelled by his own 
affective states. A consequence of this freedom is the 
clearer understanding of goals, the possibility of employing 
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substitutive means and alternative ends. There is hence a 
greater capacity for delay and planned action. The person 
is better able to exercise choice and willfully rearrange a 
situation. In short, he can manipulate the environment 
rather than passively respond to the environment. This 
freedom from the domination of the immediate situation 
also permits a more accurate assessment of others. The 
adult is more able than the child to distinguish between 
the motivational dynamics and the overt behavior of 
personalities. At developmentally higher levels, therefore, 
there is less of a tendency for the world to be interpreted 
solely in terms of one's own needs and an increasing 
appreciation of the needs of others and of group goals " 
(1957, p.127) 
In describing the state of primltivity, Werner outlines the 
requirements of primitivity as a formal, abstract concept, and 
then proceeds to give examples of actual individuals whose 
patterns of thought and action closely conform to those 
requirements. In speaking of a "primitive" culture, Werner uses 
the guideline that the preponderance of the thought of most 
people in the culture be primitive in nature. Overall, a fairly 
clear picture emerges of what Werner is using as the "original" 
pole of his comparative framework, both in theory and in 
actuality. 
Werner does not depict "advanced" mentality as a 
structurally uniform whole to the extent that he does in 
describing primitivity. This is because Werner sees earlier, 
primitive characteristics as being retained even as more advanced 
ones develop. For example, an otherwise rational person may 
retain a superstition about knocking on wood after saying 
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something hopeful. The existence of several developmental levels 
operating at once within an individual or culture is called "genetic 
stratification" or "developmental heterogeneity" (1957, p.145; cf 
Flavell, 1966, p.28, and Kaplan, 1966, p.37: "genetic levels"). In 
any case, my interest in orthogenesis as a direction does not 
depend on seeing it as a series of structurally—whole "stages”. 
Thus the following examples will usually be couched in terms of 
INCREASING qualities, rather than in terms of static 
characteristics. 
The label "advanced" follows the same restrictions as the 
label "primitive": it is a comparative term, with the basis for 
comparison adhering strictly to the "formal co-ordinates" 
(Langer, p.746) of orthogenesis. It is not assumed that advanced 
people are better than primitive people, or that we can 
determine in advance of inquiry the nature of someone's thought 
just because he is from a certain culture, or that people in 
adavnced cultures operate uniformly in an advanced way. It is, 
on the contrary, held to be likely that in more advanced 
cultures, the relationship between developmental levels within 
each person will vary from individual to individual. 
b. Examples of orthogenesis 
i. Symbolic thought 
At the heart of orthogenesis in thought and langauge is the 
formation of SYMBOLS. A symbol, in Werner's definition, is a 
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VEHICLE for representing an object or REFERENT by means of an 
intentionally established correspondence or analogy. For Werner, 
the distinctly human organismic end or goal is Knowing, and 
symbols are our vehicles for Knowing. Now, Werner’s 
constructivist view of Knowing involves the idea that "the human 
world cannot claim to reflect an independent 'reality per se1", but 
is, rather, a man-specific... representation of 'what there is' by 
means available to the human being" (1963b, p.472). 
Werner uses the terms "symbol" and "symbolic vehicle" 
interchangeably, but the latter term is meant to place more 
emphasis on the actual symbolic medium employed, the "sounds, 
lines, body movements, etc." (p.474) 
Werner distinguishes symbols from signs or signals. A sign 
or signal can elicit or inhibit behavior by anticipating an event, 
or substituting for it. But a symbol involves an intentional 
cognitive act which "implies some awareness, however vague, 
that vehicle and referential object are not identical but are, in 
substance and form, two totally different entities." (p.475) Thus a 
bell may be a SIGNAL which, by substituting for food, maKes a 
dog salivate, but the bell is not a SYMBOL for food. Throwing up 
one’s hands as a "simple and direct expression" (ibid.) of anger 
may be a SIGN of anger, but it cannot be properly called 
SYMBOLIC. The content of dreams, while symbolic for the 
psychoanalyst who consciously finds interpretative meanings 
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within them, are not symbolic for the dreamer because they are 
simply "taken as such". 
The orthogenetic power of the symbol lies in its "dynamic 
schematizing activity , which refers to the idea that symbols, 
including language, are not simply static "products" which exist 
as isolated units in a fixed world, but constitute an organizing, 
structuring ACTION, a "directive, regulative, form-building 
process (p.476) by which the organism creates and shapes a 
meaningful and changeable world. Symbols transcend the 
immediate expressive qualities of "sensory, postural, affective, 
and imaginal components of the organismic state" by creating a 
cognitive structure which "intertwines" and contains (integrates) 
these qualities yet remains flexibly independent of them, and in 
fact "shapes" them. For example, the word "contains" in the 
previous sentence draws upon certain motor-perceptual 
antecedents but can be used in a metaphoric sense which does 
not imply that anything substantial is actually "contained”. 
Symbols transform the human world from one of "things- 
of-action" (in primitive life) to one of "objects-of-contemplation". 
The symbolizing process involves an orthogenetic shift towards 
"polarization" of subject and object: the child comes to know 
objects as being outside himself, as having their own 
characteristics; he similarly comes to see his thoughts and 
feelings as being inside himself. The "expressive qualities" in 
objects are co-ordinated by the symbol in such a way that the 
70 
person can construct a notion of similarities between objects. 
Fires in general are hot; stoves, like fires, are hot; the sun is like 
a big fire or stove, etc. This integrative function is complemented 
by a differentiative one; only by means of symbolic thought can 
one distinguish between the metaphoric and the concrete. To the 
primitive mind, the ritual fire does not SYMBOLIZE the sun, they 
are one and the same. By using similes, metaphors, and and 
analogies, a person comes to reflect upon the world, rather than 
be completely bound up in it. Orthogenesis within symbolic 
thought "rests on twin form-building processes" (p.481). Not only 
are the referents (objects) increasingly organized in a meaningful 
way, but the vehicles (symbols) are increasingly organized within 
language, "the symbolic form par excellence" (p.482). Increasing 
integration and differentiation in symbolic thought are described 
in terms of a progressive "autonomization" and complementary 
"distancing" which occurs along four dimensions. 
First, there is the distancing between the person and the 
object, which has already been discussed. Symbolic thought shifts 
the person’s perception of the object from being dependent on its 
immediate external form or presence to being something that can 
be grasped by means of an "internalized cognitive schema" (1963c, 
p.492). The paradoxical yet logical result of this is that the person 
can conceive of both object and subject as having their own 
autonomous existence and qualities (A child’s ability to conceive 
of his mother as an autonomous being that comes and goes 
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depends on his ability to form a symbolic image of his mother 
when she is not there. At a more advanced level, one might 
consider as an example my mother's comment when I was a 
teenager that 1 would treat her more kindly if I "simply thought 
of her as a human being”). 
Second, there is progressive distancing between the person 
and the symbolic vehicle. Regarding the external form of the 
vehicle, the person becomes more able to use forms such as 
writing and speech which are more removed from immediate 
affective and sensori-motor levels, whereas earlier symbolic 
formswould include images and movements which are more 
closely tied to a highly personal, direct pragmatic action upon 
something. The person-independence" of forms such as speech 
make them suitable for social intercourse, for the "handing over" 
of meaning from one person to another (p.493). Regarding the 
internal form of the vehicle, meanings become less "private and 
idiosyncratic", which again means that communication becomes 
more possible, since symbols increasingly "serve to represent 
relatively the same content for the communicants" (p.494). 
Third, there is progressive distancing between the symbolic 
vehicle and its referential object. Whereas in primitive thought, 
words are considered to have a magical identity with the things 
they represent, development entails a separation of vehicles from 
their "thinglike" status. With regard to their external form, 
symbols lose their tendency to be drawn or spoken so as to 
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pictorially or onomatopoeically look or sound like the thing they 
represent. A more primitive symbol for "tree" would have to look 
more like an actual tree, whereas the word "tree" is independent 
of such a function. Similarly, the inner meaning of the symbol 
becomes less dependent upon a sensorially observable 
manifestation of the symbolic vehicle. Werner is careful to point 
out, however, that the connection between words and their 
synaesthetic, physiognomic associations are not completely 
severed. There are many examples of onomatopoeia in language, 
and when one learns a foreign language, it is precisely when one 
begins to feel at home within the motor-affective associations of 
words that one is approaching true fluency. It is the work of a 
poet to be hypersensitive to such associations. Here again we have 
an example of higher development entailing not a disjunction 
from prior forms, but a "distancing" WITH retained access. 
Finally, there is a progressive distancing between the 
"adressor" and the potential "addressee", in the sense that the 
developing symbolic structures enable communication with an 
"audience" further and further removed physically and in terms 
of common experience from the "speaker". This developmental 
aspect is closely interwoven with the previously mentioned notion 
that as symbolic vehicles develop, they become "more communal 
and less egocentric, idiosyncratic, and contextualized" (p.498). 
Werner recognizes that with people who are close to one another 
emotionally and otherwise, a highly personalized mode of 
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communication may be "adequate” (and presumably enriching), 
and that an identity of connotations between communicants 
becomes less likely with increasing psychological distance between 
them. With development, the individual will possess more 
flexibility to make use of both highly personal and highly 
universal forms, in an "integration of individual and 
transpersonal expressiveness" (p.500). With those further 
removed, the goal is to achieve a "consensus" of meaning 
whereby "the connotations evoked in both addressor and 
addressee occupy a COMPARABLE POSITION within each 
individual's PERSONAL network of meanings" (p.499, emphasis in 
original). 
As can be seen by the above examples, Werner's use of the 
terms "distancing" or "polarization" does not mean that with 
development, people are bound to become more distant and 
polarized from one another, or individuals from society, in the 
common-langauge meanings of those terms which imply mutual 
alienation. [1] The distancing and polarization that is referred to 
here is comparative or relative to an egocentric state in which 
other individuals and social institutions are not recognized as 
having their own existence whose effect upon the subject can be 
reflected upon, and upon which the subject sees himself as 
capable of acting. Within this frame of reference, increasing 
"distancing" is necessary for there to be true communication or 
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sharing of mutual experience BETWEEN individuals as opposed to 
the mere collapsing of others into the subject's "ego-halo-. 
ii. Aesthetic and sensory experience 
With orthogenesis, involuntary synaesthesia gives way to 
an increasing ability to differentiate between the senses, as well 
as a greater articulation within each sense. Older children can 
distinguish more colors and tones than younger ones (1948, p.98). 
It is also true, however, that in advanced cultures, symbols 
tend to supplant functions which, in primitive cultures, are 
fulfilled more directly by sensory experience. In one sense, the 
person brought up in a primitive culture has more "developed” 
sensory powers than the person from the higher culture. The 
more eidetic memory of certain primitive peoples permit them to 
draw excellent likenesses of animals and other familiar things in 
their world, as long as they follow a particular traditional 
drawing system (pp. 147-48). Eskimos can make unerring maps of 
long stretches of coastline by a similar process. The visual and 
olfactory tracking abilities of Bushmen are also, purely as sensory 
powers, far beyond what the average Westerner can achieve. 
Werner’s point is that such abilities are generally bound up in the 
specific milieu within which they are developed. They represent a 
"too perfect adjustment" of the individual to his surroundings, so 
that there is no "flexibility and freedom in unceasing attempt to 
readjust, which is the very life and essence of higher, advanced 
cultures" (p.19). These "superior" sensory abilities of primitive 
peoples represent a specialization on a more primitive level" as 
opposed to a continued development of "new means" (p.18). 
Werner wants us to consider the mental PROCESS behind an 
achievement , as well as the outer form of the achievement 
itself. 
People in advanced cultures lose some of the striking powers 
associated with such primitive specialization, but the symbolic 
means which replace them are less context-dependent and more 
flexible. Nonetheless, it would presumably constitute further 
development for a person in an advanced culture to cultivate 
these kinds of powers, and achieve a greater mobility of level. 
(This partially explains the attraction of the "Tarzan" myth, the 
man capable of the "best of both worlds"!). 
Werner uses the example of great artists like Kandinsky 
(p. 71) to point to a more mobile and integrated level of aesthetic 
development beyond the stage that most people in advanced 
culture achieve. Kandinsky could and did experience things 
synaesthetically, yet he could make use of language to convey his 
experiences "rationally" in words. In other artists, of course, such 
as the dramatist Strindberg (p.462), greater synaesthetic insight 
was accompanied by schizophrenia and a breakdown of rational 
thought. Orthogenesis in aesthetics, therefore, entails an 
increasing ability to be mobile between lower and higher ways of 
perceiving the world, accompanied by an increasing co-ordination 
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of the lower by the higher. The expressive metaphor, as 
conveyed by language and art, provides a vehicle lor 
communicating an integrated experience which can evoke a 
response at a variety of levels (intellectually, emotionally, 
sensorially, etc.) from a wide audience. 
iii. Emotions 
Orthogenesis in the emotional realm involves the increasing 
perception of emotions as being generated internally, and not as 
being inherent in the properties of external objects. Also, emotion 
is differentiated from the senses, so that, for example, the 
expression, "a sour person" is understood to be metaphor rather 
than an actual fusion of taste and affect. How one feels about 
someone becomes less dependent on how they look (1948, pp.83- 
85). Emotions become more articulated; an infant can only 
manifest a global "distress", a slightly older child adds fear and 
anger to this repertoire, and these are subsequently refined to 
include shame, anxiety, jealousy, disappointment, etc. (pp.86- 
87). 
Emotions also come increasingly under the co-ordination of 
the intellect (p.56b), and so the individual gains the ability to 
delay, moderate, or even abandon an emotional response as a 
result of reflection. Autonomy with respect to one's emotions is 
therefore a hallmark of development. One's bodily sensations that 
accompany emotion do not lead as much to "blind. 
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uncoordinated, momentary outbursts" (p,479), as in tantrums. 
The child develops more integrated and purposeful means of 
adapting to unpleasant situations (running away, hiding the (ace, 
argument, etc.). 
Emotions are also less attached to immediate and concrete 
events. One thereby becomes more emotionally open and 
receptive to images, imaginations, events far removed in time 
and space, etc. This, of course, creates its own new problems. As 
children grow, they are, for example, less afraid of loud sudden 
noises, but more afraid of dreams and "imaginary creatures" 
(p.480). Presumably, with further orthogenesis, the individual is 
progressively able to distance himself from emotional impulses 
even when these are connected to complex cognitive schemes. 
Werner does not spell out the nature of such a higher stage, 
however. 
iv. Action 
With orthogenesis, action becomes more INTENTIONAL and 
SPONTANEOUS compared to primitive forms, which are more 
automatic, rigid, and determined by the environment. The 
developing individual becomes increasingly directed by his own 
intentions as flexibly and voluntarily chosen from among an 
increasing number of possibilities. The ability to see one's society 
as distinct from oneself is a prerequisite of the ability to act more 
flexibly with respect to authority and tradition. The development 
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of symbolic abstraction, as in grouping operations, allows the 
subject to "shift his point of view during a deliberate grouping” so 
that he is "no longer passively subject to the forces of sensory 
stimulation" (1937, p.358). An older child, confronted with a 
group of shapes, is able to group them differently according to 
size, shape, or color, whereas a younger child cannot see how a 
piece might belong to more than one group 
One way to interpret the relationship between intentionality 
and integration-differentiation might be as follows: intentionality 
involves a differentiation between the individual’s internally 
integrated cognitive schema of "possibilities” and the immediate 
"given" quality of the physical or social environment. The 
integrative power of this schema lies in its ability to "dominate” 
and change the given external environment while simultaneously 
taking it into account". Thus the intentions, and their behavioral 
manifestations, do not stem from purely egoistic fantasies. Such 
fantasies, rooted in idiosyncratic internal attachments, are 
themselves differentiated from an intentional schema based upon 
a wider, more interactive, more objective set of environmental 
associations. This is an example of orthogenesis transforming the 
relationship of the organism to both the internal and external 
environment, so as to achieve a unity between inner and outer 
"results". 
Faced with a constantly shifting internal and external 
environment, intentionality allows the organism to maintain its 
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course despite emotional or cultural vicissitudes. Intellectually, 
diverse stimuli can be co-ordinated within a larger plan of action: 
"Decrease of immediacy of action signals a development through 
which the organism gains greater freedom of movement". This 
freedom is due to "the rising ability of the child to master the 
environment by indirect action; this involves the use of circuitous 
routes, instruments, and the ability to delay and to plan" (1948, 
p.486). 
Increasing spontaneity brings increasing ability to initiate 
action without depending upon some particular stimulus from the 
environment. It brings an increasing ability to respond in a 
variety of ways to a particular environmental situation, ways 
which are less fixed by immutable routine. 
Orthogenesis brings increasing OPENNESS to and IMMUNITY 
from the environment. The individual is "able to differentiate his 
organism from his objective environment". This leads to a 
"growing spontaneity of action" in which, generally speaking, 
there is a "change from object-negative to positive reactions" 
since the individual's integrity is less threatened by 
environmental stimulation and change. For example, "strong 
stimuli of sound and light at first cannot be mastered by the 
organism: hence, he reacts negatively to these stimuli by crying, 
turning away, etc. Later, at about six months, the 
predominantly negative responses change to predominantly 
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positive reactions; this is an indication that the child organism 
has learned to digest’ intense stimulation" (1948, p.487) 
v. Relationship to Nature (the physical universe) 
With respect to the human relationship to the physical 
world, orthogenesis is characterized by the following: 
* Increasing differentiation between physical and 
psychological causation. The notion that things are caused by a 
personalized force within all objects, (or by an "immanent Thou" 
which decrees what things happen, 1956, p.92) is replaced by 
ideas based on sheer observation and the positing of non- 
psychological natural laws. 
* The idea that nature has only physical, and not 
psychological qualities, transforms the human relationship to 
nature from one of "mutuality" and "unity" to one of 
"exploitation” and being "separate” from nature. Nature becomes 
something "upon which (man) may work his will" (ibid.) [2] 
* Moral and sacred qualities are differentiated from the 
physical world, and lodged in a more encompassing supernatural 
or spiritual domain. The worship of deities replaces the worship of 
animals or totems. Moral guidance is not sought from the 
physical world, except symbolically. The world relinquishes the 
role of moral agent: unrelated events are not seen as punishing 
the individual for his sins. 
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vi. Relationship to Others and Society 
With respect to the individual's relationship to others, 
orthogenesis involves movement from egocentrism to 
PERSPECTIVISM (Langer, 1970, p.743). Perspectivism permits "an 
interaction of personality with an outer discrete world, both polar 
elements being relatively self-subsistent" (Werner, 1948, p.191) 
The individual becomes increasingly able to "sympathize with, 
empathize with, and adopt the perspectives of others as well as 
his own; and he can increasingly integrate all these to form a 
coherent basis for his own conduct" (Langer, p.744) 
The developing individual does not simply absorb and act 
upon the views of others wholesale, nor does he become 
confirmed in a purely personal perspective. Rather, BY VIRTUE 
OF an increasingly integrated personality, increasingly 
differentiated from the environment and its demands, the 
individual becomes MORE capable of self-modification in the face 
of new perspectives. He can permit GREATER interaction with and 
openness to other human beings. 
"Increasing individuation is the counterpart of increasing 
socialization" (1948, p.452). As the individual moves from 
egocentrism to perspectivism, his relations to groups of people, 
and to society as a whole, become progressively less based upon 
unquestioned authority. They rely more upon co-operation, 
reciprocity, and dialogue. There is also an increasing 
"equalitarianism" which is "tempered by a consideration of the 
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inner and outer circumstance conditioning the individual". As 
opposed to a more rigid "everybody should be treated equally" 
view, this view can include, for example, the justice of giving a 
6 year old playing a game with 11-year-olds "an extra chance". 
The crisis of adolescence in advanced culture is a 
preliminary for the establishment of a new relation between 
personality and society" (p.456). Such a crisis is only possible in a 
society which has advanced past the primitive stage of "rigid, 
indurated authority , a society which is itself sufficiently 
differentiated to allow for individual differences and a wide 
variety of social roles and possibilities. The adolescent individual 
in advanced culture becomes able to conceive of "objective social 
goals". This is one thing that makes his rebellion different from 
that of the egocentric 2-year-old. It is the social structure that 
ceases to be authoritative: "there is a marked growth in the 
understanding of individual differentiation in a differentiated 
society, in the desire for self-determination with respect to the 
social role and the authority chosen” (ibid.). 
With further development, the individual comes to the 
notion of RESPONSIBILITY: "when this sense of a personal freedom 
of choice exists, the individual acquires a new sense of 
responsibility, however limited, in relation to the society in which 
he lives and carries on his personal struggle" (ibid.). The 
responsible individual is capable both of differentiating himself 
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from society and of integrating objective social goals into his own 
personal goals. 
Development of responsibility and perspectivism unite in 
particular within the development of leadership. Werner's 
comments here are brief, but he indicates that leadership based 
on sheer domination is related to rigidity and egocentrism, 
whereas with development, the leader is more able to adopt a 
stance in which he "spontaneously and flexibly responds to 
differences in other persons" (p.504). 
With respect to the behavior of groups, development entails 
increasingly integrated and differentiated interactions between 
people, which Werner links empirically with increase in age. With 
small children, interaction is limited to two people at a time. The 
spontaneous organization of larger groups, in a game, for 
example, is only possible at about age four or five. In large 
groups of younger children, play tends to be "associative". 
Children may work on a diffusely "common" activity (e g., 
building a castle), but each is really in his own world. Only later 
does "co-operative" play emerge, where there is an integration of 
individual goals around a well-articulated group project. Finally, 
groups only become stable, with clear "in-group" and "out-group" 
attachments, as in boys' and girls' "clubs", with advancing age. 
Again, Werner does not pursue the notion of a higher level of 
development which would transcend the propensity of "advanced" 
culture to divide people into exclusive groups. 
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It seems, however, that increasing perspective would 
imply such further development. 
3S 
QL Development in t.hf wnrk of ,iPan Piage>t 
1. Introduction 
While Piaget does not use the term "orthogenesis" to 
describe the direction of development, his description of what 
constitutes this direction, or "vector" (1965, p.386, Cf. "vection", 
1971, pp. 123, 356) is virtually identical with Werner's. In this 
review, I shall limit myself to a demonstration of this identity, 
focusing on those aspects of the developmental vector that have 
been amplified by Piaget. This is not a review of Piaget's position 
in general, which would properly focus on the mechanisms of 
development, the functional invariance between biological and 
cognitive structures, and the Iorico-mathematical interpretation 
of successive thought structures (1970). This review is limited to 
illustrating another important theme in Piaget's work, the 
invariant characteristics of the vector of development. References 
to explanatory mechanisms are held to the minimum necessary 
to support such illustration 
Like Werner, Piaget claims a value-neutrality for his notion 
of the direction of development which belies the spirit of his 
work. Piaget's aim regarding the expression of the developmental 
vector is "to establish some objective and independent hierarchy, 
untainted by any value judgement" (1971, p 122). Even when 
discussing the development of moral judgement itself, Piaget 
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claims that "this is a psychological work, and it is not for us to 
take up a moral standpoint" (1965, p.294). He attempts to chart 
the development of social interactions in general "without 
attempting to evaluate this 'vector', and limiting ourselves to the 
mere description of psychological facts" (p.397). Piaget seems to 
regard values as external to his conclusions, as "subjective" 
elements which can only "taint" inquiry. This is the classic 
value-neutral scientific position, and Piaget is wary of 
committing the naturalistic fallacy" of deriving values from 
facts, or of distorting facts to conform with presupposed values. 
Yet all of Piaget's work is drenched in the presupposition 
that the process of development is desirable and valuable. For. 
example, despite Piaget's insistence that "the role of the 
psychologist is... to give the facts the pedagogue can use and not 
to put oneself in his place and give him advice" (Bringuier, 1980, 
p. 131), Piaget cannot resist prescribing educational approaches 
which "best correspond with our psychological results" (1965, 
p.404). These turn out to be those which promote greater 
autonomy and de-centering in the individual, and co-operative 
self-government in the social structure (see especially 1976, 
pp. 51, 90-91, 99, 112, and 1965, pp.363-364). 
In addition, Piaget, by emphasizing the phenomena of 
development over those of non-development and long-term 
resistance to development, sometimes blurs the distinction 
between developmental stages as "real states" and as "limiting 
87 
forms of equilibrium", norms which have their basis in the 
extension of logic as much as in the observable "world of fact" 
(1965, p.386). This tendency makes it easier for Piaget to 
emphasize, for example, the co-operation of 12-year-olds rather 
than the brutality of peer pressure to conform at that age. Piaget 
certainly does not deny the existence of regression, arrested 
development, or evil, but he is even less consistent than Werner 
about differentiating his normative definition of development from 
the facts of change. 
Piaget seems to slam the "front door" of his inquiry against 
the invasion of values, only to allow them to enter through the 
"back door", whereupon they mingle with the facts in an 
unregulated way. Piaget’s explicit disavowal of any value 
judgement being attached to "evolutive vection" (1971, p.123) 
seems to be juxtaposed with the implicit idea that the "immanent 
logic" of organic functioning, coupled with the concept of a "final" 
state as logically "implied" by this functioning, obviates or 
subsumes any need for explicit justification of the change vector 
as an ethical norm. This interpretation, although speculative, 
helps to explain why Piaget eschews making educational 
prescriptions in theory, while making them in actual practice. 
88 
^Examples of Integration and niffgrpntiatinn 
a. Piaget's Definition of These Terms 
For both Piaget and Werner, the "main lines of 
development" are "the dual directions of differentiation and 
integration (1971, p.72). Piaget lays heavy emphasis on the idea 
that the same vector which characterizes development within the 
domain of intelligence also characterizes the evolution of life in 
general, and particularly that of intelligence out of non-intelligent 
behavior structures, such as instincts and reflexes. Therefore, 
while I shall limit myself here to examples of development within 
intelligence, I shall permit myself to refer to ideas which Piaget 
has set forth in the context of biological phenomena in general, 
since, for him, intelligence is but a specific, uniquely developed 
case of such phenomena. 
For both Piaget and Werner, development is a 
complementary and interdependent balance or synthesis between 
integration and differentiation: 
"The chief characteristic of the vection which seems to be 
evinced by organic evolution is a remarkable alliance 
between two features that are antipathetic at first sight, 
although their working together is a necessary factor in the 
adaptations achieved at the higher levels. The first of these 
[is]... the ever-deepening integration making the 
developmental processes more and more autonomous in 
relation to the environment. The second...is the increasing 
'opening' of possibilities of actions upon the environment, 
and consequently, insertion into wider and wider 
environments" (1971, p.356). 
89 
For Piaget, as for Werner, increasing integration and 
differentiation is manifested in the following ways: 
i. Structures of thought, language, and action become 
increasingly STABLE yet MOBILE. Thus arithmetical concepts form 
a stable framework within which numbers can be subtracted and 
then re-added (reversibility = flexibility) without in the least 
disturbing the overall structure. 
ii. In functional terms, this means an increasing DE¬ 
CENTERING (or DECENTRATION) of the organism and a 
corresponding AUTONOMY from 
"distorting assimilations... which distort because they are 
not accompanied by adequate accommodations, [so] that 
the subject remains centered on his own actions and his 
own viewpoint.. .successive decentrations.. .make it possible 
for the subject to take the points of view of other subjects 
or of objects themselves" (1970, p.710). 
ill. There is an increasing set of possibilities for thought and 
action with respect to the internal and external environment. In 
other words, there is a general EXTENSION or OPENING of the 
environment (differentiation) which implies an increasing ability 
of the organism to maintain its integrity in the face of change, 
and an increasing power of the organism to co-ordinate the 
environment for its own ends. 
iv. There is an increasing "differentiation of substructures 
and their integration into totalities" (1971, p.7l). Differentiation 
and integration are here used in their sense of distinguishing with 
complementary co-ordination of the distinguished elements. This 
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includes the re integration of earlier structures within later ones 
(e.g., perceptual within conceptual structures, or Euclid's idea of 
space within Einstein’s). 
In the examples that follow, I have chosen to review the 
areas in which Piaget amplifies and extends Werner's ideas, 
rather than those which involve virtual repetitions of concepts 
already reviewed in Werner’s work. For example, I shall not 
discuss the development of the symbolic function, (see 1960, 
pp. 124-127, 158-159), nor magical or animistic thinking in the 
child, (see 1951a, 1951b), where Piaget's ideas match Werner's in 
nearly every detail. Since my aim is to show how the overall 
direction of development is the same for both authors, 1 believe I 
can do this while sparing the reader a mere reiteration of 
previously explored ideas. Instead, I shall focus on Piaget's notion 
of OPERATIONS, as well as on his ideas about the development of 
morality, personality, and society, which are enrichments of 
Werner's. 
b, Operational Thought 
The trajectory of increasing integration and differentiation is 
manifested in thought by the emergence of OPERATIONS. An 
operation is essentially a "grouping" of thoughts or actions which 
is defined by its integrated "conservation of the whole" (1960, 
p. 140), manifesting itself in logical deductions and the feeling of 
logical necessity. It is the co-ordinative power of the grouping 
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which allows the subject to de-center from particular perceptions 
of objects by performing a mental operation which compensates 
for perceptual changes within concrete actions (concrete 
operations), and ultimately for the absence of any concrete 
perceptions at all (formal operations): 
The distinguishing characteristic of the sensori-motor 
schema (perception, etc.)...is that they are always 
centered on a particular state of the object and a point of 
view peculiar to the subject; thus they always testify both 
to an egocentric assimilation to the subject and to a 
phenomenalist accommodation to the object. On the other 
hand, the distinguishing characteristic of the mobile 
equilibrium peculiar to the grouping is that the 
decentralisation.. becomes systematic... thought is then no 
longer tied to particular states of the object, but is obliged 
to follow successive changes with all their possible detours 
and reversals; and it no longer issues from a particular 
viewpoint of the subject, but co-ordinates all the different 
viewpoints in a system of objective reciprocities. The 
grouping thus realizes for the first time an equilibrium 
between the assimilation of objects to the subject's action 
and the accommodation of subjective schemata to 
modifications of objects" (i960, p.142). 
Operations build upon previous integrations and 
differentiations at the sensori-motor and pre-operational or 
"intuitive" level. An example of this is the construction of the 
"permanent object" scheme (pp. 108-109). Before this scheme is 
constructed, a child behaves as if an object had ceased to exist if 
it is removed from view (covered by a cloth, placed under a 
sofa). Afterwards, the child initiates searching activity for the 
object (removing the cloth, looking under the sofa). The object 
permanence scheme represents an integrated (autonomous) 
subjective idea of the object which is differentiated (de-centered) 
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from perception, thereby opening the environment to include not 
only the place where the object is, but also all the places in 
which in might be imagined to be, and extending the child's 
power over that environment. 
This scheme, however, does not yet represent an operation, 
since the child. 1) still depends upon physical appearance and 
practical purpose in forming conclusions about the object, 2) 
cannot focus upon more than one aspect of the object at a time, 
nor 3) co-ordinate one aspect with another. "We might therefore 
say that at this level spatio-temporal, logico-arithmetical, and 
practical (means and ends) groupings form a global whole and 
that, in the absence of differentiation, this complex system is 
incapable of constituting an operational mechanism" (p. 152). In 
one experiment which demonstrates this, a child is shown a box 
of 20 wooden beads, in which most are brown, and only a few 
are white. The child is asked "are there more brown beads or 
wooden beads?". The child will insist that there are more brown 
beads "because there are only two or three white ones", while 
alternately recognizing that if all the wooden beads are removed 
from the box, there will be none left, but if all the brown beads 
are removed, the white ones will remain. The child is incapable 
of forming the notion of the inclusion of classes, wherein "brown" 
as a subset of "wooden" can be co-ordinated with "brown" as 
opposed to "white". The child can understand each one 
separately, but cannot group the two within a logical whole. 
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Once operations are achieved, however, the idea that there 
are more wooden beads than brown ones becomes a matter of 
logical necessity for the subject; it n^s to be that way. A similar 
example, involving the conservation of substance, is the 
experiment wherein a child is given a clay "sausage" which he 
proceeds to make longer and thinner. "Centering" on the increased 
length, the pre-operational child will insist that there is now 
more sausage, even though he admits that none has been added 
(If the sausage is made longer and longer, at some point the child 
will declare that there is less!). The operational child, on the 
other hand, will see as a matter of unshakeable necessity that 
the clay has conserved its original substance because: 1) nothing 
was added or taken away (IDENTITY), 2) the sausage gets 
correspondingly thinner as it lengthens (COMPENSATION), and 3) 
although the sausage has been lengthened, it could just as easily 
be reformed into its original shape (REVERSIBILITY). 
The practical notion of reversibility, that what is done in 
the objective world can be undone within the subjective mind, is 
one hallmark of the operation, and the necessary precursor for 
understanding basic arithmetical principles such as commutivity, 
transitivity, etc. Yet operations which are dependent upon 
concrete action or perception are not yet "fully reversible": "being 
constantly tied to action, they give it a logical structure, 
embracing also the speech accompanying it, but they by no 
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means imply the possibility of constructing a logical discourse 
independently of action" (p. 146). 
FORMAL operations open up this possibility by performing "a 
grouping operating on concrete groupings" (p 152), rather than 
mere groupings of concrete objects: "with formal operations there 
is even more than reality involved, since the world of the possible 
becomes available for construction and since thought becomes free 
from the real world. Mathematical creativity is an illustration of 
this new power (p.151). The problem of Edith, Lily, and Suzanne 
mentioned earlier (Sec. A 3bi above) can be solved by forming it 
into an abstract problem: 
A < B; A > C, therefore B > A > C 
Again, there is an opening of the environment, a co¬ 
ordination of possibilities under the subject's control, and an 
autonomy from "reality" which is not autistic, but rather a de¬ 
centering from immediate givens. 
Integration and differentiation are the invariable 
characteristic of the direction of development: "Each of the 
transitions from one of these levels to the next is therefore 
characterized both by a new co-ordination and by a 
differentiation of the systems constituting the unit of the 
preceding level" (p. 152). 
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c. Morality 
Within Piaget's theory, moral and intellectual development 
are interrelated. Like the development of operations, the 
development of moral judgement is an adaptational search for 
equilibrium between subject and object, in the case of moral 
development, the object is other people, and the equilibrium is 
sought within human relations. This equilibrium, manifested as 
.justice in action and thought, entails a sequence of thought 
structures aimed at the regulation of these relations. Development 
in the moral realm may be characterized by the emergence of 
the same logical rules as in the intellectual realm: e.g., absence 
of self-contradiction (i960, p.163), and reversibility, reciprocity or 
the co-ordination of viewpoints" (p.162). In a sense, then, one 
might describe moral development as a subset of intellectual 
development. 
Yet the construction of operations themselves depends upon 
the nature of the interactions between people, reason itself is 
formed "at the heart of an investigative collectivity" (1976, p.5l). 
Not only in Piaget's theory, but in his prescriptions for education, 
therefore, moral and intellectual development are held to be both 
parallel ("Logic is the morality of thought just as morality is the 
logic of action"; 1965, p.398) and mutually reinforcing. 
Piaget does not exclude affect from the realm of the moral, 
for Piaget, the moral realm seems to be defined by its unique 
subject-object relations (i.e., within this domain, the "object" = 
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other -subjects') and by its aim of equilibrating those relations, 
with the means employed including both affect (energy) and 
cognition (structure). For example, will, which for Piaget plays 
the role of an "affective de-centering", (Kohlberg, 1984, p.556) 
analogous to the cognitive role played by operations (the operation 
asserts itself in the face of perceptual "centerings", while will 
asserts itself in the face of affective "centerings"), is referred to 
as a "moral feeling" (1960, p,5). 
Moral development studied by Piaget follows a trajectory of 
increasing integration and differentiation, as manifested by the 
following: 
i. There is a movement from moral judgement based on 
EGOCENTRISM and corresponding adult CONSTRAINT to judgement 
based on individual AUTONOMY and corresponding social CO¬ 
OPERATION. Piaget emphasizes that the child's egocentrism, far 
from being in opposition to authority (wherein increased 
authority would overcome egocentrism, a popular belief) in fact 
enters into a mutually reinforcing relationship with it (1965, 
p.61). Development consists of constructing moral rules which are 
increasingly independent of external influence, especially that of 
fear of punishment, and based rather on MUTUAL RESPECT, and 
the ability to take another's viewpoint. The freely chosen co¬ 
operation of people who regard each other as equals is seen as the 
ideal equilibrium to be achieved. 
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ii. The rules which govern such co-operation are 
increasingly those of DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE as opposed to 
RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, or OBEDIENCE. Distributive justice is based 
on the idea of reciprocity and equality: the idea of fault stems 
from the notion that the "bond of solidarity" necessary for 
mutual respect has been broken, and the purpose of punishment 
is to lead the transgressor (as well as others in the community) 
to realize this and to act in such a way as to restore this bond 
(pp. 227-232). Such justice is increasingly free from the emotional 
need for revenge, (thus it becomes increasingly tempered by love 
and forgiveness, see p.323) and from the need to obey a set of 
rules merely because they are decreed by a perceived 
AUTHORITY. There is a shift from "a system of rules that are 
external" to "relations founded on reciprocity" (p.395). Distributive 
justice sees the responsibility for the social equilibrium as 
distributed equally among all members of the group; any rules 
agreed to by the group derive from a conscious desire to preserve 
these relations. This is seen as more developed than an unequal 
relation between rule-makers and rule-obeyers, or than agreed- 
upon obedience to a rule whose purpose goes unquestioned. 
iii. As has already been discussed in the above review of 
Werner's work, there is progressive differentiation of subjective 
moral responsibility from the OBJECTIVE features of the 
transgression (e.g., how big the ink stain was as opposed to 
whether it was done on purpose), from intentions ascribed to the 
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physical world (the bee stung him because he was bad), and 
from the collective social group (everyone in the group should be 
punished if one person was bad). 
iv. There is movement from pure "equalitarianism" to an 
understanding of "equity". When the focus is on pure equality, 
justice consists of doing precisely to an offender what the offender 
did (an eye for an eye); with increasing equity, punishment is 
freed from this concrete idea, and seen as more symbolically or 
analogically equivalent. Also, instead of treating everyone 
according to a rigid or arbitrary "equality", a view based on 
equity makes allowances for age, circumstances, "special relations 
of affection" (p.283), etc. The example is given of an older boy 
and a younger one who are given ice cream; the younger one 
drops his by accident, should he be given more? There is an 
increasing ability to empathize with an actual person in an actual 
situation, and to balance the equal application of the rule with 
the specialness of the circumstances. 
v. There is increasing differentiation between the conception 
of what is and the conception of what ought to be, in such a way 
that one's ideal conceptions become more autonomous from what 
is while providing a basis for critical action upon existing 
conditions, whether in society or in one’s own behavior and 
judgement. At the same time, the "ought" is not formed through 
mere conformity to a group, nor through idiosyncratic desires, 
but through the regulations provided by an increasing breadth of 
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dialogue and co-operation within a society of increasingly 
differentiated (varied as well as autonomous) individuals: 
' ‘S thC 0nly thin8 that allows for the 
distinction between what is and what ought to be.. .the 
essence of social constraint and of external authority, on 
“nt,ra:y; ls,t° ldentlfy what is with what ought to be, 
realized" (p^f thm8S being thUS conceived 35 already 
vi. There is increasing differentiation of moral content from 
method, and the integration of the former by the latter, which is 
the method of experimental behavior", which "whether 
scientific, technical, or moral, consists, not in a common belief, 
but in rules of mutual control. Everyone is free to bring in 
innovations, but only in so far as he succeeds in making himself 
understood by others and in understanding them" (ibid ). To 
agree on the process of dialogue and mutual efforts at 
understanding as a moral method is increasingly held to be more 
important than specific values or rules of behavior. Even a rule 
agreed upon by everyone "can acquire no new value from the 
mere fact of its generality" (p.394). Development means 
increasing concern with the overarching, integrating process by 
which rules are agreed upon, and decreasing concern with the 
degree of conformity to or identification with a given rule. There 
is a shift in allegiance from “constituted rules" to "constitutive 
norms" (ibid.): 
"The morality of the autonomous conscience does not tend 
to subject each personality to rules that have a common 
content: it simply obliges individuals to ’place1 themselves in 
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I?"1™ relationship with each other without letting the 
thc>ir 1Ve resultant upon this reciprocity destroy 
their individual points of view" (p 397) 
d. Personality 
Intellectual, affective, and moral development at the higher 
levels is integrated by Piaget within the concept of PERSONALITY. 
Autonomy and de-centering are at once the source and the 
defining characterlsitcs of personality, which is alternately 
distinguished from "self", "ego”, or even the "individual". 
Personality is therefore something that only begins to evolve 
during late childhood and early adolescence, once operational 
thought is well-established: 
"...by personality we mean, not the unconscious self of 
childish egocentrism, nor the anarchical self of egoism in 
general, but the self that takes up its stand on the norms 
of reciprocity and objective discussion, and knows how to 
submit to these in order to make itself respected 
Personality is thus the opposite of the ego and this explains 
why the mutual respect felt by two personalities for each 
other is genuine respect and not to be confused with the 
mutual consent of two individual 'selves' capable of joining 
forces for evil as well as for good" (1965, p.96); "...an entire 
concept of personality could be defined by terming it a 
reciprocal 'rapport'... it is essential to distinguish the 
individual and the personality. In the degree that the 
individual is self-centered, he creates an obstacle by his 
moral or Intellectual egocentrism to the Inherent relations 
of reciprocity that all evolved social living contains. 
Whereas, on the contrary, the part of an individual that is 
a 'person' freely accepts some kind of discipline, or 
contributes to its creation, by voluntarily subjecting himself 
to a system of mutual 'norms' that subordinate his liberty 
in respect to that of others... the personality is opposite to 
anarchy at the same time that it is opposite to any 
restraints since it is autonomous, and two such 
'autonomies' can only maintain reciprocal relations" (1976, 
pp.90-91); "..personality implies a kind of de-centering of 
the self which becomes part of a co-operative plan which 
subordinates itself to autonomous and freely constructed 
discipline" (1967, p.66). 
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Autonomy and co-operation are seen as opposed to 
tendencies towards ANOMY, or isolation and the absence of 
internal self—guidance, and HETERONOMY, or subjection to 
external control. Anomy and heteronomy go hand in hand within 
the egocentric personality. 
Egocentrism itself is not seen as something trasncended once 
and for all by a particular stage. Rather, it is a persistent 
tendency which not only takes on new forms at each stage, but 
whose form depends on the developmental acquisitions of that 
stage, and frames the problem to be overcome by further 
development.This is in keeping with the theory of convergent 
reconstruction: "each new mental ability starts off by 
incorporating the world in a process of egocentric assimilation. 
Only later does it attain equilibrium through a compensating 
accommodation to reality" (1967, p.64). The role of egocentrism as 
the core "problem" of human development in Piaget's work 
cannot be too highly stressed: for Piaget, all development is in 
some way development out of egocentrism. 
At the level of concrete operations, therefore, the child's 
very ability to construct assumptions about concrete events 
makes it possible for his egocentrism to take the form of a 
preference for these assumptions over the facts of a situation 
(Salkind, p.208) Faced with a situation that does not conform to 
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a hypothesis, the child will alter the "facts" rather than alter his 
hypothesis; the idea that there might be more than one 
hypothesis is still beyond him. 
With formal operations, fact and hypothesis are 
differentiated, but one s own thoughts and the thoughts of others 
are not at first (p.210). This sets the terms for adolescent 
egocentrism, which consists of the adolescent projecting his own 
concerns onto others (e.g., believing that everyone is scrutinizing 
his appearance), or of elaborating fantasies (a "novel", 1968, p.68) 
about the self or about society which do not accommodate 
themsleves to reality (See Elkind, pp. 117-128). 
Personality development is characterized by integration and 
differentiation, as follows: 
i. There is an equilibration between these assimilative 
adolescent notions and accommodation to a more objective self¬ 
perception, real others, and actual social institutions. In Piaget’s 
view, this is achieved through "effective and enduring work", 
undertaken in concrete and well-defined situations" (1967, p.69). 
Piaget stresses, however, that development does not consist of 
abandoning the "vast dream of reform" in order to completely 
accommodate oneself to the world, but rather to overcome the 
"megalomania" associated with one's fantasy of one’s own 
messianic role, while still acting to transform the world in 
accordance with ideas which are increasingly informed by a de¬ 
center ed perspective. 
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ii. There is the emergence of a "lifeplan", a "personal 
system" in which there is 
' ■ ' au^onomous organization of rules and values, and 
the affirmation of will with respect to the regulation and 
hierarchical organization of moral tendencies... these factors 
are integrated with the self into a unique system to which 
all the separate parts are subordinated... it is peculiar to a 
given individual and implies autonomous co¬ 
ordination. . .[it] is both a source of discipline for the will 
and an instrument of co-operation" (p. 65) 
iii. There is a transformation of the experience of romantic 
love and peer friendship from one which is an egocentric 
projection of an ideal onto a person to one which truly takes the 
other person objectively into account: "Then what we seek in the 
other person is the very thing that enables the other person to 
come out of himself while yet remaining most profoundly himself" 
(1965, p.352). Piaget's ideas here make it quite clear that 
cognition is not something to be set up in opposition to affect, for 
love implies not only a "bond of affection", but a desire to "know" 
the other person. 
iv. There is an increasing role played by discussion in social 
interaction, as opposed to the mere playing of games or other 
sharing of concrete activity. Obviously, it is not Piaget's aim to 
denigrate concrete activity as a form of meaningful interaction, 
or to hold up empty verbiage as an ideal. His point is that prior 
to a certain stage of development, individuals cannot allow the 
mutual communication of ideas and feelings through dialogue to 
play a meaningful role in social interaction. With this ability, the 
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entire universe is open to discussion, and the individual's 
potential opportunities for de-centering expand accordingly (1967, 
P 68). 
v. There is an increasing autonomy of reason from both 
dominant social beliefs and affectively-charged egocentric 
distortions. The rules of a game, for example, are seen to apply 
to everyone equally (reversibility), even when this means a 
disadvantage for oneself. If a rule is perceived as truly unfair, on 
the other hand, apart from one's own selfish interest, then this 
view is maintained in the face of authority or peer pressure to 
the contrary. "The autonomy of reason has nothing to do with 
individual fancy, but it stands in direct contradiction to the idea 
of external authority recognized as such" (1965, p.370). Progress 
in science, on the other hand, depends on autonomy from 
internal distortions due to attachment to a particular theory or 
hypothesis. 
vi. There is an increasing autonomy from fear as a 
determining motivation. Piaget maintains that there is always 
some role for fear, but that it moves from being connected to the 
idea of physical punishment to a more subtle aversion to "any 
lowering of prestige in the eyes of the other", in the case of 
mutual respect: "The quasi-physical element of fear which plays 
a part in unilateral respect then gradually begins to disappear in 
favor of the purely moral fear of falling in the esteem of the 
respected person" (1965, p.382). Piaget does not equate this kind 
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of fear with the fear of being ostracized by the social group 
(which is an embodiment of authority). Presumably, the "other" 
whose respect one would not wish to lose is one whose values and 
ideals truly embody our own, fear of what this "other" would 
think could be likened to a fear of falling in one's own self¬ 
esteem. Piaget does not explore the possibility of further 
autonomy from fear or other attachments as an aspect of 
personality development. 
vii. It is hard to mistake Piaget's ideas about what would 
constitute development, not only for the child, but for the adult 
in a position of authority. Piaget implies (1965, pp. 190-194) that it 
is the adult's attachment to maintaining unilateral respect that 
perpetuates egocentrism in children, in himself, and in social 
institutions. Adults maintain this mode of dealing with those in 
their power because that is how it was done by their parents, 
their boss, etc. With respect to both parenting and leadership, 
therefore, personality development consists of an increasing desire 
to promote systems based on co-operation and reciprocity, an 
ability to act scientifically in discerning appropriate means to this 
end, and overcoming internal and social barriers to the 
establishment of such systems. 
e. Society 
For Piaget, society is neither the result of individual 
initiative followed by imitation, nor is it a separate "totality" 
which shapes the individual from the "outside". Rather, it is a 
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system of relations between individuals. Piaget points out that 
even with only two individuals, the system of their relations 
forms a gestalt which cannot be reduced to its parts. Society, 
as a vastly complex system of varied interactions, can be 
considered an entity in a '‘statistical" sense only, and not in a 
"mythological" sense. Piaget consistently rejects the path of 
projecting a mythic destiny or personality onto "society" which is 
the source of individual personality, or somehow superior to the 
individual (1960, p.156-157). The developing "epistemological 
subject" is simultaneously "an individual, though decentered in 
relation to his private ego", and a "sector of a social group 
decentered in relation to the constraining idols of the tribe" (1971, 
p.360). With development, "these two kinds of decentering" are 
mutually reinforcing. 
Piaget is quite aware that the work of equilibration at the 
level of social institutions is "unfinished": "Society cannot be 
regarded as a completed whole nor as a system of fully realized 
values" (1965, p.353). Society "is not just one thing", but contains 
both relations of autonomously de-centered co-operation and 
mutual respect as well as relations of constraint, egocentrism, 
authority, and unilateral respect. Piaget is clear that it is these 
latter features which "characterize most of the features of society 
as it exists". Although the foundations for individual co-operation 
manifest themselves in 12-year-olds, these are not taken up 
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within the realm of government, economics, education, and the 
like (1965, p.76). 
Therefore, it is in speaking of the development of society 
that Piaget differentiates most clearly between development as an 
immanent fact , and as an "equilibrial limit" embodied in a co¬ 
operation rarely seen at the level of social systems. Nonetheless, 
Piaget declares that "the actual evolution of the relations of 
constraint tends to bring these nearer to co-operation" (1965, 
p.396). 
To be precise, Piaget does not usually speak directly of the 
"development" of the society as an entity, but rather of the 
increase in more developed inter-individual relations, i.e., those 
marked by autonomy and de-centering. What follows here, then, 
is a gathering of Piaget's thoughts on what changes in social 
institutions would bring this about. With development: 
i. There is movement toward greater DEMOCRACY: equality 
between the generations, self-governance, and social 
egalitarianism. Breaking down the barriers which prevent the 
"infinite capacity for interaction with other people" and "complete 
reciprocity" between individuals is both the source and the fruit 
of not only greater moral development, but of greater intellectual 
development in all areas of life. 
ii. There is increasing differentiation and "density" of the 
society with respect to the diversity of influences upon the 
individual, and the number of roles available: "The 'denser' the 
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community, the sooner will the adolescent escape from the direct 
constraint of his relations and, coming under a number of fresh 
influences, acquire his spiritual independence by comparing them 
with one another. The more complex the society, the more 
autonomous is the personality and the more important are the 
relations of co-operation between equal individuals" (1965, p 336). 
iii- There is a decrease in collective conformism and an 
increase in the organic solidarity" of the group, which arises 
from communication and mutual respect. Organic solidarity is 
sometimes evinced by the children who "stick together" in the 
face of unilaterally imposed adult authority (e g., by not 
"squealing", p.251). Piaget points out that when expressing 
organic solidarity, a group may appear to be regressing to 
collective responsibility (where the group is to blame for the 
offenses of the one) but that a crucial distinction must be made 
in the fact that the more developed group is quite aware that 
they are not collectively to blame, but that they are each as 
individuals freely choosing to take blame, responsibility, or 
punishment for the acts (or alleged acts) of one or more of their 
members out of solidarity with them. 
iv. In educational institutions, there is an increase in the 
degree of co-operative self-government allowed students, wherein 
they make and enforce their own rules, etc. Also, an increase in 
the amount of work done by investigative teams of students 
pursuing a matter of collective interest (but not to the exclusion 
109 
of individual work). This would be movement away from rules 
and schedules imposed by authority, and away from teaching 
methods which present the same information to all students 
regardless of interest or ability while simultaneously isolating 
students from one another in their work (1965, p.363, 1976, 
p. 108). 
v. There is an initial increase in differentiation between the 
morality of duty" to society from the morality of "good" based on 
mutual respect and reciprocity, with an eventual hierarchic 
integration of the former under the latter, until there is a re¬ 
convergence of the content of the two. In this progression, 
primitive society begins with all codified social norms being ones 
of arbitrary constraint ("legal prohibitions or taboos"), in 
opposition to the interpersonal relations of mutuality that "grow 
up between individuals" in an almost extralegal way. Gradually, 
these informal norms become differentiated in their own right as 
a "morality of good”. With the development of society, "as ritual 
obligations diminish along with conformity, the morality of good 
wins against the morality of duty, and... comes to constitute the 
actual content of the duties themselves". At this point, however, 
the duties are no longer unilaterally imposed by the society on 
the individual, nor seen as arbitrary, but are seen as logically 
derived from the "good" (1965, p.352-353). 
vi. There is a movement away from SOCIOCENTRISM, (or 
ethnocentrism) which is the manifestation of egocentrism at the 
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level of identification with the social group. Piaget observes that 
while it is “relatively easy to co-ordinate the points of view of 
individuals on a question of pure intelligence (for example, of 
putting into relation perspectives of different observers), and still 
relatively easy to co-ordinate them concerning a moral conflict, 
reciprocity and objectivity seem to become an insurmountable 
difficulty on the level of national feelings and in international life" 
(1976, p. 131). Members of a developing society would increasingly 
be able, and in increasing numbers, to co-ordinate the viewpoints 
of different nations, races, groups, etc. in order to arrive at a 
co-operative solution. 
vii. Within the sociohistorical institution of scientific 
thought, there is an increasing decentering and corresponding 
autonomy from egocentrism. Piaget charts the progression of 
astronomy, for example, beginning with the thought of the 
ancient Chinese, where “the Son of the Heavens [emperor] 
insured the seasons by his moving about". Next come the 
Chaldeans and Babylonians, who understood that heavenly bodies 
have a trajectory independent of human action, but who still 
conceived of the earth (first as a "great plateau, then as a 
hemisphere, and finally as a sphere") at the center of the 
universe. Then come the Copernican and Newtonian revolutions 
("a most striking symbol of the victory of objective co-ordinations 
over the spontaneous egocentrism of the human being), which 
established the relation of the earth to the solar system, but 
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which held time and space throughout the universe to be 
identical to that of earth’s. Finally, "still two more centuries 
were required for Einstein to teach us the relativity of time and 
space, depending on velocity, and to construct a tool of co¬ 
ordination much more subtle than that of classical mechanics, 
waiting to be surpassed in turn" (1976, pp. 137-138). 
C- Integration and Differentiation, and their Justification as a 
Standard Qf Ethical Adequacy, in Lawrence Kohlberg’s Stages of 
Justice Reasoning 
1. Introduction 
Kohlberg, adhering closely to Piaget's framework, appeals to 
increasing integration and differentiation as an "internal standard 
of adequacy" for defining stage changes as developmental (DAE, 
p.l57).[3] Although his own theory is limited to the domain of 
justice reasoning, he indicates that this standard would apply to 
all development that can be described in terms of cognitive stage 
advance (ibid.). Kohlberg recognizes the need for explicit ethical 
justification for this standard (p.151). He thus resolves the 
contradictions previously indicated in the work of Piaget and 
Werner. [4] 
Kohlberg's justification is limited to demonstrating the 
increasing moral adequacy of successive justice reasoning 
structures characterized by increasing integration and 
differentiation. However, his metaethical approach within this 
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specific domain has implications for my attempt to justify 
orthogenesis as a definition of development in general. 
My review of Kohlberg's work will be limited to those 
aspects most crucial to my thesis: his further elaboration of the 
content of orthogenesis and his ethical justification of it as a 
definition of development. My review is organized as follows: 
Sec. 2: A definition of Kohlberg's domain of developmental 
study. 
Sec. 3: A review of the ways in which Kohlberg's stage 
sequence, as well as his notion of "substages", is characterized by 
orthogenesis. 
Sec. 4: A review of Kohlberg's grounds for justifying 
orthogenesis as a standard of increasing "moral adequacy". 
2. Kohlberg's Domain of Developmental Study 
Although Kohlberg's packages his theory as one of "moral 
development", he takes pains within his most recent formulation 
of it (CFT, p.224) to characterize it as, more precisely, a theory 
of the development of JUSTICE REASONING. In his earlier work, 
Kohlberg argues for a strict definition of the word "moral" as 
referring to justice reasoning only. He softens this position in his 
later work, saying that justice reasoning is the "central moral 
function" (p.216, Cf. the "core of the moral domain", p.236), but 
also that "the theory of justice reasoning (is) necessary but not 
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sufficient for defining the full domain of what is meant by moral 
development" (DRC, p.338). 
Kohlberg aims to differentiate the cognitive, rational, and 
structural dimensions of morality from overt behavior, emotions, 
and social institutions (FITO, p.214). He assigns a nearly 
deterministic role to reasoning as 1) what it is that primarily 
develops in moral development, and 2) what it is that has 
greatest influence over thought and action in the resolution of 
human conflict. His theory may be seen as a reaction against 
emotivist, associationist, or other theories which attempt to 
minimize the role of reason as the source of moral differences or 
change, and which emphasize instead the role of unconscious 
forces, sentiments, societal conditioning, etc. Morality, in these 
theories, can be reduced to non-cognitive influences, even in the 
case of "humanistic" theories which emphasize a "natural" or 
"inner" moral knowledge (CFT, pp. 289-293; MSM, pp. 196-198). 
Kohlberg's definition of what constitutes justice reasoning is 
virtually identical with Piaget's. The development of justice 
reasoning is the parallel, in the subject-subject domain, to 
general cognitive development in the subject-object domain. 
Justice reasoning has two components. 1) a SOCIAL COGNITION 
component which is that of ROLE-TAKING. Role-taking is no 
different from Piaget's de-centering or Werner's perspectivism 
when applied to the social domain; 2) the specifically mQ.Ciil 
aspect of social cognition, that of the attempt to resolve or 
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equilibrate CONFLICT between individuals and within society as a 
whole (JR, p. 191, 194). 
Kohlberg conceives of human conflict as having to do with 
mutual expectations expressed in terms of RIGHTS and DUTIES, 
i.e., what individuals have a right to expect as their due from 
others, and what is an obligation of the individual toward others. 
Development of justice reasoning, therefore, includes development 
of one s conception of human rights and obligations as well as 
one's role-taking ability. Such development leads to JUDGEMENTS 
indicating resolutions of human conflict which are more 
"equilibrated" (JR, p. 194; FITO, pp. 190, 193). For Kohlberg, 
"the core of justice is the distribution of rights and duties 
igRUlated^bv concepts of eoualitv and reciprocity. Justice 
recognized as a 'balance' or equilibrium corresponds to the 
structural moving equilibrium described by Piaget on logic. 
Justice is the normative logic, the equilibrium, of social 
actions and relations" (MSM, p.184, emphasis in original). 
Kohlberg recognizes that there are other moral 
"orientations" besides justice, including ones relating to normative 
social rules, utilitarian welfare considerations of "the greatest 
good" or "harm to others", and conceptions of the "ideal self" 
(ibid.). He argues, however, that all these presuppose an implicit 
notion of "fairness" or justice, and that all make an implicit 
appeal to considerations of equality and reciprocity in human 
relations when confronted with the need to resolve moral conflict 
dilemmas (CFT, pp.310-313). He argues that only the justice 
orientation renders these "distinctively and fundamentally moral" 
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concerns explicit: "One can act morally and question all rules, one 
may act morally and question the greater good, but one cannot 
act morally and question the need for justice" (MSM, p.184). [5] 
Kohlberg s appeal to justice reasoning as the "central 
minimal core of morality is itself an attempt to resolve conflicts 
among an assumed plurality of moral views by locating what he 
sees as a factor implicit within and essential to all of them (CFT, 
pp.306-307). He recognizes that there are other dimensions to the 
moral realm, such as that of "charity, love, caring, brotherhood, 
or community", or "benevolence" (all of which Kohlberg groups 
under the general notion of AGAPE, or "responsible love"; CFT, 
p.227). But he argues that there are not "two separate general 
moralities", but rather that "special obligations of care 
presuppose, but go beyond, the general duties of justice, which 
are necessary but not sufficient for them" (p.229). 
Kohlberg concedes that he focuses upon justice because it is 
the aspect of the moral domain most theoretically compatible 
with and empirically measurable within a cognitive- 
developmental theory of "hard structural stages" (CFT, p.238). He 
allows for "the possibility of extending the idea of stages of moral 
judgement to other and possibly broader conceptions of the moral 
domain" through the use of "soft stage" theories (such as Erikson’s 
theory of life stages or Loevinger's theory of ego-development). 
Such theories capture "choices which go beyond duty and justice. 
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that is, dilemmas which elicit supererogatory choice", as well as 
changes in purpose or life-orientation (CFT pp. 306-307). 
3., Orthogenesis in Kohlhgrg's Justice Reasoning Stages 
At the heart of Kohlberg’s theory is his description of six 
invariantly sequenced and universal stages of justice reasoning. 
The account of these stages offered here will consist only of the 
bare bones necessary to illustrate the principal ways in which 
they constitute an orthogenetic trajectory. A full account of the 
stages can be found in a wide variety of Kohlberg's writings 
(FITO, JR, 1981 appendix, 1984 appendix A). 
Kohlberg divides his six stages into three categories of pre- 
conventional (Stages 1 and 2), conventional (Stages 3 and 4), and 
post-conventional (Stages 5 and 6). At the pre-conventional 
stage, reasoning about deontological (rights and obligations- 
oriented) problems exhibits an egocentrism which cannot 
articulate social or cultural expectations as such. At Stage 1, the 
individual does not even conceive of himself as having rights or 
duties independently of the dictates of perceived authority or fear 
of punishment. At Stage 2, the individual is able to see rights and 
duties as a matter of egoistic instrumental exchange or reward. 
At the conventional stages, the constituted norms of society 
or religion become the overriding arbiters of moral judgement. At 
Stage 3, the individual is able to put himself in the place of a 
concrete other. The Golden Rule becomes meaningful in concrete 
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situations, as do intentions. What is moral is defined as what is 
nice , and as what is socially appropriate for people filling set 
social roles (parent, friend, policeman, etc.). At Stage 4, the 
formal concept of society or cosmic order emerges, and the 
individual defines rights and duties in terms of what will 
maintain the constituted rules of the social or religious order. 
At the post-conventional stages, the understanding emerges 
that the social order itself derives its moral legitimacy from 
considerations which transcend or precede the mere fact of its 
authority. Therefore, socially-constituted conventions can be 
morally called into question. At Stage 5, individuals see society as 
based on the upholding of general and individual rights. This 
allows for the possibility of making changes in social rules so as to 
better fulfill this function. Rational law, based on agreement 
between people, becomes the arbiter of rights and duties. At 
Stage 6, universal ethical principles, as differentiated from 
particular laws or social arrangements, are the autonomous 
arbiters of rights and duties. Such principles form a "'second- 
order' use of the Golden Rule", (JR, pp.203-204, Cf. CFT, p.315) by 
formally and universally applying reciprocal role-taking and 
equity between all individuals as determining just relations at 
both the interpersonal and societal levels. 
The orthogenetic trajectory from Stage 1 to Stage 6 is 
manifested in a variety of interdependent ways. First, there is an 
increasing integration of moral judgement in the personal realm 
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with moral judgement in the social or abstract realm. At Stages 
judgement at the latter level is simply not possible. A Stage 
4 individual might hold very harsh authoritarian views on 
abstract social matters, or about other social groups, yet apply 
the Golden Rule to his personal relations. Only at Stage 6 is there 
complete success at applying a degree of reversibility in 
judgement to social issues parallel to that applied in the context 
of concrete relationships. [6] 
Second, there is increasing distinguishing (differentiation) of 
moral considerations from nonmoral or factual ones: at Stage 2, 
physical size or the "importance" or power of a person is seen as 
morally irrelevant; at Stage 3, hedonistic reward value and 
calculated "prudence"; at Stage 4, concrete conformity and the 
particular roles individuals play in society; at Stage 5, the need 
to maintain the particular constituted forms of society, and at 
Stage 6, all "legal" considerations and social-utility considerations. 
Third, this increase in moral differentiation is 
complemented by an increase in the immunity-integrity 
(integration) of moral judgements in the face of environmental 
changes or "unbindings". Stage 1 reasons to refrain from doing 
something wrong would unbind if there were no anticipated 
punishment for doing it. Stage 2 reasons would hold in the 
absence of fear of punishment, but would unbind if there were no 
anticipation of advantage or exchange for not doing it. Stage 3 
would hold in the face of considerations of prudence or gain, but 
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would unbind if other "nice" people did it. Stage 4 would hold 
despite the behavior of concrete others, but would unbind if the 
social order didn t care about it, or approved of it. Stage 5 would 
exert a partial check upon morally wrong behavior approved or 
ignored by society by leading to efforts to revise the social rules. 
In the absence of a clear social contract, however, the obligation 
to act rightly would be perceived as weak or absent. Also, 
considerations of overall social utility would weaken the Stage 5 
resolve to act justly (thus capital punishment would be 
permissible if it really deterred crime). Stage 6 would hold despite 
contrary or absent social rules, and despite such social utility 
considerations. It would unbind only when universal ethical 
principles could not resolve the issue at hand. 
Fourth, there is increasing differentiation and co-ordination 
of considerations of intentions and consequences in judging what 
is right. Here Kohlberg articulates more fully the general pattern 
set forth by Piaget and Werner. At Stage 1, there is an exclusive 
"focus upon irrelevant physical form of the act (e.g., size of the 
lie), or of the consequences of the act (e.g., amount of physical 
damage) " (SS, p.49) . At Stage 2, intention is still ignored, but 
consequences are seen in terms of their "human need-value" 
(ibid.), i.e., how they serve instrumental needs or prevent pain. 
At Stage 3, intentions are distinguished from consequences, and 
something becomes right if a "nice" person does it, and the person 
"means well", i.e., was not acting out of selfish or "mean" 
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motives. At Stage 4, the need for following impartial rules is 
paramount, and actions are judged bad if a rule is broken. 
Meaning well is still important, but not enough to excuse 
breaking a rule seen as necessary for the preservation of order. 
The general consequences "if everybody did it" becomes a 
meaningful consideration. At Stage 5, intention and consequence 
are more fully co-ordinated; someone can be held "legally" to 
blame for having broken a necessary rule, yet "morally" less to 
blame if the intention was a good one. Although an individual's 
intent may mitigate blame in a specific circumstance, it does not 
make something that is against the rules "right". At Stage 6, the 
intention to follow a universalizable moral principle is 
distinguished from simply having one's heart in the right place. It 
is right to obey the "self-chosen" moral principle even if it means 
breaking the rule if you must. There is a recognition that "moral 
principles don't allow exceptions any more than do legal rules" 
(p.51). 
Fifth, there is increasing differentiation and autonomy of 
the "conscience" as a motivating factor in one's own moral 
action. At Stage 1, "conscience" is an irrational fear of 
punishment. At Stage 2, a more objective and pragmatic view of 
both reward and punishment develops. At Stage 3, concrete 
reward and punishment are subordinated to a concern about the 
approval or disapproval of concrete others. At Stage 4, the 
informal and concrete disapproval of others is subordinated to 
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formal concepts of "honor" and "duty", and to "guilt over 
concrete harm to others" (p.52). At Stage 5, concern over 
"institutionalized blame" is subordinated to concern for 
maintaining the rational respect of a community of equals and 
one s own self-image as a rational person. At Stage 6, concern for 
community respect and respect for oneself as "rational" is 
subordinated to the concern for maintaining one's own self- 
respect as an upholder of moral principles. [7] 
Sixth, there is increasing de-centering with respect to one's 
capacity for role-taking, with a complementary increase in the 
ability to co-ordinate the various roles of others within a scheme 
of REVERSIBILITY. Reversibility is the power of a moral 
judgement to remain constant after taking the roles of all the 
actors involved. Therefore, full reversibility results in a 
judgement all parties could agree to as "fair". By representing an 
autonomous de-centering from a particular view, it results in a 
more stable and flexible equilibrium. Principles which imply a 
reversible solution to a problem are those of "distributive equality 
proportionate to circumstance and need" (equity) and "merit or 
desert, reward in return for virtue, effort, or talent" 
(reciprocity) (JR, p.201). By seeing reversibility as an 
"equilibration in valuing" (ibid.), Piaget and Kohlberg use it as an 
explanatory model for why people do tend to develop morally, it 
is an aspect of the immanent need for equilibrium. 
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Stages 1-6 chart a course of increasing reversibility. At 
Stage 1, there is no reversibility; morality is a one-way affair 
between power and obedience. At Stage 2, reversibility takes the 
highly unequilibrated form of favor for favor, blow for blow, 
leading potentially to "an endless cycle of retaliation" (CFT, p.316) 
without resolution. At Stage 3, there is reversibility in terms of 
the Golden Rule in interpersonal relationships. However, there is 
no conception of institutionalized rights independent of the 
motives or character of the concrete people involved. At Stage 4, 
reversibility extends to the notion of impartial societal norms. 
Even a mean person has the right not to be robbed, even by a 
well-meaning person, and is entitled to legal redress if he is. At 
Stage 5, rules themselves are hierarchically ordered according to 
an implicit principle of total reversibility. The duty to protect life 
becomes clearly more important than the duty to protect 
property, since even the person whose property was at stake 
would presumably agree with such a hierarchy if it were his life 
that was at stake. At Stage 6, universal principles become "ih£ 
self-conscious operation of moral musical chairs in making just 
choices" (CFT, pp. 315-317, emphasis in original). 
Seventh, with each stage there is an increasing opening of 
the moral universe to include a wider application of rights to a 
wider family of individuals. At Stage 1, only those with power 
have rights, at Stage 2, those who can give something in 
exchange, at Stage 3, concrete well-meaning others, at Stage 4, 
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those within the bounds of the constituted social order, at Stages 
5 and 6, all individuals, with Stage 6 rights being more 
thoroughly universal and unconditional. Also, a key feature of 
development (CFT, p.251) is the opening of "social perspective": 
undifferentiated and egocentric at Stage 1, including two 
mutually aware actors at Stage 2, including a third-person 
perspective at Stage 3, including a member-of-society perspective 
at Stage 4, and finally, a "prior-to-society" perspective at Stages 
5 and 6. 
Eighth, there is an increasing integration of lower-stage 
problems within higher stages, and the incorporation with 
transformation of their salient elements. Stage 6 principles do not 
ignore the Stage 4 problem of maintaining society. This problem is 
co-ordinated more fully with the additional problem of 
maintaining all societies in an equitable relation to one another. 
Resorting to a Stage 1 "might-makes-right" ethic in dealing with 
foreign societies, justifiable within a Stage 4 morality of 
maintaining one's own order, would not be justifiable at Stage 6, 
since it does not lead to an equilibrated solution when applied 
universally. Similarly, Stages 3 and 4 do not ignore the Stage 1 
and 2 problems of preserving oneself from harm or improving 
one's well-being. They integrate this problem within a more 
reversible scheme of taking the needs of others into account as 
well. 
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Ninth, there is a movement of justice considerations from 
an implicit (syncretically diffused) form toward an increasingly 
explicit (discretely articulated) form. At Stage 4, for example, the 
idea that rules must be upheld because of the consequences "if 
everyone did it implig? the fundamental consideration of equity 
in the form of everyone being treated equally. Since, however, 
this fundamentally moral consideration is fused with a need to 
uphold authority, even laws that treat some people unfairly are 
to be upheld. At Stage 5, the implicit moral reason for 
maintaining the society, to ensure equal treatment of all, 
becomes explicit, and there is a critique of social rules that 
impede this aim (CFT, pp.310-313). 
Tenth, there is a thorough integration of rights with duties 
at the highest stage. At Stage 4, rights and duties are not strictly 
correlative, largely because they are mediated by the focus upon 
the social order. Because someone has a societal right to property 
does not mean that an individual has a direct duty to protect 
that right. Instead, one has a duty to maintain the society which 
protects that right (even if it doesn't in the case of certain 
individuals; the current case of forced Navajo resettlement being 
one example). At Stage 5, "for every right, society has some duty 
to protect that right. Duties to other individuals, however, are 
not clearly specified in the absence of either individual contract 
or social contract" (JR, p.217). Therefore, someone may have the 
right to, or be acting in accordance with what is right, if they 
125 
steal in order to save a life. But this does not mean the person is 
obligated to steal in order to save a life, especially if the person to 
be saved is a stranger. At Stage 6, however, "obligations are 
correlative to any right or just claim by an individual that gives 
rise to a corresponding duty for another individual" (p. 216) One 
person's right is another person's duty to protect that right. 
In this regard, Kohlberg addresses the problem posed by 
Stage 6 of how to choose between conflicting duties, since the 
rational moral agent" cannot be an "omnipotent saint", 
protecting everyone's violated rights everywhere at once (p. 219). 
He uses this dilemma to illustrate the differentiation between 
rules which dictate " 'Don't do that' or 'Do that"', and moral 
principles which are used as "guides" for either direct action, or 
for generating universally justifiable rules (pp.220-221). At higher 
stages, there is also increasing differentiation of such principles 
from concrete moral rules. 
Finally, as in Piaget's work (See Sec.B 2cvi above), there is 
an increasing determination of the content of a moral decision by 
the structure of reasoning employed. Kohlberg is careful to 
distinguish the FORM of moral judgement, as expressed by his 
stages, from the CONTENT of the judgement, as expressed by a 
particular moral choice. In a dilemma posing a choice between 
the right to life and the right to property, for example, 
individuals give responses on both sides of the issue at every 
stage. What determines their stage is the kind of reasoning they 
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use to justify their choice. At Stages 5 and 6, moral reasoning 
articulates a hierarchy of values based on the contribution of 
those values to completely reversible solutions to moral problems. 
Therefore, in dilemmas pitting life against property, stage 5 
individuals are more likely to side with the right to life. In 
dilemmas pitting the certainty or near-certainty of the loss of 
one individual s life against the mere possibility or higher 
probability of loss of life for a larger number of people, Stage 6 
individuals are theoretically more likely than Stage 5 individuals 
to agree to protect the single but more endangered person. Stage 
6 reasoners would treat each person's claim to life equally, by, 
for example, putting everyone in the place of the most 
endangered person. They would then see that giving everyone a 
50% chance to live would be fairer than giving a 100% chance to 
most people and no chance to one person. It is in this sense that 
Kohlberg claims Stage 6 to be one at which "all reasonable people 
could agree" (JR, p.214). 
The issue of differentiating form from content brings us to 
the issue of substages, a later addition to Kohlberg's theory (CFT, 
pp.250-257; 1984 appendix C). The substage theory was developed 
by Kohlberg to account for the widely differing "normative 
content" of subjects who were at the same formal justice 
reasoning stage in terms of their "social perspective" and 
structuration of duties and rights according to the "three justice 
operations: equality, equity, and reciprocity" (CFT, P-251). 
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Initially, Kohlberg followed Piaget in expecting that with 
stage development, individuals would become more autonomously 
oriented in their reasoning content as well in the formal features 
of their thinking. He found, however, that there were individuals 
at LOWER stages who made choices and gave reasons for them 
which were intuitively" MORE developed than those of subjects at 
HIGHER stages! 
The content of the answers of these lower-stage subjects 
was, from a Stage 6 viewpoint, morally more "correct". For 
example, they would condone stealing in order to save a life, or 
keeping one’s word in the face of a parental order to break it. 
These subjects thus employed an intuitive hierarchization of 
values similar to that held by higher-stage subjects. Their 
judgements appealed to respect for the intrinsic worth of 
persons. They exhibited a higher degree of prescriptivity, i.e., an 
adherence to the "right" choice despite inclinations or pragmatic 
considerations. They were more universal, extending the right 
action to include all people, as well as more universalizable (all 
people could, without contradiction, act that way). Further, 
these lower-stage judgements displayed a higher degree of 
autonomy (reliance on one's own reason rather than on 
authority), as well as reference to relations of mutual respect 
between autonomous individuals (as opposed to relations of 
constraint or estrangement). They were more reversible and de- 
centered, considering others viewpoints. Finally, they were also 
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more constructive, showing an awareness that rules, and social 
institutions, are autonomously invented for reasons "derived from 
communication and co-operation between and among persons" 
(pp. 253-256). Kohlberg refers to these distinctions as lying 
"midway between form and content"; for clarity's sake, I shall 
refer to them as "content" here. 
The substage reflecting more heteronomous content is 
labeled "A"; the more autonomous one, "B". Enough of a gap 
exists between the two modes of response to lead Kohlberg to 
characterize them as distinct "types" (1984, appendix C). But it is 
not clear whether Kohlberg considers movement from A to B as a 
continuum, or a discontinuous shift from one substage to the 
other, more similar to between-stage movement. 
As indicated above, form determines content to a greater 
extent at the highest stages. Therefore 75% of subjects at Stage 5 
give type B responses, with the percentage being theoretically 
higher at Stage 6, the stage at which intuition and self-conscious 
reasoning are held to converge. But in introducing the notion of 
substages (or "moral types", see appendix C, p.663), Kohlberg adds 
a non-structural dimension to his otherwise "hard structural" 
theory. It is allowed that superior moral content can be 
consistently determined by something other than a "hard" 
cognitive structure. 
Kohlberg's substages introduce a variety of developmental 
pathways into an otherwise unilinear theory. Although Kohlberg 
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contends that individuals do not regress from substage B to 
substage A within the same stage, they can and do move from, 
for example, 3B to 4A. At first, this prompted Kohlberg (1984, 
appendix C, p.663) to hypothesize that movement from A to B 
within each stage represented a consolidation of stage gains. The 
facts did not bear this out, however. While some individuals did 
move from 2A to 2B to 3A and so on, some individuals 
maintained a type A orientation throughout their stage 
progression, while others maintained a type B orientation 
throughout (ibid., also CFT, p.255). Movement from A to B would 
thus appear to be its own developmental pathway. 
Not only is there a pathway of "intuitive" (CFT, pp.260-261) 
development, but what makes movement from substage A to B 
"developmental" is change according to orthogenetic criteria of 
increasing autonomy, de-centering, universality, prescriptivity, 
etc. Kohlberg thus in effect concedes that the orthogenetic criteria 
for defining development can be used without tying them to a 
formal structural framework. [8] 
4. Kohlberg’s Grounds for Justifying. Orthogenesis as a Standard of 
Moral ’’Adequacy" 
To be precise, Kohlberg does not set out to directly justify, 
orthogenesis as a "formal internal standard of adequacy" in 
psychological development. What Kohlberg justifies is his claim 
that judgements generated at increasingly integrated and 
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differentiated stages represent a hierarchy of "moral adequacy" 
(FITO, p. 213). 
These judgements are phenomenal reflections of 
psychological structures which are increasingly equilibrated. 
Integration and differentiation are, for Kohlberg, formal criteria 
which describe the level of equilibration achieved at this internal, 
psychological level. Thus, by justifying the judgements at each 
stage as more adequate, he is indirectly justifying increasing 
integration and differentiation as valuable also. 
There are two approaches that Kohlberg uses to justify 
moral stages as increasingly valuable. The one that he appeals to 
most explicitly is FORMALIST. Within this approach, "the formal 
standard of cognitive-developmental psychological theory [i.e , 
orthogenesis] is not itself ultimate, but must be elaborated as a 
set of ethical and epistemological principles" (DAE, p 158). 
Orthogenesis is not such a principle, but rests upon other 
principles which are "prior" to it. These principles are those of the 
"formalist" school of philosophy. Kohlberg explains his choice of 
formalism as follows: "We are arguing that a criterion of 
adequacy must take account of the fact that morality is a 
unique, sui generis realm. If it is unique, its uniqueness must be 
defined by general formal criteria, so our metaethical conception 
is formalistic (FITO, p.215, emphasis in original). Among the 
formal criteria Kohlberg appeals to are "impersonality, ideality, 
universalizability, preemptiveness" (ibid ). Within this metaethic. 
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it is these formal criteria which make judgements moral" (ibid , 
emphasis added). 
Kohlberg outlines a specific "parallel" between integration 
and differentiation and two of these criteria: universality and 
prescriptivity (pp. 216-217). The increasing psychological 
integration maps into increasing formal universality, while 
differentiation maps into prescriptivity. Each moral stage is 
justified as more moral because its judgements are more: 
a. UNIVERSAL - they are applied equally to a more 
inclusive class of beings, and can, by their very nature, be so 
applied self-consistently (without self-contradiction; FITO, pp.184- 
185) 
b. UNIVERSALIZABLE - all actors could act according to 
such a judgement without self-contradiction (in keeping with 
Kant’s "categorical imperative"). 
c. PRESCRIPTIVE - moral reasons for acting are 
differentiated from nonmoral ones, one ought to (is prescribed to) 
act irrespective of considerations (fear of punishment, hope of 
gain, affection, moral considerations of a lower order, 
conformity, etc.) held increasingly to be irrelevant. 
Increasing integration and differentiation, which creates a 
more psychologically equilibrated stage, can be seen as explaining 
why Judgements at that stage are more morally equilibrated, 
i.e., conforming more closely to the formal ideal of perfect 
universality, universalizability, and prescriptivity. But their 
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Justification as more moral appeals to the formal ideal, and not 
to the explanation. In keeping with this view, Kohlberg justifies 
increasing moral adequacy teleologically "a higher stage is a 
better stage because its judgements more closely approximate 
Stage 6 judgements , which serve as the ideal formal standard 
(JR, p. 192). 
Now, as Eddy (1986, p.75) has indicated, Kohlberg hints 
that there is another form of justification undergirding these very 
formal principles. As Eddy implies, Kohlberg does not undertake 
to integrate this other justificatory route with his formalism. This 
other route 1 call GENETIC-FUNCTIONAL since it considers the 
origin and purpose of moral thought as relevant to its justification 
(Cf. “functional-genetic", DAE, p.128). 
According to this strand of justification, moral adequacy 
depends upon the increasing ability of psychological structures, 
and the overt judgements rendered by them, to resolve problems 
or conflicts bv producing agreement among people: 
"[Martin Luther] King's morality was a more integrated and 
differentiated moral system than that of most people. It 
was more adequate because if all people adopted King's 
morality, it would resolve for everyone moral problems and 
conflicts unresolved by lower-stage moralities (DAE, p. 158); 
"each higher stage. . addressed problems unrecognized by, 
or unresolved by, lower stages" (FITO, p.214); "Stage 6 
principles. . .structure an imaginative process in the 
individual's mind which attempts to produce an ideal moral 
dialogue for resolving conflicts. The adequacy of the conflict 
resolution is determined by the achievement of social 
consensus under dialogic conditions" (CFT, p.303). 
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Within this line of justification, universality, 
universalizability, and prescriptivity derive their moral authority 
from their reflection of the more fundamental criterion of 
Lgyersifrllity• Our philosophic theory stresses the criterion of 
reversibility as the ultimate criterion of justice" (CFT, pp.308- 
310). Kohlberg appeals to reversibility when he "elaborates the 
way in which I believe the substance of Stage 6 principles of 
judgement to be better than the substantive principles of lower 
stages, not just the sense in which they are formally 'more 
moral'" (JR, p.193, emphasis added). 
Reversibility, for Kohlberg, seems to hold a dual status. It is 
on the one hand a formal criterion for assessing moral 
judgements independently of any psychological statements, like 
universality and prescriptivity. On the other hand, it directly 
reflects the orthogenetic psychological process of autonomous de¬ 
centering. Reversibility is the act of each person freely placing 
himself in the other person's shoes and co-ordinating the other's 
viewpoint with his own to arrive at a "reversible" solution. Moral 
principles, therefore, are not only better because they 
approximate a formal ideal, but because this formal ideal is itself 
a "map" of "substantive" orthogenesis qua reversibility. 
If all people reasoned at Stage 6, the stage of self-conscious 
and systematic reversibility, then, given "common agreement on 
facts and probabilities", they would "eventually agree on the 
'right' solution in concrete situations" (JR, p.193). Kohlberg is not 
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resting this claim upon the tautology that if everyone held the 
same views, they would all agree. As Piaget points out, generality 
of agreement is not identical to morality; Huxley's Brave New 
World is based on universal brainwashing for universal 
agreement. Stage 6 is a "structure or method" (ibid.), not a 
conclusion. It is held to be parallel to the "scientific method" for 
seeking truth in the nonmoral scientific realm (CFT, p.272). [9] 
Kohlberg's hypothesis is that if the method of Stage 6 were 
universally employed, agreement on the resolution of specific 
conflicts would be more likely. Kohlberg is not always careful to 
differentiate between the value of sheer agreement, as the 
resolution of substantive conflict, and the ultimate value of the 
method itself as reflecting and causing a psychologically-specific 
kind of agreement, namely autonomously de-centered agreement. 
I think it can be assumed, based on Kohlberg's liberalism, that 
this is a distinction implied in all his work. [10] 
In one sense, what Kohlberg seems to be saying about 
agreement is this: the more people are psychologically 
autonomously de-centered, the more they are hypothetically 
capable and desirous of co-ordinating each other's views to arrive 
at a mutually agreeable solution. However, his important addition 
to this somewhat obvious point is that Stage 6, as a formal 
operational representation of this process, is capable of imagining 
an "ideal moral dialogue" among such individuals. It is able to use 
such an abstract "dialogue" to arrive at equilibrated (reversible) 
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solutions to both real and hypothetical dilemmas of a complexity 
extending all the way to the just arrangement of entire societies, 
following Rawls (JR, pp. 193-201). 
Kohlberg thus supplements his explicit formalist metaet.hic 
with a genetic-functional metaethic implicit in his views on 
reversibility and conflict resolution (agreement). Within the latter 
scheme, formal ethical criteria are not themselves ultimate, but 
derive their authority from their "mapping" of psychological 
orthogenesis qua reversibility. The value of reversibility is in turn 
derived from the way in which it resolves conflict, the search for 
such resolution being seen as the origin and function of the justice 
domain. 
This, however leaves us with a lack of integration between 
these two justificatory schemes which Kohlberg never resolves. Do 
universality and prescriptivity derive their justifying power from 
their internal logical purity and consistency, following a Kantian 
formalist view? Or do they derive their justifying power from 
their description of judgements which in turn reflect a more 
integrated and differentiated psychology and more equilibrated 
social consequences, following a Deweyan genetic-functional view7 
Kohlberg never consummates a "marriage" of these two 
approaches. 
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D; Tfig QrthQftgnetlC Principle in John Dewey s 
Conception of 
1. Introduction 
Dewey does not attempt to define all manifestations of 
growth[ll] within a single unifying principle. He does, however, 
provide bountiful examples of what he means by growth. By 
presenting a range of these examples found throughout a variety 
of Dewey's works, I intend to show that they conform to, and 
enrich, the notion of orthogenesis presented so far. 
Like Kohlberg, Dewey sees all determinations of what 
constitutes "growth" as involving an ethical evaluation For 
Dewey, however, growth in the way one makes such ethical 
evaluations, i.e., "moral development", is not a fixed realm to be 
held separate from other aspects of growth. Nor is there is a fixed 
set of issues which are held to be uniquely "moral" ones. Rather, 
any growth, even growth in, say, mathematical ability, can be 
seen as "moral" growth when looked at from the point of view of 
evaluating its effect upon both the subject's character, and the 
objective world. In making these evaluative judgements, a 
scientific, i.e., objective and thorough, assessment of inner and 
outer consequences cannot be completely separated from the 
"moral" aspect of the judgement, since "the system of science., is 
absolutely dependent for logical worth upon a moral interest: the 
sincere aim to judge truly" (1946, p.227). 
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Comparison with Kohlberg's approach may make Dewey's 
approach clearer. Kohlberg makes a fixed distinction between 
attaining a certain stage of "cognitive" development as opposed to 
attaining a comparable stage of "moral” development. Kohlberg 
defines development as "moral" ONLY when it involves 
judgements resolving SOCIAL conflict. Further, increasing 
principled reversibility of justice reasoning is his SOLE measure of 
this moral development". For Dewey, the "moral" point of view 
enters in as soon as we consider anv kind of "better or worse" 
choice between ends which is focused upon the CHARACTER or 
ongoing disposition of the agent: 
"What sort of agent, of a person, shall he be? This is the 
question finally at stake in any genuinely moral situation: 
What shall the agent be? What sort of a character shall he 
assume? On its face, the question is what shall he do, shall 
he act for this or that end. But the incompatibility of the 
ends forces the issue back into the question of the kinds of 
selfhood, of agency, involved in the respective ends. The 
distinctively moral situation is then one in which elements 
of value and control are bound up with the processes of 
deliberation and desire, and are bound up in a peculiar 
way: viz., they decide what kind of a character shall 
control further desires and deliberations." (1908, p.210) 
"Character" for Dewey includes affective considerations as 
well as the rational-logical ones with which Kohlberg is 
exclusively concerned. The "psychological" reference to effect upon 
character does not take place in isolation, but is complemented 
by a "sociological" reference to consequences in the environment. 
These two points of reference are held in "reciprocity" within a 
moral judgement (1946, pp. 247-248). 
138 
For Dewey, all action-situations are potentially moral ones 
when looked at from a standpoint of "regulated activity (1946, 
p.248), in which case the act "has reference to conscious control 
of the nature of the change (i.e., deliberate change), and thereby 
gets ethical significance" (p.249). Thus, ail manifestations of 
growth are potentially moral when consciously assessed from this 
standpoint. 
Kohlberg agrees with Dewey that "moral" growth includes 
"cognitive" growth, but thinks that the reverse isn't so. For 
Dewey, cognitive growth, even growth in a child's ability to 
perform mathematical operations, has ethical import. All we are 
doing when we assess such growth "cognitively" as opposed to 
"morally" is temporarily taking the ethical issues as "presupposed" 
or constant. We are "holding off" questions of the child's (or 
teacher's) values in pursuit of this ability, or of the psychological 
and social consequences to result from it. As soon as these 
questions are brought into consciousness, we are dealing with this 
"cognitive" ability in an ethical light (pp.230-231). 
Dewey's broader definition of the moral allows us to see 
moral implications in situations that fall outside those included in 
Kohlberg's definition. For example, a scientist conducting an 
experiment may not be directly involved in any justice conflict, 
but as soon as attention is directed to his choice of methods as 
serving a particular kind of truth-seeking character, or a 
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particular set of welfare producing consequences, we are looking 
at the situation from a moral point of view. 
If all manifestations of growth can be looked at through an 
ethical lens, so to speak, the value of ethical principles 
themselves are to be judged by their contribution to growth. 
What this means is that when we are looking at a particular 
aspect of growth ethically, what we are really doing is looking at 
its larger consequences for growth in general. For Dewey, "growth 
itself is the only moral *end,M (1950, p.141). 
Sensitivity to CONTEXT in determining what constitutes 
growth is more central in Dewey’s work than it is within the 
organismic paradigm. Context, for Dewey, includes the widest 
possible range of cultural and sociohistorical factors that might 
enter into a determination of what is problematic in a situation. 
Dewey's idea of growth, as the solution to a defined problem, 
might be more likely to include changes in the society as well as 
in the individual. 
According to Dewey, "examination discloses three deepening 
levels or three expanding spheres of context” (in Bernstein, 1960, 
p. 108), which need to be considered in assessing growth. The first 
is the individual's unique situation. The second is the individual's 
culture, including all historical forces shaping the sociocultural 
situation. The third is the "general understanding of the workings 
of human nature" (p.109). This involves "the make-up of 
experience itself" (ibid.). In order to make the most general 
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statements about growth, one must base them upon the actual 
attributes of experience at the most general level. [12] In the 
following section I shall summarize Dewey’s analysis of this most 
"pervasive and inclusive context of experience” (p.110). 
2,-Attrifrutes of the Experiential context 
a. Overview 
An analysis of several of Dewey's writings reveals four 
interrelated yet distinguishable characteristics which are truly 
universal in the strict sense of being inevitable aspects of what it 
is to be human. They are "natural" in the sense that they are 
not dependent upon certain kinds of human experience or 
intervention, but rather set the inescapable context, or 
"groundrules", of all experience. One might say that they 
constitute our experiential "biology" - our "human nature". 
These four attributes do not of themselves tend towards 
growth without some level of individual and social regulation. 
This regulation may, under some sociohistorical or individual 
conditions, become so much of a "habit" that it appears to have a 
claim on being "natural". This, however, is an illusion of sorts 
caused by our suppression of a context that we take for granted 
in the ordinary course of affairs. 
Dewey sometimes makes statements which indicate a belief 
that this experiential context is "violated" (1938a, p.42) by 
changes or attitudes which are not growthful. But such 
141 
statements are rhetorical shortcuts. Their point is that pursuing 
growth without taKlhft into account these fundamental principles 
of experience is doomed to failure because it "violates” the 
principles in the same way that an airplane that crashes does so 
because its design “violates" the principles of aerodynamics. 
What is inherent In nature is the experiential context 
within which growth must be defined if it is to fulfill its 
regulative function as a value. Growth is not a mere translation 
or extrapolation of this context. It is rather an adaptive, 
regulative response of the organism to what is "problematic" or 
obstacle-producing about it (Gouinlock, p.xxx). Consciousness and 
valuation arise out of this response; in a sense, they ARE the 
response. While all responses, all acts of consciousness or 
valuation, are inevitably shaped by the problems inherent in 
experience, they are not all equally or inevitably growthful. 
b. The Four Attributes 
i. Continuity 
Continuity is simply the principle that "every experience 
both takes up something from those which have gone before and 
modifies in some way the quality of those which come after 
(1938a, p.35). Continuity conditions our definition of growth by 
forcing us to consider the effect of an experience in the present 
upon those to come. The dimension of time implicit in continuity 
sets, in effect, a problem which can only be resolved by an 
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appeal to consistency. Something cannot be considered an 
adequate or consistent response if, by "resolving" a problem in 
the current moment, it sets up an even worse problem for the 
future. Each "present" is, in addition to being just itself, the 
future" of some past moment, and the "past" of some future 
moment. Since all time, in this sense, is collapsed into each 
present moment, the only adequate, or "growthful" experiences 
are those which can command consistency without self- 
contradiction over time: 
"That a man may grow in efficiency as a burglar, as a 
gangster, or as a corrupt politician, cannot be doubted. But 
from the standpoint of growth as education and education 
as growth the question is whether growth in this direction 
promotes or retards growth in general. Does this form of 
growth create conditions for further growth, or does it set 
up conditions that shut off the person who has grown in 
this direction from the occasions, stimuli, and opportunities 
for continuing growth in new directions?" (p.36)[13] 
In addition to consistency in a given direction over time, 
continuity also appeals to consistency across various dimensions of 
growth, since change in one direction has an influence upon 
change in other directions. For example, for a burglar to advance 
in burglary, he must also advance in his disregard for others' 
rights, which in turn narrows and renders antagonistic his 
interactions with others, etc. Thus, "only when development in a 
particular line conduces to continuing growth does it answer to 
the criterion of education as growing. For the conception is one 
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that must find universal and not specialized limited application" 
(ibid., emphasis in original). [14] 
Dewey is quite clear that continuity, by itself, is not a force 
for growth. What matters is how we take continuity into account 
in determining our values and actions. This is what Dewey means 
by using it as a criterion by which to discriminate between 
experiences which are educative and those which are mis- 
educative" (p.37): 
"... there is some kind of continuity in any case since every 
experience affects for better or worse the attitudes which 
help decide the quality of further experiences, by setting up 
certain preference and aversion, and making it easier or 
harder to act for this or that end";... "while the principle of 
continuity applies in some way in every case, the quality of 
the present experience Influences the wav in which the 
principle applies"; ..."there is no paradox in the fact that 
the principle of the continuity of experience may operate so 
as to leave a person arrested on a low plane of 
development, in a way which limits later capacity for 
growth" (pp.37-38, emphasis in original). 
ii. Interaction 
The principle of interaction means that every experience is 
influenced simultaneously by subjective and objective conditions. 
These conditions determine the quality of experience in a 
mutually influential way: 
"Experience does not go on simply inside a person. It does go 
on there, for it influences the formation of attitudes of 
desire and purpose. But this is not the whole of the story. 
Every genuine experience has an active side which changes 
in some degree the objective conditions under which 
experiences are had. The difference between civilization and 
savagery, to take an example on a large scale, is found in 
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the degree in which previous experiences have changed the 
objective conditions under which subsequent experiences 
take place. . .we live from birth to death in a world of 
persons and things which in large measure is what it is 
because of what has been done and transmitted from 
previous human activities. When this fact is ignored, 
experience is treated as if it were something which goes on 
exclusively inside an individual's body and mind" (p.39). 
Just as the principle of continuity sets a problem which can 
only be resolved by taking consistency of movement over time 
into account, interaction sets a problem which requires us to take 
the regulation of both subjective and objective conditions into 
account. In Dewey's view, such a solution would have to avoid 
the trap of SUBORDINATING one set of conditions to the other. 
Spoiling a child by allowing him to do whatever he wants in spite 
of the consequences to others would be an example of 
subordinating objective conditions to the child's subjective ones. 
Forcing a child to conform to a pre-determined and fixed set of 
scholastic procedures and contents with no regard for his unique 
interests and needs would be committing the opposite practice of 
subordination. Like continuity, then, interaction operates in any 
case, for better or worse, growth being "a particular kind of 
interaction" , namely one which "assigns equal rights to both 
factors in experience - objective and internal conditions" (p.42). 
Dewey indicates that continuity and interaction “intercept and 




According to this principle, all individual experience is 
conditioned from birth by the utter dependence of the individual 
upon natural and social forces. Not only do language, thought, 
and personality depend upon social influence, but physical 
survival itself: 
"In fact, the human young are so immature that if they 
were left to themselves without the guidance and succor of 
others, they could not acquire the rudimentary abilities 
necessary for physical existence. The young of human 
beings compare so poorly in original efficiency with the 
young of many of the lower animals, that even the powers 
needed for physical sustenation have to be acquired under 
tuition. How much more, then, is this the case with respect 
to all the technological, artistic, scientific, and moral 
achievements of humanity!" (1916, p.4). 
What human beings depend upon most fundamentally is 
COMMUNICATION, and, as an outcome of communication, some 
level of CONSENSUS (pp.4-5). At the most basic level, the infant 
must be able to make its needs known, and evoke some kind of 
co-operative response from another human being, or survival 
itself is impossible. 
The "helplessness" of the individual is not looked upon as 
something merely negative, for it is precisely this need for others 
that forces the child to exercise his power of communication, of 
reaching out to others. Children are "gifted with an equipment of 
the first order for social intercourse", and the use of this 
equipment functions as a "compensating power" for the fact of 
dependence (pp. 42-43). 
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Dependence, then, as accompanied by the basic power to 
communicate, is an aspect of experience which sets up the 
HQtgntial for growth, by setting up a problem for the individual 
which can only be overcome by increasing independence: 
...if helplessness were all there were in dependence, no 
development could ever take place. A merely impotent 
being has to be carried, forever, by others. The fact that 
dependence is accompanied by growth in ability, not by an 
ever increasing lapse into parasitism, suggests that it is 
already something constructive. Being merely sheltered by 
others would not promote growth. For it would only build a 
wall around impotence" (p.43). 
Here again, Dewey intimates that dependence is inherently 
or immanently growthful, but at the same time, he also implies 
that it is only potentially so by giving a concrete example of how 
it might not tend in a growthful direction. If an individual does 
respond to the fact of dependence by seeking to maintain or 
increasing his dependence upon others, then this does not adapt 
to the problem in a way that does away with the problem, but 
in a way that simply "builds a wall" around it. Conversely, 
Dewey warns that: 
"there is always a danger that increased personal 
Independence will decrease the social capacity of an 
individual. In making him more self-reliant, it may make 
him more self-sufficient; it may lead to aloofness and 
indifference. It often makes an individual so insensitive in 
his relations to others as to develop an illusion of being 
really able to stand and act alone - an unnamed form of 
insanity which is responsible for a large part of the 
remediable suffering of the world" (p.44). 
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Both increasing parasitism" and the increasing "illusion" of 
self-sufficiency" are regressive adaptations to the problem of 
dependence; the former reinforces it, the latter denies it. The 
growthful response to dependence is some form of increasing 
INTERDEPENDENCE, wherein an individual increases both his 
autonomy and his sensitivity, openness, and responsiveness to 
others (ibid.). 
Dependence and interaction seem nearly identical; both 
point to the basic problem of subject and object in experience. 
One subtle distinction to be made might be to say that the 
principle of dependence explains, in a functional, causative 
fashion, the "structure" of interaction, i.e., the need to weigh 
and fuse both "internal" and "external" conditions in defining 
growth. 
iv. Plasticity 
Plasticity is the "power to modify actions on the basis of the 
results of prior experiences, the power to develop dispositions" 
(p.44, emphasis in original). Just as dependence explains the 
source and mechanism of interaction, plasticity explains the 
source and mechanism of continuity (1938a, p.35). It relates to 
what Piaget calls the "bursting of instinct" in human beings, the 
fact that we are not programmed to follow a specialized pattern 
of change, but rather have a vast capacity to modify ourselves in 
the face of changing conditions. Plasticity involves the "power of 
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acquiring variable and novel modes of control" (p.46). These 
modes of control Dewey calls HABITS. Habits are not innate, nor 
formed by the environment from without, but are rather formed 
by the organism in interaction with the environment (like 
Piagetian "schemes"). 
Plasticity means that habits of thought and action, even 
ones which are heavily conditioned by long-enduring 
sociohistorical context, are never completely fixed. There is 
always some degree of "elasticity". On the other hand, a habit 
represents an "active preference and choice for the conditions 
involved in its exercise", so as to form an "intellectual disposition" 
(p.48). The nature of plasticity as elastic habit creates the 
possibility of growth by allowing the organism to not only learn 
from the environment, but to acquire "the habit of learning". 
Such learning is capable of undergoing further modification, 
transformation, and even abandonment. 
Like the other inherent aspects of experience, plasticity 
frames a problem for growth to resolve, namely, the problem of 
balancing the power to learn and the power to modify prior 
learning. The conflict arises from the fact that the very habit¬ 
forming power that makes learning possible is the same power 
which makes resistance to future learning possible. This forces 
any definition of growth to take into account the Lind of habits 
formed, and their influence upon later habit-formation and 
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reconstruction. This is the sense in which the problem of 
plasticity is the source of the problem of continuity. 
Without the formation of regular habits, there can be no 
economical and effective control of the environment", no "ability 
to use natural conditions as means to ends" (p.46). But while 
habits may provide "powers so well established that their 
possessor always has them as resources when needed", they may 
also "mean that something has a fixed hold upon us, instead of 
our having a free hold upon things", they may lead to "ruts, 
routine ways, with loss of freshness, openmindedness, and 
originality" (p.48). Any growthful direction, then, must resolve 
this conflict by allowing for the formation of habits, but also 
providing for some kind of reconstructive check upon them. In 
Dewey's view, reflective reason and affective impulses combine 
forces to exert such a moderating influence upon habit. 
3. Orthogenesis in Dewev’s Examples of Growth 
a. Overview 
Dewey is cautious about the possibility of organizing all 
aspects of growth within one universal principle. He is concerned 
that such a principle would become some sort of Kantian formal 
imperative, disconnected from concrete experience. And yet, a 
universal principle of growth, although not a Kantian one, is at 
least partially articulated by Dewey, complete with warnings 
against reliance upon such a principle: 
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Progress means increase of present meaning, which 
involves multiplication of sense distinctions as well as 
harmony, unification. This statement may, perhaps, be 
made generally, in application to the experience of 
humanity. If history shows progress it can hardly be found 
elsewhere than in this complication and extension of the 
significance found within experience. It is clear that such 
progress brings no surcease, no immunity from perplexity 
and trouble. If we wished to transmute this generalization 
into a categorical imperative we should say: ’So act as to 
increase the meaning of present experience'. But even then 
in order to get instruction about the concrete quality of 
such increased meaning we should have to run away from 
the law and study the needs and alternative possibilities 
lying within a unique and localized situation. The 
imperative, like everything absolute, is sterile. Till men give 
up the search for a general formula of progress they will 
not know where to look to find it” (1922, p.283). 
The "multiplication of sense distinctions as well as harmony, 
unification" to which Dewey refers is identical to the notion of 
differentiation and complementary integration, i.e., the 
orthogenetic principle. Dewey expresses this principle tentatively 
because he does not wish to court the risk of limiting either its 
potential multilinearity or its contextual sensitivity. Nor does he 
wish to imply any ideal state which would close the door to 
further growth. Nonetheless, his examples of growth consistently 
demonstrate this principle at work. 
b. Growth as Progressive Adaptation to Problems Within the 
Universal Context of Experience 
I will summarize the orthogenetic qualities of what Dewey 
considers to be growth-responses to the universal experiential 
conditions of continuity, interaction, dependence, and plasticity: 
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i. In response to the fact of CONTINUITY (i.e., that each 
experience reflects the past and affects the future), Dewey sees 
growth as the increasing integrative co-ordination of diverse 
experiences. Experiences are growthful to the extent that they 
lead to continued and expanded growth. Taken in isolation, this is 
essentially an appeal to integration qua universality and self- 
consistency. 
ii. In response to the fact of INTERACTION, Dewey sees 
growth in the increasing equilibration of organism and 
environment in a virtually Piagetian sense. This involves 
increasing de-centering and opening of the individual towards an 
increasingly differentiated (varied, extended, and articulated) 
environment, coupled with the increasing autonomy and co- 
ordinative power of the individual with respect to the 
environment. 
iii. In response to the fact of DEPENDENCE (upon other 
people and nature), Dewey sees growth as an increasing 
interdependence wherein increasing autonomy is complemented 
by increasing awareness of, and responsiveness to, one's 
connectedness to others and nature. [15] 
iv. In response to the fact of PLASTICITY (i.e., that habits 
possess both the power of self-modification and the power of 
resistance to modification), Dewey sees growth as an increasing 
co-ordination of increasingly varied and complex habits by an 
autonomous power of reconstruction (or habit of growing ). 
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Growthful habits confer both an autonomy-immunity gained 
from ease of execution and resistance to interference, and a de¬ 
centering-opening gained from a wider environment and more 
flexibility in the face of new conditions. The "stable-flexible" 
concept found in both Werner and Piaget comes to mind here. 
c. Personality: Love, Will, and Thoughtfulness 
Dewey's complex view of what constitutes growth in 
personality, or CHARACTER, may be succinctly expressed in terms 
of what he calls the virtues of LOVE, WILL, and 
THOUGHTFULNESS, which correspond to growth in feeling, action, 
and thought respectively (1908, pp. 422-423). 
In the idea of thoughtfulness, also expressed as 
REFLECTIVENESS, Dewey reiterates many of the qualities of 
cognitive orthogenesis previously examined in Werner, Piaget, and 
Kohlberg: a) consideration of an ever-larger environment of inner 
and outer consequences; b) differentiation and hierarchization of 
such considerations; c) de-centering from personal bias and other 
egocentric, sociocentric, or egoistic distortions; d) co-ordination of 
thought within general principles. In the idea of love, also 
expressed as SENSITIVENESS or SYMPATHY, Dewey expresses the 
affective side of thoughtfulness. For him, the affective side of 
increasing role-taking or perspectivism in growth is highly 
relevant, since it is our increasing affective sensitivity to others, 
and to objective considerations in general, which gives rise to our 
sense of the problematic, and engages our problem-solving 
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faculties. Love is an increasing opening and de-centering process, 
and an increasing integration of the object as a matter of 
sympathetic concern to the subject. 
In the idea of will, also expressed as COURAGE or 
PERSISTENCE, Dewey captures the integration of thought and 
feeling within action, and the integration of the subject’s internal 
state with the objective conditions through action. Will involves 
the co-or dinative power of the subject to act upon the products 
of his de-centered, far-ranging, and articulated thoughts and 
sympathies despite the obstacles of fear or ingrained prior habits. 
As with Piaget and Kohlberg, will functions as an affective- 
cognitive differentiation (de-centering) of the subject from those 
habits of thought and feeling which would otherwise impede 
action. [16] 
As growth proceeds, love, will, and thoughtfulness are 
increasingly "harmonized" (integrated) within the subject's 
experience, but in a non-syncretic (differentiated) way, so that 
they operate harmoniously, yet exert a sort of check upon one 
another. For example, growth in reflection would provide 
autonomy from affective prejudice, while growth in sympathy 
would make one uneasy about rationalized prejudice (causing one 
to focus further reason upon it). Thought would be exercised to 
examine motives for action, and thus decrease self-deception by 
forming "the habit of reading 'motives’ in the light of persistent, 
thorough, and minute attention to the consequences which flow 
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from them (1908, p.258). On the other hand, will would be 
exercised to ensure that thoughts and feelings do in fact "regulate 
the overt acts performed, since growth in character "means 
intelligent forethought of ends and resolute endeavor to achieve 
them (pp. 244-246). Dewey defines the thorough integration of 
love (sensitiveness) and thoughtfulness (reflectiveness) with will 
as "conscientiousness" or "wisdom" (p. 418): "genuine moral 
knowledge involves the affection and the resolute will as well as 
the intelligence" (p.423). 
Character growth, for Dewey, is growth in certain habits; 
"Wide sympathy, keen sensitiveness, persistence in the face of 
the disagreeable, balance of interests enabling us to undertake the 
work of analysis and decision intelligently" (1950, p.133). It also 
includes the growing ability to see the interactive implications of 
particular habits for growth in general. 
d. Habits. Skills, and Interests 
However, Dewey says it is not only possible but desirable to 
temporarily suppress these ethical considerations in growth, i.e., 
the relation of particular habits to the entirety of growth. We 
can in this case define growth within the formation of the 
particular habits, skills, and interests which manifest individual 
personality. [17] These include habits of thinking and learning, of 
artistic expression, of craft, of economic endeavor, and so on. 
Dewey appeals to orthogenetic criteria in defining what is 
growthful in such formation. With growth: 
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Habits which affect behavior become more available to 
explicit control by consciousness, and thus more subject to 
reconstruction. This includes habits of thought and social 
organization determined by individual and social context, which 
may be taken for granted. Growth involves the power to examine 
all habits in terms of their contribution to growth. The growth- 
aim is to become increasingly autonomously de-centered from 
unconscious habits (1916, pp.19, 29) so that habits become 
increasingly INSTRUMENTAL, i.e., co-ordinated by the individual's 
larger purposes. The individual thus acquires "the possibility of 
release from submergence in the merely given" (1925, p.270). 
* Habits (including skills and interests) increase their "active 
capacities to readjust activity to meet new conditions" (1916, 
p.52) while at the same time, they retain "executive skill, 
definiteness of interest, and specific objects of observation and 
thought". With growth, flexibility is not gained at the expense of 
articulation or concentration. Rather, "habit is formed in view of 
possible future changes and does not harden so readily... By a 
seeming paradox, increased power of forming habits means 
increased susceptibility, sensitiveness, responsiveness" (1925, 
p.281). 
* Habits, skills, and interests increase their mutual 
"interpenetration", co-ordinated by the increasingly integrated 
character of the individual. They are organized so as to support 
one another, and not function at cross-purposes, or in an 
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isolated compartmental" state (1922, in Gouinlock, p.101). 
However, this is by no means done at the expense of the 
number, variety, or uniqueness (differentiation) of habits, skills, 
or interests, which also increase with growth (1925, pp. 280-281). 
Increase in both variety and interrelation is what distinguishes 
the growing individual from one who is becoming more 
"pigeonholed” in his habits, or else subject to mere 
"predetermined regularity" (1922, in Archambault, pp. 82-85). 
Growth allows for "emergence of unexpected and unpredictable 
combinations" (1925, p.281). 
* Artistic ability increasingly reflects both the artist’s 
unique individuality and perspective (originality), and his power 
to communicate a vision which can be shared and appreciated 
socially. There is also growth in sheer skill, an increasing power 
of sensitivity to and control over the environment which would 
describe growth in any ability. But orthogenesis in artistic ability 
is distinguished simultaneously by its "manifestation of 
individuality" (in Bernstein, p.242), and by its power to 
communicate with, enlarge the experience of, and evoke the 
individuality of others, to "disclose the meaning of the 
individuality of others to those others" (p.243). For Dewey Art is 
not the possession of the few who are recognized writers, 
painters, musicians; it is the authentic expression of any and all 
individuality" (ibid.). 
157 
e. Individual and Society 
Dewey’s notions about the relationship of the individual to 
society, and how this relationship defines what constitutes growth 
for both individual and society, are very similar to Piaget’s. Like 
Piaget, Dewey does not harbor some fixed or reified notion of 
society as transcending individuality; society is nothing other 
than an association of communicating and interdependent 
individuals. On the other hand, just as society cannot be 
separated from individuality, individuality cannot be separated 
from society; like Piaget, Dewey maintains that "every actual self 
is a self which includes social relations and offices, both actual 
and potential" (1908, p.380). Without society, there can be no 
personality, no individuality. 
The simultaneous existence of a person as both a unique 
individual and as a member of a social organization forms a 
problem in experience which it is the very function of the 
growth-process to resolve in a progressively adaptational way, a 
way which increasingly does away with the terms of the 
problem. The growth-path Dewey charts is virtually identical to 
Piaget’s "two kinds of de-centering", a path which avoids both 
social conformity and egoism. Growth-paths, and the values 
which direct and regulate them, are judged by the degree to 
which they "release individual potentialities of desire and interest, 
and [do] so in a way that contributes to MUTUAL 
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REINFORCEMENT of the desires and interests of all members of a 
group" (1939, p.60, emphasis added). 
This release of individual potentialities of desire and 
interest" is essentially what Dewey defines as FREEDOM (See also 
1922, pp.304-306). The "mutual reinforcement" of freedom within 
society is, however, a matter of social ORGANIZATION. Dewey 
recognizes that there are "seeming" conflicts between freedom and 
organization; his point is not to offer a fixed solution, but to 
outline both the terms of the problem and the general growth- 
direction in which resolutions ought to be sought: 
"I have no desire to add another to the cheap and easy 
solutions which exist of the seeming conflict between 
freedom and organization. It is reasonably obvious that 
organization may become a hindrance to freedom; it does 
not take us far to say that the trouble lies not in 
organization but in over-organization. . . the relation of 
individual freedom to organization is seen to be an 
EXPERIMENTAL affair. It is not capable of being settled by 
abstract theory" (1922, p.307, emphasis added). [18] 
Dewey makes it clear that growth for each individual and 
growth for society qua all individuals are mutually 
interdependent: 
"It is true that the aim of education is development of 
individuals to the utmost of their potentialities. But this 
statement in isolation leaves unanswered the question as to 
what is the measure of the development. 
A society of free individuals in which all, through their own 
work, contribute to the liberation and enrichment of the 
lives of others, is the only environment in which any 
individual can really grow normally to his full stature. An 
environment in which some are practically enslaved, 
degraded, limited, will always react to create conditions 
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that prevent the full development even of those who fancy 
they enjoy complete freedom for unhindered growth" (in 
Archambault, p.12). 
Thus, growth is defined as that process which has the 
power to ensure the "mutual reinforcement" of growth among all 
individuals. Taken in the abstract, this leaves us again with the 
principle of universality or consistency, this time across all 
individuals rather than merely within each individual. Again, to 
reveal what kind of mutual reinforcement is growthful. we must 
resort to more specific examples. These examples turn out to be 
manifestations of the orthogenetic principle qua autonomous de¬ 
centering. 
This means that for each individual, growth has two faces. 
Insofar as an individual grows out of egocentrism or egoism, he 
increasingly "forgets" himself, and concentrates upon how he can 
benefit others, both directly and terms of shaping the social 
organization: 
"The acquisition of skills is not an end in itself. They are 
things to be put to use, and that use is their contribution to 
a common and shared life. They are intended, Indeed, to 
make an individual more capable of self-support and of self- 
respecting independence. But unless this end is placed in the 
context of services rendered to others, skills gained will be 
put to an egoistic and selfish use, and may be employed as 
means of a trained shrewdness in which one person gets the 
better of others" (in Archambault, p.ll, Cf. pp. 427, 430; 
1908, p.394). 
On the other hand, however, this concern for others is also 
de-centered from any fixed notion of social organization to which 
they must conform. It is thus imbued with the concern for 
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preserving and enhancing each person’s autonomy: "regard for 
the happiness of others means regard for those conditions and 
Q&.jgCtS Which Permit others freely to exercise their own powers 
from their own initiative, reflection, and choice" (1908, p.302, 
emphasis in original). Dewey's "ultimate and unified standard" for 
educational practice is "the extent and way in which a study 
brings the pupil to consciousness of his social environment, and 
confers upon him the ability to interpret his own powers from 
the standpoint of their possibilties in social use" (in Archambault, 
p.121, emphasis added). The individual is increasingly helped to 
free himself from narrow egoism by leading him to a concern for 
others, but is at the same time encouraged to create his own 
interpretation of how to best serve others. 
Now, of course, a growing person remains concerned with 
preserving his own individuality, and with seeing that others 
learn to become more socially oriented. But it is precisely the 
hallmark of growth in the individual-society relationship that the 
individual is free to focus more upon his own de-centering 
because others are increasingly looking out for his autonomy, and 
he is more free to look out for others' autonomy because they are 
increasingly looking to their own de-centering. 
Thus, with growth, individual and social aims "merge", but 
at a dialectically higher plane than the syncretic and rigid 
"submergence" of the individual into society found in primitive 
cultures as defined by Werner. The individual s need for 
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autonomy (individuality) is increasingly adopted by society, and 
the society s need for de-centering (social responsiveness) is 
increasingly adopted by the individual. The social organization is 
itself increasingly DEMOCRATIC, in that all individuals are expected 
to play a direct role in shaping the society through active 
communication and mutual agreement. 
In a less developed (but still post-primitive) individual- 
society relationship, more concern on the part of each individual 
is directed towards safeguarding his own autonomy, and social 
organization is more directed towards getting people to behave 
according to a fixed social plan. Hence the conflict between 
individual and society. Dewey rejects paths of either increasing 
“individualism" or "statism" as solutions to this conflict. Both 
solutions are regressive, not progressive adaptations to the 
individual-society problem in that they reinforce, rather than 
overcome, its terms (1916, pp. 91-98; 1908, pp.225-226). 
With growth, by contrast, the individual, by focusing on 
social aims rather than purely egoistic aims, gains autonomy 
from the internal demands and insecurities of his own ego. 
Simultaneously, the society, by preserving individual autonomy, 
hence variation among socially equal individuals, reinforces the 
individual’s efforts to overcome egoism or sociocentrism by 
exposing him to a plurality of perspectives and influences. Thus 
we arrive at the progressive "mutual reinforcement that Dewey 
has in mind. 
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Such mutual reinforcement depends upon COMMUNICATION, 
CO-OPERATION, and SHARED EXPERIENCE as its medium. De¬ 
centering is not merely distant appreciation or tolerance for 
another s perspective, but an active willingness to engage in 
dialogue and mutual exploration of perspectives. Autonomy is not 
merely freedom to go off by oneself to do one's thing, but 
freedom from egoistic or sociocentric barriers against others, and 
freedom to form the greatest possible variety of associations. 
Dewey, in this regard, presents two complementary criteria 
for defining growth for social groups within a society, as well as 
for entire societies themselves. These criteria are related to intra¬ 
group and inter-group integration and differentiation, 
respectively. The first criterion is the number and variety of 
interests in the group which are shared in common by members 
of the group. Dewey compares a band of thieves, in which the 
common interest is limited to that of the loot to be shared, with 
a family in which "there are material, intellectual, aesthetic 
interests in which all participate and [in which] the progress of 
one member has worth for the experience of other members". 
Similarly, in a "despotic state", the interests shared between 
ruler and ruled are few, whereas in a democratic state, they are 
many and varied. 
The second criterion relates to the number of "varied and 
free points of contact with other modes of association , i.e., other 
groups. While the band of burglars acts in necessary secrecy, the 
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family is connected to all sorts of business, religious, political, etc. 
groups in which it takes an active part through shared interests 
with others. In a class-based society, members of one class share 
few interests with those of another, whereas in a more developed 
society, differences between varied ethnic or occupational groups 
do not prevent them from engaging in dialogue or having a 
number of interests in common (1916, pp.83-84). [19] 
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Notes 
1. One may consider, however, that each new developmental 
advance brings with it a new set of problems which define 
the direction of the next advance. Thus the alienation of the 
individual from society which exists in more advanced 
cultures could be seen as a sort of "price" paid for 
development out of primitivity. Healing this rift without 
regression back to primitivity would become a problem to be 
solved by further development. 
2. Werner does not pursue the notion of a higher level of 
development, transcending the exploitative and alienated 
relationship to nature which might be seen as the "price" of 
development out of primitivity, 
3. Initials refer to articles by Kohlberg, most of which are 
included in The Philosophy of Moral Development (1981) and 
The Psychology of Moral Development (1984). In some cases 
(DAE, FITO) the page references are to earlier printings of the 
work, (see Bibliography) rather than those included in the 
abovementioned volumes. Here is the "code": 
CD: "Continuities and Discontinuities in Childhood and Adult 
Development" (1984) 
CFT: "Current Formulation of the Theory” (1984) 
CP: "Capital Punishment, Moral Development, and the 
Constitution" (1981) 
DAE: "Development as the Aim of Education" (1978) 
DRC: "Synopses and Detailed Replies to Critics" (1984) 
FITO: "From Is To Ought" (1971) 
JR. "Justice as Reversibility" (1981) 
MJMA: "The Relationship of Moral Judgement to Moral Action” 
(1984) 
MSM: "Moral Stages and Moralization" (1984) 
QSS: "Moral Development, Religious Thinking, and the 
Question of a Seventh Stage" (1981) 
SS: "Stage and Sequence" (1984) 
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4. Such recognition stems partially from Kohlberg's desire to 
ranslate his psychological theory into prescriptions for 
educational practice (DAE, p.129, CFT, p.275). He is eager to 
differentiate his theory from maturationist and associationist 
theories which purport to derive educational "oughts" from 
psychological facts", thereby committing the "naturalistic 
fallacy . His aim is to develop an independent philosophical 
rationale for why educators should favor his psychology over 
others. 
5. Kohlberg s statement that Justice as a principle at higher 
developmental stages "takes precedence over law and other 
considerations, INCLUDING WELFARE (FITO, p.220, emphasis 
added) seems peculiar at first glance. After all, the concern 
ultimately behind the quest for thorough equality and 
reciprocity in human relations is not logical elegance, but 
giving each person his "due", which certainly implies each 
person's welfare. Kohlberg's use of the word "welfare", 
however, seems to refer more specifically to the utilitarian 
notion of "greatest good for the greatest number". His point is 
that at lower stages, an individual's rights might be 
sacrificed if this were thought to contribute to the welfare of 
a larger number of people (e.g., in the case of capital 
punishment). Higher (more reversible) stages of reciprocal 
role-taking would entail a more principled recognition of the 
individual's right to life no matter what "good" the 
individual's death might be held to produce for others (CP, 
pp.252-253, JR, pp.205-209). 
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6. In this respect Kohlberg distinguishes his moral theory from 
Piaget s. Piaget interprets the difference between co-operative 
relations among adolescent peers and their more 
authoritarian thinking about society as having to do with 
intergenerational constraint. He assumes social 
authoritarianism is an ongoing vestige of "Stage 1" thinking 
explained by the difference between peer and child-adult 
relations. Kohlberg, seeing such adolescent thinking as 
compatible with Stage 4, distinguishes its law-maintaininR 
orientation from the Stage 1 law-obeying, orientation (FITO, 
p.199). Stage 4 thinking, rather than being an internalization 
of societal or parental taboos, is a rational and constructive 
attempt to see oneself abstractly as a "member of society". 
Use of Stage 4 for resolving moral issues at the level of 
society would be presumably quite compatible with continued 
use of a co-operative Stage 3 ethic within concrete personal 
relations. The fact that in some cultures, adolescents respond 
towards their peers in one way and to adults in another is a 
"dimension... sensitive to a wide variety of cultural and 
subcultural influences which cannot be analyzed in rate-of - 
development terms" (SS, p.43). 
7. Kohlberg emphasizes the more negative emotions in this 
account of motivational change within justice reasoning One 
explanation for this is that Kohlberg wishes to demonstrate 
that it is cognition as distinct from affect that develops in 
moral development. The emotion of anxiety is thus held 
constant from stage 1 to stage 6, and development is shown 
to be a matter of that anxiety becoming cognitively 
associated with self-disapproval as opposed to physical 
punishment or social ostracism. Insofar as Kohlberg speaks of 
positive affective motives such as compassion or love, he 
tends to associate them with AGAPE as being elaborations 
upon justice rather than central elements of it. One positive 
affective motivation implied in Kohlberg’s theory might be a 
love of rational order. It seems, however, that Justice 
reasoning might be seen to develop with empathy rather 
than fear being chosen as the affective constant. Movement 
from fear-motivation to empathic-motivation, while not a 
moral movement in Kohlberg’s narrow sense of the word, 
might be considered a dimension of psychological development 
with some bearing upon the moral domain. 
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Kohlberg makes it clear that his theory of justice reasoning is 
designed to be compatible with a hard structural stage model 
defined in terms of hierarchic integration of one structure by 
the next, invariant sequence, and structured "wholeness" 
(CFT, pp. 237-238, 244-247). A sub-theory of intuitive moral 
types is not easily integrated into such a model, and 1 don't 
see where Kohlberg has made a systematic attempt to do 
this. 
He does say that 'moral action stems from responsible choice 
guided by an Intuition of moral values and Is not necessarily 
dependent on stage sophistication" (p.26l). Only at Stages 5 
and 6 does a "full, rational, and principled justification" for 
such action occur (ibid.). So one could perhaps say that 
moral intuition is an extra-rational force (although perhaps 
"cognitive" in the broad sense of the term) impinging upon 
moral judgement as a spur to reason, as well as a domain of 
development in its own right. The exact relations between 
the substage (or moral type) dimension and the "stage 
sophistication" dimension are not made clear. Nonetheless, 
one could at the very least conclude from Kohlberg's addition 
of the substage theory that moral education is not only a 
matter of leading students to move stage-wise, but also a 
matter of leading them from type A to type B at a 
potentially earlier age than one would expect them to reach 
Stages 5 or 6! 
9. In his earlier work, Kohlberg claims that increasing 
agreement at higher stages is shown by his research: "The 
general claim that the higher the stage, the more the 
determination of content by structure, and the more 
agreement among people, is elaborated empirically" (JR, 
p.193). In his later work, he maintains that Stage 5 subjects 
agree more than Stage 4 subjects (CFT, pp.272-273). But he 
asserts, due to lack of empirical verification of Stage 6, that 
"we are in no position to claim the empirical psychological 
truth that there is substantive moral agreement reached at 
the terminus of moral development". Rather, moral 
agreement is held to be a "metaethical ideal" (ibid.). 
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10. Without crystalline differentiation of these two values, mere 
agreement or conflict resolution" can be very scary as 
moral alms, or as Justifications of moral adequacy. This is of 
course the whole point of dystopian novelists such as Huxley, 
Orwell, and Zamiatin, who portray worlds which achieve 
complete agreement at the expense of autonomy and critical 
doubt. Limiting putative moral discourse and agreement to 
rationally moral people (JR, p.193) does not, in my opinion, 
substitute for such differentiation. 
11 Dewey uses the term "growth" as his descriptive term for the 
constant direction of desirable change or adaptation in 
human beings. In some works, Dewey uses the term 
"development" interchangeably with "growth" (e g., 1916, 
Ch.4). In others, however, (in Bernstein, p.237), he uses’ 
"development" to refer to both good and bad adaptive change, 
presumably reserving "growth" to describe the progressive 
form of "development". Since I have defined "development" in 
this thesis as progressive (desirable) ontogenetic adaptation, 
and since Dewey does not consistently use it that way, 1 will 
confine myself, in this section, to the word "growth" to 
describe what elsewhere in the thesis is described equally as 
"growth" or "development". 
12 One may ask to what degree one can make statements about 
the general workings of experience without these simply 
reflecting bias introduced by one or both of the first two 
levels, namely personal and/or cultural bias. Dewey's answer 
to this is that the only "correction of biases" to be had is 
"through acquaintance with the experience of others, 
contemporary and as recorded in the history of the race". 
The wider the scope of one's "sympathetic 
intercommunication" with people of different cultures and 
times, the better chance one has of overcoming egocentrism 
and sociocentrism in one’s generalizations (in Bernstein, 
p.109). 
13. Here, obviously, Dewey is stretching the word "growth" to 
include all kinds of change, so as to allow for "bad growth" as 
well as "good growth". This is a deviation from Dewey's usual 
use of the word as implying the desirable direction of change. 
It doesn't affect his point, and should be overlooked. 
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14. Dewey implies that the criteria of universality and 
consistency as a response to the fact of experiential 
continuity relieves us of the need to "specify the direction in 
which growth takes place" (1938a, p.36). This is a puzzling 
implication, for here Dewey's apparent desire to avoid any 
principled generalization of the direction of growth leaves him 
in effect defining growth in terms of even more abstract 
notions. Elsewhere, Dewey explicitly rejects mere universality 
and self-consistency as sufficient to define an ethically 
acceptable direction of change (1908, pp. 316-317). 
The fact is that Dewey does repeatedly "specify the direction 
in which growth takes place", through very concrete 
examples. Without direct reference to these examples and 
their consequences, Dewey would not entertain for a moment 
the abstract idea that growth can be defined solely in terms 
of its tendency to "create conditions for further growth" 
(1938a, p.36), although he would deem this a necessary 
criterion. 
My interpretation, drawn from the wider context of his 
ideas, would be that continuity is only a partial (necessary 
but not sufficient) description of the context of experience. 
Therefore, increasing universality and consistency, as a 
response to the problem posed by continuity, is only a partial 
description of growth. To render it complete, it must be 
complemented by responses to the other aspects of the 
experiential context: interaction, dependence, and plasticity. 
15. See Colwell (1985) for an interpretation and thorough review 
of Dewey's sensitivity to modern "ecological" concerns, 
especially humanity's interdependence and interconnectedness 
with the global environment. 
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16. With respect to the role played by fear in character 
development, it is important to contrast Dewey’s theory with 
the Piaget-Kohlberg approach. Because Piaget and Kohlberg 
focus exclusively upon the cognitive side of development, 
affective factors are held constant; there is no idea of 
affective growth per se. All that matters is growth in the 
cognitive structures to which the affective "energies" are 
attached. Thus for Piaget and Kohlberg there is no need to 
overcome fear as a central motivating force. Rather, it is 
sufficient for the cognitive object of the fear to change: from 
fear of authority, to fear of the opinions of peers, and finally 
to fear of losing one’s own self-respect. 
For Dewey, as a person grows, he replaces motivation by 
fear, no matter what its object, with motivation by 
sympathetic appreciation of the needs of the situation: "it is 
necessary that the child should gradually grow out of this 
relatively external motive, into an appreciation of the social 
value of what he has to do for its own sake, and because of 
its relations to life as a whole" (in Archambault, p.119). 
Dewey is aware that "Fear is a motive which is almost sure 
to enter in - not necessarily physical fear, or of punishment, 
but fear of losing the approbation of others" (ibid ). But 
growth out of fear is necessary if one is to "shift the center 
of ethical gravity from an absorption which is selfish to a 
service which is social" (p.120). Movement from fear- 
motivation to empathy-motivation thus seems to be an 
affective de-centering to complement the cognitive de¬ 
centering stressed by Piaget and Kohlberg. For Dewey, the 
growth of both affect and cognition are mutually dependent 
and reinforcing. 
Dewey recognizes that a shift in the cognitive object to which 
fear is attached makes a developmental difference: "...fear 
need not be an undesirable factor in experience. Caution, 
circumspection, prudence, desire to foresee future events so 
as to avert what is harmful, these desirable traits are as 
much a product of calling the Impulse of fear into play as is 
cowardice and abject submission" (1916, p.84). But in this 
case, fear is checked not only by cognition but by other 
affective impulses as well, so that "the appeal to fear is [not] 
isolated" (ibid., emphasis in original). 
Kohlberg's "Stage 6" reasoner, motivated purely by a fear of 
falling in his own opinion of himself if he were to violate his 
self-chosen universal principles, would be seen by Dewey to 
be suffering from a flaw in ethical character. Dewey would 
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say that only sympathy as a motivation is going to lead this 
person to obtain the "moral knowledge" he needs to make 
adequate intellectual judgements: 
Sympathy widens our interest in consequences and leads us 
to take Into account such results as affect the welfare of 
others, it aids us to count and weigh these consequences as 
counting for as much as those which touch our own honor, 
purse, or power . .Sympathy, in short, is the general 
principle of moral knowledge, not because its commands take 
precedence of others (which they do not necessarily), but 
because it furnishes the most reliable and efficacious 
intellectual standpoint" (1908, pp.334-335, emphasis in 
original). 
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17. The following quote explains Dewey's position on this point 
more fully: 
It is not necessary nor advisable to be always considering 
the interaction of habits with one another, that is to say the 
effect of a particular habit upon character - which is a name 
for the total interaction. Such consideration distracts 
attention from the problem of building up an effective habit. 
A man who is learning French, or chess-playing or 
engineering has his hands full with his particular occupation. 
He would be confused and hampered by constant inquiry into 
its effect upon character. He would resemble the centipede 
who by trying to think of the movement of each leg in 
relation to all the others was rendered unable to travel. At 
any given time, certain habits must be taken for granted as 
a matter of course. Their operation is not a matter of moral 
judgement. They are treated as technical, recreational, 
professional, hygienic, or economic or esthetic rather than 
moral. To lug in morals, or ulterior effect on character at 
every point, is to cultivate moral valetudinarianism or 
priggish posing. Nevertheless any act, even that one which 
passes ordinarily as trivial, may entail such consequences for 
habit and character as upon occasion to require judgement 
from the standpoint of the whole body of conduct. It then 
comes under moral scrutiny. To know when to leave acts 
without distinctive moral judgement and when to subject 
them to it is itself a large factor in morality. The serious 
matter is that this relative pragmatic, or intellectual, 
distinction between the moral and non-moral, has been 
solidified into a fixed and absolute distinction, so that some 
acts are popularly regarded as forever within and others 
forever without the moral domain. From this fatal error 
recognition of the relations of one habit to others preserves 
us. For it makes us see that character is the name given to 
the working interaction of habits, and that the cumulative 
effect of insensible modifications worked by a particular habit 
in the body of preferences may at any moment require 
attention" (1922, pp.39-40). 
18. It is an error to think, as have critics such as Callan (1982), 
that Dewey harbors some fixed notion of "democracy" as an 
ideal society to which individuals would conform in order to 
obtain a fixed and compromised measure of "freedom". As 
Callan points out, the danger in such a fixed view is that 
unpredictable eccentricities of individuality which threatened 
the ideal balance might be subject to a social disapproval as 
inhibiting as more egregious forms of oppression. It is 
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precisely in order to safeguard the continuously 
reconstructive nature of individual interests that Dewey 
rejects the temptation to erect such a fixed notion of 
democratic society. 
19. Now obviously Dewey does not think that organized crime is 
better than isolated crime because of its wider network of 
connections. To the extent that this might be construed from 
the paragraphs cited, it is yet another example of the 
dangers of interpreting Dewey out of context. Dewey has a 
habit of setting forth general criteria for growth as if they 
were sufficient unto themselves. I think this is because he 
takes it so fully for granted that they are not, that they 
presuppose certain ideas such as, for example, those related 
to growth in "character". 
One cannot rely upon his criterion of growth as what 
"conduces to further growth" without reference to additional 
criteria which specify the direction of growthful subject- 
object interaction. One cannot rely upon his criterion of 
growth as what is "mutually reinforcing" between individual 
and society without reference to additional criteria which 
specify the direction of growthful individual-society 
interaction. Similarly, one cannot rely upon his criteria of 
the number and variety of interests within or between 
groups without reference to additional criteria which specify 
the growthful direction of such interests. 
CHAPTER III 
JUSTIFICATION FOR ORTHOGENESIS AS A DEFINITION OF GROWTH 
OR DEVELOPMENT 
A. Introduction 
To re-state the definition given in Chapter 1, orthogenesis is 
a direction of change in the organism with respect to its 
environment. This direction is characterized by increasing 
integration with complementary differentiation. Integration- 
differentiation comprises three pairs of complementary qualities. 
The first is increasing DISTINGUISHING of elements with an 
accompanying CO-ORDINATION of the elements distinguished. Piano 
technique develops as harmonies and fingerings emerge from an 
undifferentiated spread of fingers and keys. At the same time, 
each fingering constitutes a pattern co-ordinated for the purpose 
of getting from one place to another on the keyboard. The ability 
to distinguish between two notes in a trill depends upon the 
ability to co-ordinate them to produce the trill sound. Likewise, 
there can be no co-ordination of the trill without a crisp 
distinction between the two notes. 
At the minute scale involved in the development of a trill, 
it is easy to see how distinguishing and co-ordination are 
interdependent. On a larger scale, such as the playing of a 
composition, it may appear as though development see-saws 
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between distinguishing and co-ordination. Thus we alternate drill, 
which isolates elements of technique, with interpretation, which 
brings the whole piece together. But on this scale as well, there 
can be no growth until co-ordination and distinguishing go hand- 
in-hand. Every growthful distinction relies upon some co- 
ordinative scheme. Exercises are growthful only as they 
contribute to the playing of the piece. Fingering drills are 
developed with the demands of compositions in mind. 
Distinguishing is thus advanced by virtue of a co-ordinating 
context; lack of co-ordination stifles the ability to make 
distinctions. 
At the same time, the growth of co-ordination reflects an 
increasing distinguishing of elements. Interpretation involves co¬ 
ordinating distinctions in rhythm, dynamics, tempo, accent, and 
so on. This includes the distinction between a lifeless sequence of 
techniques, however precise, and a flowing drama of phrases. To 
stress interpretation is not to muddle distinctions of technique. It 
is rather to make even finer and more subtle distinctions, and 
co-ordinate them more carefully. Without such distinctions, 
attempts to play the piece as a "whole" will result in bad playing. 
In the effort to play a piece well, we may emphasize drill when 
fingering is sloppy. Or we may emphasize playing the piece 
straight through, mistakes and all, if we need to get the "feel" of 
it. We achieve good playing, however, only when interpretation 
and technique are mutually reinforcing. 
176 
Where growth is thwarted, failure to distinguish and failure 
to co-ordinate coincide. A racist appears to distinguish between 
people, blacks are different from whites. But he fails to see all 
blacks and whites as individuals sharing the common right to 
have their individuality respected. Because he lacks any co¬ 
ordinating notion of equality or individuality, he actually fails to 
make essential distinctions between persons; to him, all blacks 
are the same. Personality and skin color are not distinguished, 
nor are they co-ordinated. They are syncretically fused, 
confounded. As skin color changes, so does personality. 
The paired qualities of DE-CENTERING and AUTONOMY 
distinguish development from this kind of error. To de-center is 
to gain greater objectivity. It is to assess the objective world 
more fully and truthfully because of a freedom gained from 
subjective distortion. Such distortion may be caused by our 
sensori-motor equipment, as in the case of optical illusions. Or it 
may be caused by cognitive immaturity, as in the case of the 
infant who cannot conceive of a toy's existence independently of 
his ability to see or grasp it. It may be caused by emotional bias 
and social conditioning, as in the case of the racist whose sense of 
security is attached to a belief in racial superiority Or it may 
simply be the result of insufficient information, or a failure to 
think things through thoroughly, as when a theory is proved 
wrong through the discovery of new facts. 
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With every act of de-centering, there is a corresponding 
autonomy gained. One becomes free from habits, thoughts, 
feelings, external forces, and beliefs which constrain choice along 
fixed lines while isolating it from the objective world. One 
becomes free to respond fully to the objective requirements of a 
situation, whatever these may be. De-centering allows a person 
to perceive what these requirements are more accurately. One is 
not swayed by authority, fixed social roles, emotions, or habitual 
inclinations where these are irrelevant. One partakes in a political 
demonstration because one concludes that the cause is just, not 
to enhance one's prestige in the eyes of friends. De-centering 
confers the ability to look at matters from a variety of 
viewpoints, and to co-ordinate these views instead of seizing upon 
just one. When the white man takes the viewpoint of a black 
person, when he understands the history of racist beliefs, when 
he detaches his anger from its misplaced object, he overcomes his 
racism. By virtue of his de-centering, he is free to respond to the 
real individuality of black human beings. 
Development is stymied when an apparent but false "de¬ 
centering" takes place without a corresponding gain in autonomy. 
A teenager may slavishly adopt the musical tastes of his peers 
without ever considering his own. Development occurs when he 
can distinguish his tastes from those of his friends, remain 
sensitive to both, and choose freely based upon his wider 
appreciation. His choice is then uncorrupted by matters having 
178 
nothing to do with music, such as a need to conform. Conversely, 
there is no growth when an apparent but false "autonomy" is 
devoid of any corresponding de-centering. By doing as one pleases 
without regard for the feelings of others or long-term 
consequences, one closes out the environment, and identifies with 
a narrow and fleeting set of desires and habits. One is in effect 
held in thrall by one's internal environment. 
With development, the individual exerts increasing power 
over his environment through the purposeful co-ordination of 
finer and more varied elements. At the same time, the exercise 
of such power is liberated from subjective attachments which 
defeat the needs of the situation as objectively determined. Thus 
a politician distinguishes and co-ordinates various abilities to wage 
a successful campaign: he gauges the popular mood, articulates 
ideas, and stirs people emotionally. His aim is not, however, to 
seek egoistic glory or dominate others. It is rather to evoke 
enough common sentiment among people so that their will may 
be mobilized to effect positive change in the society. An artist co¬ 
ordinates technical skill with knowledge of the human condition 
and the history of art to produce an original work. This work 
achieves an independence from artistic habits of the past, yet it 
speaks out clearly in a moving language beyond words. Despite its 
unique and autonomous individuality, the artwork communicates 
in a way that all can understand. The mountain climber, 
through a co-ordination of will and muscle, attains the peak. To 
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do so, he must gain autonomy from feelings of fear and thoughts 
of failure, while merging his concentration with every contour of 
the rock face. 
The overall effect of increasing co-ordination with 
distinguishing, and autonomy with de-centering, is to bestow an 
IMMUNITY from the environment (internal as well as external) 
alongside an OPENING to it. Immunity and opening are the third 
pair of complementary qualities. The politician is thoroughly open 
to all kinds of opinions. He is sensitive to his need for adequate 
food and rest. He is aware of the morale of his staff. Yet he is 
able to choose and co-ordinate his responses to the environment 
according to his most de-centered and far-reaching goals only. He 
is immune to the catcalls of reporters; he smiles graciously. He is 
immune to fatigue from repetition; he gives a speech with 
genuine passion even though he is giving it for the hundredth 
time. He is immune to pressure from narrow constituencies, he 
keeps the general welfare in mind. His immunity is not gained by 
ignoring theenvironment or walling it off. Rather, it is gained by 
virtue of an openness to whatever the environment presents. Out 
of this openness, he distinguishes egoistic and self-defeating goals 
from goals which, if achieved, would really solve problems for all 
the people. He then remains immune to the former while 
autonomously choosing the latter. 
Within development, immunity reinforces opening. Because 
the mountaineer is not pulled around by his fear, he can expose 
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himself to danger. He does not, however, ignore his fear. Rather, 
he uses it to keep him alert and prudent on the climb. Because 
he is not controlled by his fear, he can remain open to it. 
Likewise, opening reinforces immunity. Those who study history 
expand their environment to include the recorded past. They 
thus become immune to the belief that dictators stay in power 
for ever, and that there is no use in trying to unseat them. To 
overcome ignorance is to open oneself to what is actually so, 
while knowledge of the truth renders one immune to falsehood. 
An apparent but false immunity gained at the expense of 
opening is not growthful. To be "immune" to the suffering of 
others is actually to be at the mercy of one's egocentrism, 
laziness, and unwarranted beliefs: "it's not my problem", "there's 
nothing I can do", "the poor will always be with us". On the 
other hand, attempts at "opening" without corresponding 
immunity disintegrate the organism. One may well sink rather 
than swim. We do not hurry to expose young children to 
knowledge of all the evils of the world when we can avoid it. We 
know that this will not be growthful for them, since they have 
no commensurate ability to master their anxiety or exert 
influence upon the world. They may succumb to fear, losing all 
power to deal with the world by co-ordinating emotion and 
thought. Or they may try to protect themselves by reducing 
their sensitivity to others. Growthful opening takes place without 
loss of internal co-ordination or external sensitivity. 
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Co ordination with distinguishing, autonomy with de¬ 
centering, immunity with opening: each pair is indivisible within 
development. It is not as though we stress autonomy sometimes, 
and de-centering at other times. Each true de-centering brings a 
corresponding autonomy, and vice versa. Also, all three pairs 
merge within actual development. Thus autonomous de-centering 
is achieved by virtue of co-ordination and distinguishing. De¬ 
centering from a selfish view to take the role of another leads to 
an autonomous judgement based on the claims of both persons. 
Such judgement involves the ability to distinguish the two views 
while co-ordinating them within a larger purpose, that of justice 
or compassion. The growing person opens himself to the other 
person’s claims as well as his own; at the same time, he remains 
immune to the dictation of his acts by his own selfishness or by 
outside authority. The term integration represents the combined 
qualities of co-ordination, autonomy, and immunity; the term 
differentiation represents the combined qualities of distinguishing, 
de-centering, and opening. All true development is characterized 
by complementary and mutually reinforcing integration and 
differentiation, captured by the term orthogenesis. 
The orthogenetic principle can be used to help assess 
whether proposed pathways of change meet the developmental 
criteria outlined above. It thus serves as a negative check upon 
actions which would decrease a person's autonomy, narrow his 
sphere of interactions, or reinforce his egocentrism. From the 
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principle, we can also infer criteria for the kind of inquiry into 
individual situations which will lead us to judge the most 
growthful response to that situation. Inquiry which is itself 
developmental must seek to distinguish and bring into awareness 
the widest and most subtle variety of factors influencing the 
situation. Thus a war between two nations may have to do with 
the personalities of the leaders, mistaken beliefs, economic 
conditions, religious differences, and specific acts of hostility. 
Inquiry must appeal to some co-ordinating idea or purpose to 
differentiate those matters which are essential from those which 
are not. Thus if we seek the security and prosperity of the 
nation, we can see that the lives of tens of thousands of young 
people may be more essential than the possession of a few square 
miles of territory. To be thorough and inclusive, inquiry must be 
objective, de-centered. Otherwise one party to the war may list 
all the wrongs committed by the other side, while ignoring or 
justifying its own. Inquiry must throw itself open to the objective 
situation while remaining immune to anything that would sway 
it off course or cause it to stop short. (The criteria for growthful 
inquiry aimed at judging what constitutes development in a given 
situation are outlined further in Chapter IV below.) 
This, however, is as far as the principle will take us. The 
web of forces, interactions, probabilities, and outright unknowns 
involved in human ontogenesis is virtually infinite. Thus the 
orthogenetic principle can be a controlling guide to evaluative 
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inquiry, but not a pre—0mDtivc> mntn i_ ;■ , 
v KinDUVe route to its conclusion. The 
principle will not tell us in advance of inquiry into a particular 
and unique situation what the most growthful thing to do in that 
situation will be. It is a constraining framework for thorough and 
objective inquiry as the basis for a judgement which reflects the 
unique qualities of the situation-in-context. It can never 
substitute for such judgement. 
Orthogenesis describes only the most general criteria which 
all developmental changes must meet. To know anything more 
about what would constitute development for a particular person 
demands a thorough and objective examination of the person’s 
situation-in-context. To see why this is so, let us recall Dewey’s 
three contexts within which all experience must be understood 
(Ch.ll, Sec.Dl above). The most particular context is the unique 
personal history of the individual. This history occurs within a 
sociohistorical context which includes not only the influence of the 
society and time to which the individual belongs, but the 
influence upon these of societies and historical periods to which he 
does not belong. At the most universal level, there is the 
structure of human experience itself. Orthogenesis, as an abstract 
principle, is on a par of generality with this most "inclusive and 
pervasive context" (Dewey, 1960, p.110). It speaks to the 
problems inherent in the basic structure of human experience. 
Knowledge of such problems, and their most general solution, aids 
us to identify the problems of particular individuals in particular 
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situations, to see them as examples of a general case. But we 
cannot know in advance how these conflicts will manifest 
themselves. Therefore we cannot suggest solutions in the absence 
of the most exhaustive analysis of the problematic situation. Such 
analysis would need to take all three contexts into account. 
Since the correct application of the orthogenetic principle 
depends upon thorough and objective inquiry into situations, it 
depends upon the ability and willingness of the user to engage in 
such inquiry. Also, the principle requires the judger to hold 
simultaneously in the mind bi-polar qualities which are at first 
glance opposed to one another. Thus, as with any principle, its 
correct use depends upon the developmental level of the user 
Kohlberg gives the example of trying to teach the Golden Rule to 
Stage 2 subjects only to have them translate it as "do unto others 
what they do unto you". In applying the orthogenetic principle, 
pitfalls of this sort abound. 
For example, one must simultaneously hold an idea of 
increasing power over one's environment, and of increasing 
responsiveness to the needs and views of others even in the face 
of one's initial inclinations. Now, a pre-operational child has 
trouble co-ordinating changes in both the length and thickness of 
a stretching piece of clay. He therefore tends to "center" on one 
or the other (See Ch.II, Sec.B2b above). The orthogenetic principle 
likewise challenges formal operational thinkers to co-ordinate two 
seemingly opposite ideas at once. Why might it not be 
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development to turn a jungle into a superhighway? Aren't we 
exercising greater control over our environment, and opening up 
new vistas to the Coca-Cola Company? Why might it not be 
development to unify our country totally behind a single 
fearless leader, putting aside our personal desires in the service of 
the higher purpose of the state? Aren't we co-ordinating our 
efforts, and becoming less selfish? 
The first example "centers" on the idea of expanding one's 
environment. It does not co-ordinate this idea with a de-centered 
sensitivity to environmental consequences, or to the effect of 
changes imposed upon indigenous peoples. The second example 
"centers" upon unification of purpose, detachment from selfish 
wants, and the taking up of another's views as one's own. But it 
does this at the expense of autonomy from external domination, 
detachment from the need for conformity, and variety 
(differentiation) in the social order. To use the principle correctly, 
the judger must overcome a tendency to center upon one quality 
while excluding its paired complement. 
B Genetic-Functional Justification for the Orthogenetlc Principle 
1, What Genetic-Functional Justification Entails 
To justify something genetic-functionally is to show that it 
functions to resolve a problem. This problem is the origin 
(genesis) of valuing in that context. According to Dewey's theory 
of valuation, the act of valuing arises out of our perception of 
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some need, conflict, or problem, and our desire for means of 
resolving it. Dewey argues that such desires OUGHT to be 
evaluated in terms of the degree to which they IN FACT do away 
with the problem qua problem. A desire which tends to eliminate 
a problem at its source, which transcends or nullifies its very 
substance, is held to be more desirable, i.e., more of a value, 
than one which tends to reinforce, deny, reshuffle, or merely 
compensate for the problem which generated it in the first place. 
(1939, pp.34, 46-48). 
Thus in Kohlberg's theory, the origin of the domain of 
justice valuation is social conflict. Justice reasoning stages are 
more "adequate" according to the degree that they resolve social 
conflict by means of a universally applied system of mutual role¬ 
taking. When each person in a situation takes up the role or 
viewpoint of another as if it were his own, this gets to the 
bottom of the source of the conflict. Whatever the substance of 
the conflict is about, mutual role-taking creates conditions for a 
stable and satisfying resolution. To the extent that Kohlberg 
implicitly justifies his stages as representing a hierarchy of 
"moral" adequacy on these grounds, he employs a genetic- 
functional justification. 
If we see valuing as an adaptation, then systematic mutual 
role-taking is a more PROGRESSIVE adaptation to social conflict 
than arbitration, or sulking, or fighting it out. Arbitration adapts 
to the conflict by submitting it to mutually recognized authority, 
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which is more progressive (better) than sulking or fighting it out, 
but which still leaves the terms of the conflict in place. Sulking 
adapts to the conflict by nursing one's emotional hurt, but by 
doing nothing to address the conflict. It might thus be termed a 
more STATIC adaptation. Fighting it out reinforces the conflict 
(except perhaps where this is a limited and mutually respected 
ritual form of arbitration) and sets the stage for revenge and 
escalation. It is thus the most REGRESSIVE of adaptations to social 
conflict. 
In this section, I will justify orthogenesis as a definition of 
development using genetic-functional criteria. To do this, I will 
pinpoint the most fundamental problem in the human condition 
out of which the very notion of development as a value arises. I 
will show that without this problem, no meaningful idea of 
human development could arise. I will then show how 
orthogenesis functions as the uniquely progressive adaptation to 
this core problem. 
2. Requirements of the Problem 
The critical step in the inquiry is the framing of the 
problem. It is an easy matter to justify any solution if the true 
nature of the problem is left unquestioned. If we accept Iran's 
contention that the source of all conflict between Iran and Iraq is 
Hussein, the Iraqi head of state, then it is easy to justify Iran’s 
proposed solution: Hussein's removal from office.The best way to 
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refute a solution is to show that the situation it purports to 
resolve is not really the problem at all. Thus we can point to 
other factors in the Iran-Iraq conflict that would not be resolved 
by Hussein s removal from office: lack of tolerance for racial and 
religious differences, historical enmity, dispute over control of the 
Tigris and Euphrates river mouths, and so forth. Iran's framing 
of the problem is inadequate because it fails to include everything 
that is essential to the conflict. If we adopted the solution implied 
by the problem thus framed, we would still have the conflict on 
our hands. 
Problems are adequately framed only when they meet the 
criteria of INCLUSIVITY and ESSENTIALITY. These criteria refer to 
the totality of our experience of a problem-in-context, what 
Dewey calls an "unsettled situation" (1938, p.106). An 
interpretation of a problem cannot be correct if it cannot include 
everything that is relevant to, or generating, the actual conflict. 
If my car still won't start after the battery has been replaced, 
then the problem is not only the battery; it may be the starter 
as well. Also, problems are not correctly framed if they cannot 
exclude what is not essential to the conflict, perhaps the battery 
was fine in the first place. The first step in justifying a solution is 
to show that one has framed an inclusive and essential problem. 
Only such a problem can generate a progressive solution, one that 
really does away with the source of whatever is unsettled, 
lacking, or in conflict about the situation. 
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My definition of that problem to which orthogenesis is the 
progressive solution is not held to be a raw empirical discovery. It 
is rather a deliberate interpretation of the facts. This means that 
my definition of the problem openly invites scrutiny and possible 
refutation. If this is understood, then it shouldn’t matter that 
the solution seems foreordained once the problem is defined. Once 
I have really put my car through all possible tests, and 
determined that it is the starter and only the starter that is the 
problem, I can replace the starter without further ado. 
Nevertheless, I must submit both problem and solution to the 
final test of the open road. 
In order to be inclusive and essential, a problem must 
distinguish correctly between those aspects of a situation which 
are CHANGEABLE (i.e., subject to regulation) and those which are 
GIVEN (i.e., not subject to regulation). Any problem, to be a 
problem, must present both kinds of aspects. 
The GIVEN conditions are the problem's context. They are 
frequently left in the background and taken for granted when a 
problem is framed. In the problem "Joe's roof leaks when it 
rains", one given is that Joe requires shelter from the elements. 
Sometimes what we think are given conditions are in fact 
changable. Joe's problem, framed as "the drip bucket is 
overflowing", takes the very thing for granted, namely the leaky 
roof, that can and should be fixed. But without some givens, 
there is no selection of desire, attention, or effort; one aims to 
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change everything at random. Instead of a problem, there is a 
diffuse uneasiness, or a "complete panic", leading to "blind and 
wild overt activities" (Dewey, 1938, p.105). Without givens, there 
are no constraints upon the situation. A problem cannot arise, 
since there is nothing for it to push against, so to speak. 
The given conditions explain a problem's history insofar as 
they represent adaptations to prior conflicts. In the problem of 
Joe's leaky roof, the roof is such a given. At one point, Joe had 
the problem of getting shelter; the solution was to move into a 
house with a roof. Now, however, there is something about the 
roof that is insufficent, problematic; it leaks. Two things make 
the leak a genuine problem. First, it is at odds with Joe’s need to 
keep dry. It thus defeats the very function of the roof. Second, 
Joe can do something about the leak; he can fix it. The leak is 
the changeable aspect of the situation. 
To qualify as the core of a problem, a condition must be 
changeable as well as lacking. If Joe couldn't do anything about 
the leak, then it would behoove him to frame the problem 
around something he could do something about. Once we have 
interpreted every conceivable aspect of a situation as an 
immutable given, we have eliminated the possibility of framing a 
problem just as surely as if we had allowed for no givens at all. 
It becomes impossible to envision any solution that is not simply 
a fantasy. As Dewey says, "Statement of a problematic situation 
in terms of a problem has no meaning save as the problem 
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instituted has. in the very terms of its statement, reference to a 
possible solution" (1938, p.108). 
To have a problem, we must have a set of conditions which 
is changeable and a set of conditions which is given. The 
changeable conditions are the focus of the problem; the given 
conditions are its immediate context. It is with respect to the 
given conditions that the changeable conditions are unsettled, 
lacking, in conflict. The leak is only meaningful as a problem 
when seen within the context of the roof, and Joe's need to stay 
dry. [1] 
For a problem to be inclusively and essentially framed, the 
changeable set of conditions must require regulation if the conflict 
is to cease. If the leak fixed itself, then no problem would arise. 
If Joe could conveniently stay dry without fixing the leak, then 
the leak would not be the essential problem. Further, the 
regulation of those conditions must be sufficient to resolve the 
conflict. If Joe's whole roof is falling apart, fixing one leak won't 
do much good. 
Framing a problem inclusively and essentially also requires 
accuracy in distinguishing what is subject to regulation from 
what isn’t. Taking what is given in a situation to be changeable 
leads to useless complaint and wishfulness, or misdirected effort. 
By contrast, taking what may be changeable in a situation as 
given, especially if this coincides with (or consists of) our own 
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desires and outlook on the situation, leads to complacency or 
unimaginative approaches to conflicts. 
Now In everyday problem-solving, things are relatively 
given or changeable. Deciding what conditions will play the role of 
the fixed and which the role of the fixable is the essence of 
creative judgement. Some problem-solution complexes will be 
more inclusive and essential than others, and so do a better job 
of doing away with conflict. Joe may accept the leak as a given, 
and buy a drip bucket so large that it takes up half the room. Or 
he may see the whole roof as the thing to change, and replace it 
entirely at great expense. The first idea swaps one annoyance for 
another equally as bad; moreover, the room will still be damp. 
The second idea does more than is necessary, adding a non- 
essential strain on Joe's finances. As adaptations, they are not as 
progressive as simply fixing the leak. Neverthless, in many 
situations, there may be a variety of ways in which problem- 
solution complexes can be framed with comparably good results. 
To frame that problem-solution which defines human 
development, however, is a far more general matter, and 
therefore a less flexible one. Unlike Joe’s roof, what is held to be 
given must be truly irremovable. If it were potentially 
changeable, no matter what the effort involved, this would mean 
that the definition unduly limited the true scope of human 
development. It would ask human beings to take for granted the 
very things they ought to dream of transcending. It would 
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exclude real possibilities for growth, while including, as essential 
constraints, factors which were either changeable or irrelevant. 
It would thus fail to meet the criteria of inclusivity and 
essentiality. 
The conditions held to be both lacking and changeable must 
be just as inclusive and essential. They must be truly changeable, 
or else the definition of growth will be tinged with fantasy, 
including non-essential matters about which we can do nothing 
It must be essential that we change those particular conditions in 
order to uproot conflict, and changing them must be sufficient to 
do so. Otherwise the definition will exclude possible solutions 
which are equally growthful, or even necessary for growth. 
Finally, in order to change, the conditions must require human 
intervention. If such change is inevitable, then we have not 
defined growth as a value at all. 
3. The Problem of Human Development 
Let us first examine the context of the problem: the given 
conditions. On the broadest scale, all human beings must adapt to 
two cosmic laws. One is the law of ceaseless CHANGE in 
environmental conditions. From the molecular level to the 
galactic, things are in a state of constant transformation. Some 
things last longer than others; the life of a human being is short 
compared to the life of a civilization, or a star. But even a star is 
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changing from moment to moment in small ways which will 
eventually add up to produce larger and more dramatic changes. 
The other law is that of the organism’s DEPENDENCE upon 
environmental conditions. Air enters our lungs to make breathing 
possible. Language enters from our culture to make thought and 
speech possible. We are bombarded by ultraviolet light and by 
countless microorganisms. If these exceed certain limits, we 
perish. We are also awash in a sea of images, assumptions, and 
expectations held by those around us. Without these, we could 
hardly fashion any frame of reference for our own ideas and 
feelings. We have evolved in interactive concert with specific 
conditions of gravity and climate. If we are to venture into space 
for long periods, we shall depend upon an artificial environment 
to simulate those conditions. 
The law of change and the law of dependence are sublimely 
indifferent to human endeavor or human constructions. We may 
struggle to stave off change, but it comes anyway. We may 
succeed to some extent in decreasing our dependence upon nature 
only to increase our dependence upon technology and social 
harmony. People can think or imagine what they will; the law of 
change and the law of dependence operate nonetheless. 
For any living organism, human or non-human, to exist, it 
must adapt to these two laws. Life is possible only when it solves 
the problem of how to maintain a stable, distinct, and self¬ 
regulating organization Riven the reality of change and 
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dependence. Life cannot sustain itself if it succumbs completely to 
the random alterations and penetrations of the cosmos. It must 
maintain some kind of ongoing integrity. On the other hand, it 
cannot sustain a state of FIXITY or ISOLATION. Isolation is 
impossible given dependence upon the environment. Since this 
environment changes, the organism must find some way to roll 
with the punches, so to speak, without being knocked out. 
The most general form of this adaptation is the same for all 
life. Life adapts to change and dependence by evolving some sort 
of mechanism for CONTINUITY and INTERACTION. This is the 
progressively adaptive solution to what might be called "the 
problem of life". Continuity allows for change. It provides, 
however, a compensating power to repeat, from one moment to 
the next, whatever it takes to maintain organization in the face 
of change. The pupil of the eye expands and contracts according 
to the amount of light present, thus ensuring a constant range of 
light necessary for seeing and undamaging to the retina. Instinct 
permits a bird to find its winter quarters each year despite 
changing weather or the passage of time. Interaction allows for 
dependence upon the environment. But it compensates by 
exerting its own constructive influence upon the environment, 
thus shaping the terms of that dependence. Thus the human eye 
and the avian instinct have rules of their own. When light is 
dim, the pupil alters its environment by expanding. When winter 
comes, the robin alters its environment by flying south; when 
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spring comes, it alters its environment by building a nest. 
Continuity and interaction embrace change and dependence, but 
within an organized system rather than a random, entropic one. 
Like change and dependence, continuity and interaction are 
given conditions with respect to the problem of human 
development. How they manifest themselves may be subject to 
change, but that they manifest themselves in some way is not. A 
human being (or a frog, or a geranium) cannot even begin to 
exist unless he interacts with the changing environment in such 
a way as to assure continuity of his essential functions. 
Continuity and interaction represent a prior adaptation to change 
and dependence, one that makes life itself possible. 
As organisms evolve phylogenetically, their mechanisms for 
ensuring continuity and interaction become more complex. 
Compared to the amoeba, the bird continues a wider variety of 
functions in the face of a wider and more varied environment. 
Evolution extends the organism's means for maintaining life in a 
changing environment upon which it depends. At the same time, 
it multiplies the frequency and variety of changes and 
dependencies. Human beings have evolved distinct and highly 
sophisticated ways of ensuring continuity and interaction. In a 
practical sense (as opposed to an absolute or theological sense), 
these qualities define what it is to be human. They are the 
attributes of PLASTICITY and COMMUNICATION. 
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As defined earlier (Ch.II, Sec.D2biv above), plasticity is the 
power to form alterable habits. Habits of thought, feeling, or 
action operate with varying degrees of conscious effort. In many 
cases they function with no conscious effort at all. This leaves 
consciousness free to deal with what is most in flux without 
sacrificing an underlying continuity or stability. For example, 
while giving a speech, one can concentrate on the reaction of the 
audience without worrying about how to pronounce words. 
What distinguishes human plasticity is the extent of its 
power to alter, redirect, or create habits, again with varying 
degrees of conscious effort. Instead of being locked in by instinct, 
humans can consider the consequences of their habits, and 
change them so as to produce new consequences. Humans form 
habits initially in response to certain conditions. If there is a 
change in any aspect of the conditions prompting and maintaining 
the habit, the habit can likewise be changed to suit. We do not 
pollute the earth out of some blind irrevocable urge. We do it 
because we have not yet taken the consequences seriously enough 
to propel us to change our ways. It might take a great effort to 
change, and we might not do it, but we have the potential to do 
it. Because of plasticity, LEARNING plays the dominant role in 
human change. 
Within human communication, sensori-motor powers are 
augmented by and integrated with the power to form symbols 
and images. This gives rise to thought, language, and 
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imagination. It permits flexible social co-operation, unlike the 
pre programmed social patterns of bees or geese. Planning 
organization, and technology become possible, leading to increased 
mastery over the environment. Ideas and symbols co-ordinate 
both the internal environment of impulses, desires, and habits, 
as well as the external social and physical environment. 
Communication has an affective as well as a cognitive side. It 
includes an extended power of empathy as well as an emotional 
need for complex interactions with others. Communication enables 
us to observe and test the environment so that our thoughts 
about it can conform more closely to what is actually so. Like 
plasticity, communication yields potential We may fail to listen 
to others, we may fail to envision the future, or we may fail to 
escape superstition. Nevertheless, we have the biological potential 
to succeed. 
Plasticity and communication provide each person with an 
extremely wide potential environment, one that can include 
other times, far-away places, and the ideas of others as well as 
his own. More variety means more potential for varied change. 
Plasticity and communication also render humans more 
dependent upon social conditions as well as natural ones: upon 
affection and role models as well as food and climate. Yet 
plasticity and communication give human beings an equal 
potential to adapt progressively to their dependence upon this 
changing environment. If the climate changes, humans can work 
199 
together to form new ways of living, new technologies, new 
priorities. If mutual hatreds lead to mutual destruction, humans 
can reflect upon the results and achieve deeper understanding. 
Thus the human organism has the potential to be enriched rather 
than threatened by the inescapable facts of change and 
dependence. 
Like the cosmic law of change and dependence, and the 
biological law of continuity and interaction, the human potential 
conferred by plasticity and communication is a given condition 
within the problem of human development. Human beings, like it 
or not, are "wired" for plasticity and communication. Even 
severely autistic persons rely upon powers of learning, empathy, 
and imagination that are distinct from those of other life forms. 
Plasticity and communication form the most immediate 
context of the problem of human development. For although the 
potential to develop conferred by them is a given, their 
employment to that end is not a given at all. To refer to our 
earlier metaphor, plasticity and communication are like Joe's 
roof. The roof has the potential to keep Joe dry. But in Joe’s 
case, the roof is not quite up to the task: it leaks. It will not keep 
the rain off Joe unless he takes some kind of action. 
Similarly, plasticity and communication do not extend 
themselves automatically in a progressive direction. That is, they 
do not inherently work in the direction of eliminating conflicts 
with the environmental givens of change and dependence. 
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Rather, they are just as likely to provide the basis for 
adaptations which are regressive. Such adaptations reinforce 
conflict with the environment by moving in the direction of 
increased FIXITY and ISOLATION. Efforts at fixity are, sooner or 
later, self-defeating in an environment which will change despite 
those efforts. Likewise, efforts at isolation are ultimately self- 
defeating in an environment upon which one is nonetheless 
dependent. 
These regressive tendencies are not, however, alien to 
plasticity and communication. Rather, they are a flaw within 
plasticity and communication, as the leak is a flaw in the roof. 
Just like the leak in the roof is at odds with Joe's need to stay 
dry, these tendencies within plasticity and communication are at 
odds with the need to adapt to change and dependence in a way 
that is not self-defeating. This problem is genuine because it is by 
no means a given, but subject to human remediation. It 
constitutes the problem to be solved by development. 
Let us examine this problem. Plasticity, the power to form 
and re-form habits, is beset by a ongoing tendency towards 
ATTACHMENT. Once habits are formed, they are hard to break. 
This is so even when we can see that they are damaging. 
Sometimes we refuse to acknowledge the damage. Rather, we 
interpret the environment so as to reinforce existing habits. 
Physico-chemical addiction (to nicotine, alcohol, etc.) is the most 
obvious kind of attachment. The addict may adopt all kinds of 
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false beliefs ( I can stop anytime") so as protect his habit. 
Attachment is the sheer need or tendency to continue or repeat a 
behavior pattern, thought, feeling, attitude, belief, or image, 
irrespective of other considerations. We keep eating ice cream 
even if it makes us fat. We keep beating our children, even it 
makes us unhappy as well as them. We continue to believe that 
the sun revolves around the earth, in the face of evidence to the 
contrary. We continue to waste resources and pollute the planet 
despite knowledge of the current and potential consequences. We 
continue to believe that people of a certain race are lazy even 
when we meet people of that race who are industrious. 
Communication is equally frustrated by a tendency to form 
habits which constrict or collapse the environment. One way we 
shrink the environment is by fusing things together, by confusing 
them. An imagined personality is fused into a tree or a snake, as 
in primitive cultures or early childhood (see Ch.II, Sec.A3 above). 
Belief in a certain religion is confused with being a good person. 
One identifies one's worth with possession of symbolic prestige 
objects, such as a Porsche automobile or a Rolex watch. We also 
form habits which close off some aspect of the environment, 
rendering it alien to us. We identify with our own desires while 
blocking out the expressed desires of others. Or we identify with 
another's desires while blocking out our own. The term 
EGOCENTRIC here includes all habits which wall off or collapse the 
environment in a fixed way. It denotes a centering of 
202 
environmental interaction around our subjective constructions. [2] 
Just as attachment hampers plasticity, so egocentrism distorts 
communication. The environment is seen only from a narrow 
viewpoint, one that refers to, and must conform to, habits which 
are isolated from that environment. 
Attachment adapts to change by generating and thriving 
upon attempts at fixity. Egocentrism adapts to dependence by 
generating and thriving upon attempts at isolation. Attachment 
and egocentrism, like plasticity and communication, are mutually 
reinforcing. Plastic habits are formed and re-formed owing to 
communication with the environment; communication occurs 
only by virtue of such habits. Likewise, attachment reinforces 
egocentrism: in an intimate relationship, as attachment replaces 
affection, so receiving replaces giving. One is less concerned about 
the other person, and more concerned about losing the familiarity 
and security of the relationship. Egocentrism reinforces 
attachment: if a primitive tribe is convinced that a ritual dance 
brings the rain, they will strongly resist any attempts to alter or 
abandon the ritual. The fixation of habits leads to, and is 
reinforced by, the distortion of the environment. The term 
"egocentric attachment" encompasses this idea. 
Egocentric attachment manifests itself "laterally" across all 
human experience. Learning any complex skill requires effort 
precisely because older, more limited habits must be unlearned 
and overcome. In learning to swim, one has to breath in a 
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conscious and regular way, and get used to the idea of exhaling 
with the face submerged in water. The thoughtless breathing of 
everyday life must be abandoned; this is difficult until swimming 
in turn becomes a habit. Emotional maturity requires effort 
because of attachment to desires and views which are immediate, 
narrow, and fixed. If one is attached to having the whole cookie, 
it is tough to share it with one's younger sister. If one is attached 
to one's own ideas, it is difficult to listen to the ideas of others. If 
one identifies utterly with one’s ability to write, it is no easy 
thing to take criticism. Ingrained habits of thought and social 
tradition must be overcome in order to gain knowledge. Thus 
modern science was born in a struggle against the authority of 
religious dogma. 
Egocentric attachment, in keeping with Piaget's view (Ch II, 
Sec.B2d above) also reappears in new and more sophisticated 
forms with each developmental advance. It thus extends 
"longitudinally" through human ontogenesis, posing more complex 
problems with each new solution to prior problems. For example, 
infantile egocentrism, exemplified by an inability to see the world 
as separate from immediate needs and perceptions, is overcome 
by the formation of the notion of a distinct "self" as opposed to 
what is "other". This creates a higher battleground upon which 
egocentric attachments must be vanquished if development is to 
continue. A person must learn to co-ordinate the "self's" 
perspective with the perspectives of others in spite of the 
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tendency to fix his worldview in terms of this constructed self 
(most of us spend our lives on this battleground!). Each new level 
of development thus frames its own new problem in terms of 
egocentric attachment. It does not follow from this that there is 
no increase in resolution of the problem. This would be like 
arguing that since I wrestle with musical difficulties today as 
much as I did at age nine, that consequently there has been no 
development in my musical skill. Each new problem simply builds 
upon, while taking for granted, problems that have already been 
solved. The developmental vector of the successive solutions Is one 
which progressively resolves the general organism-environment 
problem within which the specific ones are framed. 
Egocentric attachment presents new challenges in exact step 
with the level of development achieved. The need to meet these 
challenges through reflective intervention, i.e., education, 
increases with development. This is so because the interactions 
required for development to continue become more sophisticated, 
and can be taken for granted less and less. Growth thus becomes 
increasingly contingent upon education, and thus upon ethical 
deliberation. 
I am not arguing that egocentric attachment is, empirically 
speaking, the dominant human tendency, and that all 
development is an uphill struggle against it. Its status as an 
ethical problem requires no such idea. The domain of ethics arises 
when there is some question of regulation requiring choice (See 
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Ch.II, Sec.Dl above). Egocentric attachment can be overcome, 
i.e., development occurs, in the context of human interventions 
that can frequently be taken for granted. Prior progressive 
adaptations (development), embodied in both the child and the 
social milieu in which a child grows, serve to diminish the power 
of egocentric attachment. In these cases, development seems to 
occur naturally", and the ethical issue is not as pressing, since 
there is no problematic situation. Thus an infant may learn to 
run and speak with relative ease when a certain degree and kind 
of feeding, love, and stimulation can be taken for granted. Even 
at early levels, however, the need for education leaps back into 
focus as soon as we can no longer take necessary environmental 
interactions as given. A starved and abandoned child may remain 
trapped for several years in a world of crawling and incoherent 
sounds. Development during childhood may appear automatic 
when a minimum of conventional teaching by adults can be 
taken for granted. Development during adolescence, however, 
might require societal permission to question those teachings. If 
such permission cannot be taken for granted, ethical issues rise to 
the surface. 
The function of adaptation is to resolve conflict between the 
organism and a changing environment upon which it depends. All 
human adaptations employ the attributes of plasticity and 
communication to this end. Egocentric attachment is a barrier to 
this effort. As a problem, it has no meaning outside of the 
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context of possibilities presented by plasticity and communication, 
any more than a leak has meaning outside of the context of a 
roof. 
Unlike the leak in the roof, however, egocentric attachment 
is built into the human condition, it is there from the start. It 
defines our humanity as fully as do plasticity and 
communication. It manifests most pervasively as the problem of 
IGNORANCE. Human beings are thoroughly dependent upon and 
affected by their environment. We are not separate from nature, 
we are an integral part of it. Yet we begin by knowing next to 
nothing about this natural universe, not even about our own 
bodies and minds. We perceive ourselves as isolated entities. Yet 
we have the potential to know the world and ourselves as a part 
of it. In the exercise of this potential, we must grope our way 
through a succession of myths, superstitions, delusions, and 
mistaken ideas. Knowledge does not fall into our laps. We must 
earn every crumb, and still continue to doubt what we 
supposedly know. 
On the social plane, we are thoroughly dependent upon 
each other for the very form of our thoughts and feelings. Yet 
we do not know one another. We perceive ourselves as isolated 
from other human beings, as having interests which run counter 
to others’ interests. These conflicts are so essential to our human 
character that we simply take them for granted. Yet they are 
conflicts only because the potential for knowing, and thus the 
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desire to know, is there. To seek love, truth, or beauty is to 
exercise the capacity for the formation and re-formation of 
habits for entering into observation of and communication with 
the environment. Egocentric attachment presents an ongoing 
obstacle to such attainment. It thus sets the problem to be 
overcome by development. 
The function of ethics is to choose between or regulate 
adaptations to conflict. It is to sort progressive adaptations which 
really get at the heart of the conflict from regressive ones which 
do not. Development is the name given to that direction taken by 
progressive adaptations. This is the basis for Dewey's claim that 
development is the inclusive and essential ethical function, the 
"only moral 'end'" (See Ch.II, Sec.Dl above). All adaptations must 
take place within the context of plasticity and communication. 
Egocentric attachment, the barrier to plasticity and 
communication, is what generates the need to regulate such 
adaptations. If there were no egocentric attachment, our habits 
of interaction with the environment would form and re-form 
without thought, resistance, or effort of any kind. Our 
communication with the environment would be total; all barriers 
between organism and environment, subject and object, would be 
removed. What, then, could possibly develop? The problem of 
egocentric attachment within a context of plasticity and 
communication thus gives rise to both the ethical domain itself 
and to development as its prime value. 
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All regressive adaptations reinforce or increase egocentric 
attachment. They operate in the direction of fixity and isolation. 
This increases the conflict between human beings and their 
environment. It leads towards the negation of those very powers 
of plasticity and communication which make distinctively human 
life possible. The very power of egocentric attachment to distort 
interaction with the environment can cause it to be perceived as 
a solution to conflict; if one could only get one's own way, the 
conflict would be over, wouldn't it? But the maintenance or 
enhancement of egocentric attachment ultimately contradicts 
larger, more thorough adaptive efforts. It increases the very 
organism-environment conflict it strives to resolve. We destroy 
an enemy to gain security, only to reinforce the true source of 
our insecurity; the notion that we are alone, separate, and 
independent from other human beings. 
All progressive adaptations work to transcend or do away 
with the operation of egocentric attachment in a particular 
situation. Such adaptations, described as a consistent direction of 
change over time, constitute development. All such adaptations 
conform to the orthogenetic principle, as set forth in the 
introduction to this chapter. Orthogenesis thus serves as a 
definition of development. As mentioned earlier, the problem of 
egocentric attachment resurfaces at a new level with each new 
developmental advance. Therefore orthogenesis must be described 
as a direction, a process, and not as a single event. 
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4- QrUlOftgngSiS ag ting Progressive Adaptation to Egocentric 
Attachment 
Orthogenesis adapts to change by seeking an organismic 
continuity which is flexible and not fixed. It seeks an intimate 
connection with the environment, but one that diminishes 
attachment. It adapts to dependence upon the environment by 
achieving autonomous self-direction without isolation. 
Attachment fuses habits, including concepts, ideas, images, 
feelings, actions, and purposes. For example, one fuses a notion of 
one‘s "self" with one's looks, one's race, or one's occupation. 
Orthogenesis overcomes attachment by distinguishing habits while 
co-ordinating them within a larger scheme of thought, feeling, 
purpose, or action. The "self" is seen to be something more 
inclusive than a collection of appearances, achievements, and 
possessions. These things have their place, but they can be kept 
in that place. They can change and be changed without calling 
the "self" into question. The larger and more inclusive of 
differentiated elements the scheme, the more developed it is. 
Thus we can speak of the "development" of a racist or a cancer 
only by failing to assess the racist in the context of a larger 
society, or the cancer in the context of the entire body. Since 
"racist" and "cancer" derive their very meaning from these 
contexts, our view of the extension of racism or cancer must be 
co-ordinated within them. Within the context of society, the 
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extension of racism is regressive; likewise the extension of cancer 
within the context of the body. Thus to hold a view of the 
extension of either as development" is itself regressive: it is to 
move away from a more co-ordinated viewpoint. Egocentric 
habits distort efforts to distinguish and co-ordinate by closing off 
communication with the larger environment. The thief may have 
an inclusive concept of "victims" within which various kinds of 
victims are distinguished, each with a unique sort of loot to be 
stolen. But this view is "centered" around, attached to, the thief’s 
desire for loot. It fails to empathize with others. It sees people, 
not as they are, but within the constricted stereotype of 
"victim". It fails to appreciate the larger implications of a society 
based on thievery. Indeed, the thief does not consider the 
consequences of his actions upon the quality of society, which 
affects him as well. Finally, he does not look inside himself, at his 
own attachments, to question whether his freedom and power 
are ultimately served by a life of thievery. In fact, he is 
imprisoned by his desire for loot and his isolation from the world 
of others’ feelings. 
Within orthogenesis, co-ordination and distinguishing 
overcome egocentrism through increasingly DE-CENTEREB 
interactions with the environment. The power and AUTONOMY 
gained through co-ordination is thus employed in a way that is 
sensitive to larger concerns: others' rights and feelings, the 
quality of the whole society, the balance of the natural 
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environment, and so forth. We can build vehicles which free us 
from the constraints of time and distance, while remaining 
sensitive to their impact upon natural beauty and social 
intercourse. In contrast to egocentrism, which fosters isolation, 
de-centering leads to a widening embrace of the environment 
with greater autonomy from distortion by fixed and self-enclosed 
habits. Distinguishing of environmental aspects from each other 
becomes more objective. Essential distinctions are preserved, non- 
essential ones abandoned. We can, for example, distinguish the 
different skin color of two people without making any distinction 
between them with respect to their rights. 
Within orthogenesis, OPENNESS to the environment replaces 
attachment to it. We can consider opposing political views 
without feeling moved either to blind conformity or compulsive 
rejection. If we take sides, it is because we have objectively 
considered the potential consequences of each view. It is not 
because we are afraid of rejection by our friends who think that 
way, or because one view better serves our narrow and selfish 
interests, or because we confuse disloyalty to the nation with 
acceptance of the other view. Orthogenesis brings an autonomous 
IMMUNITY to these non-essential considerations without thereby 
encouraging egocentric isolation from them. A person can notice, 
and not simply push out of awareness, the fear rising within 
when he is about to take an unpopular stand. Seeing this fear in 
himself can render him more compassionate to others in a similar 
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position, even if their views are different. Yet he can still choose 
to act out of other motives, and not be run by his fear. Within 
development, independence from the environment and 
connectedness to it are not only compatible, but mutually 
reinforcing. The person can remain both aware of and immune to 
his fear because he is equally aware of the larger needs of the 
situation: unless he speaks out, an injustice may be done, or a 
falsehood accepted as truth. He is able to autonomously 
distinguish these considerations as being more essential to his 
welfare and that of others. 
Such examples may mask a point that bears repetition, the 
orthogenetic principle only indicates the most general 
characteristics of any developmental course. It cannot prescribe 
the most growthful course to take in a particular situation in 
advance of a thorough and objective examination of that 
situation. Until we have examined the situation, we don't know 
what is really given and what is really changeable about it. 
Further, we don’t know how egocentric attachment is most 
inclusively and essentially at work in that situation; in other 
words, we’re not sure what the problem is. The man in the 
above example may have no difficulty overcoming his fear. 
Rather, he may have a tendency to shoot his mouth off too often 
and at the wrong time, making him an ineffective vehicle for an 
unpleasant truth. Is it more growthful for him to speak, or to 
control his impulses and let others speak for him? Whatever the 
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path indicated within a hypothetical example, it must be 
understood that a real situation-in-context may include facts 
which lead us to recommend a different path. Nonetheless, to 
justify any chosen path as developmental, it must be shown how 
it overcomes egocentric attachment through orthogenesis. 
214 
c FQrmal Justification Of Orthogenesis as an 
Ethical Principle 
1. Formal Justification: Dgfinition and Limits 
I hold that orthogenesis prescribes the desirable, valuable 
direction of human ontogenesis. It is an ethically normative 
principle. One way to justify it as such is to refer to formal 
metaethical criteria. 1 accept (see Ch.I, Sec.C, Sec.F above) 
Kohlberg’s criteria of UN1VERSAL1ZABILITY, UNIVERSALITY, and 
PRESCRIPTIVITY as definitive of such formal justification (see 
Ch.II, Sec.C4 above). 
Formal justification is not divorced from genetic-functional 
justification. Formal criteria act rather as a kind of "shorthand" 
for what kinds of solutions to problems will be most INCLUSIVE 
and ESSENTIAL (see Sec.B2 above). The criteria of 
universalizability, universality, and prescriptivity are valuable 
because they test whether principles help us frame problems and 
solutions progressively, i.e., in a way that will really do away 
with the source of the problem. 
A UNIVERSALIZABLE principle is one that everyone in a 
society can follow without destroying the very social context 
which gives meaning to the principle "Expect government 
services but evade taxes" is not universalizable, because if 
everyone followed it, there would be no services and no evasion. 
Acts which are not universalizable, like lying, seek some 
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egocentric advantage within a social context that is taken for 
granted. But in a society where everyone lied all the time, 
communication itself would disintegrate. This would defeat 
whatever "advantage" one hoped to gain by lying. 
Universalizable principles, on the other hand, are SELF- 
CONSISTENT and SELF-REINFORCING when EVERYONE follows 
them. Help others", unlike "steal from others", resolves the 
problem of insecurity in a way that INCLUDES everybody. It also 
addresses what is most ESSENTIAL about our problems: if people 
know they will be helped by others, they have less need to steal. 
Universalizable principles acknowledge that we depend upon each 
other for security, knowledge, language, personality, life. They 
adapt to this progressively, by promoting DIALOGUE. Non- 
universalizable principles promote self-defeating egocentric 
isolation. 
Universalizability tests whether principles require the 
individual to respect DIALOGUE within society. UNIVERSALITY 
complements this by testing whether principles oblige society to 
respect VARIETY among individuals and situations. "To be polite, 
eat with a fork" is not universal because it excludes cultures in 
which it is polite to eat with the fingers. "Do not take the life of 
members of your own nation" is not as universal as the principle, 
"Respect the right of all individuals to life". Guides for action that 
are not universal may reflect a sociocentric bias: being human 
gets confused with being white, or being friendly with shaking 
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hands. Bias may be idiosyncratic as well as sociocentric: “Be 
productive may get confused with “Sacrifice everything to your 
job . The latter statement takes too narrow a view of the 
individual. Universal principles seek to include not only varied 
individuals and situations, but a wide view of what an individual 
comprises. To include the widest variety of individuals and 
aspects of individuals, they must hit upon what is most 
ESSENTIAL to human welfare. Thus "always obey the law" leaves 
unsolved the problems of individuals oppressed by the law, as in 
the case of Rosa Parks. It fails to address what is essential about 
law: its promotion of individual welfare. 
A PRESCRIPTIVE principle is one that holds itself up as a 
general "prescription" to "cure" problematic situations. It 
prescribes what ought to be done to eliminate the problem. A 
prescriptive principle does not "give up" in the face of a tough 
problem. "Safeguard human rights" takes on more meaning, not 
less, in a world plagued by violence. It cannot merely describe 
the problem: "Look, people have always been starving" is no 
prescription for world hunger. Yet it must refer to the current 
problem to be solved. Thus it cannot Justify Itself solely as an 
extension of previous conditions, although these may shed light 
upon our present situation. For example, it is not prescriptive to 
justify loving others solely by referring to a prior instinctual 
drive for love. Without reference to the way in which love 
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operates to resolve conflict, the same "naturalistic" argument 
could be used to justify aggression or lust. 
A prescriptive principle must INCLUDE what is ESSENTIAL to 
solving a problem, while excluding all else. It must not include 
matters which are irrelevant to the problem, or neglect facts 
which are. For example, Piaget’s child subjects, judging the 
degree of wrongdoing, focus on the size of the stain and ignore 
the intentions of the stainer. The rule "make smaller stains" is 
not a prescriptive principle in the way that "take care to avoid 
damaging things" is.. It misses the point, so to speak. "Express 
your ideas unless nobody else does" includes an injunction to 
conform which sabotages the fight against intellectual sterility 
Prescriptive principles, like "defend the right of free speech", 
maintain their force even when one disagrees with the speaker, 
or when such defense is unpopular. "Maintain order by punishing 
demonstrators" misses what is truly essential to maintaining 
long-term order: wholehearted popular consent to a just 
government. I aim to show that the orthogenetic principle 
defines, in an ethically universalizable, universal, and 
prescriptive way, what it means to grow or develop. This means 
only that orthogenesis captures the most general traits to which 
all problem-solutions must conform if they are to be called 
developmental or growthful. It states that all growth involves 
greater distinguishing of environmental elements from each other 
alongside a greater co-ordination of those elements, increasing 
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autonomy of choice alongside a greater de-centering of the 
perspective from which choices are made; and increasing 
immunity from the vicissitudes of the environment alongside a 
greater opening of interaction with the environment. 
Such a principle can aid educational inquiry (i.e., inquiry 
aimed at promoting development) in several ways. First, we can 
deduce from it general standards for the development of inquiry 
itself. To develop, inquiry must become more THOROUGH and 
OBJECTIVE (Cf. Dewey, 1922, p.246, "broad" and "impartial"). 
Thoroughness engenders the widest, most OPEN view of causes 
and consequences, and seeks to CO-ORDINATE these within 
judgement. Objectivity aims at IMMUNITY or AUTONOMY from 
egocentric or sociocentric bias. It strives to DISTINGUISH matters 
which are essential to a problem from those which are not, and 
to DE-CENTER from cultural conditioning, and fixed or 
unwarranted beliefs. (In Chapter IV, I shall explore guidelines for 
thorough and objective inquiry in education). 
Second, the principle can help us recognize and criticize 
changes which run counter to development. We can be more 
alert to influences which reinforce egocentrism or sociocentrism, 
which fuse essential distinctions, which constrain autonomy or 
awareness, and so forth. Third, it provides a principled basis on 
which to justify, debate, or reflect upon the growthfulness of 
specific changes we are planning, or which have already 
occurred. How will the change render the student more immune 
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to environmental changes while opening him up to the 
environment? How will it increase his autonomy while giving him 
a more de-centered perspective? Fourth, it can stimulate us to 
see connections and analogies between different avenues of 
growth. In Piaget s work, the mental reversal of mathematical 
operations and the mental reversal of roles in social conflicts are 
linked by the idea of de-centering (Ch. II, Sec. B2b-c above). 
What might growth in artistic ability have in common with 
growth in scientific ability? The orthogenetic principle gives us an 
ethical language for exploring such questions. 
In no case, however, does the orthogenetic principle allow 
us to predict what will be most growthful in a particular 
situation. Only thorough and objective inquiry into that situation 
can achieve this. Within each unique situation, each effort to 
promote growth will be guided not only by principles, but by the 
educator's global frame of reference, including intuitions and 
concrete perceptions. Each actual problem-solution will be unique 
to that situation. The orthogenetic principle acts as a check upon 
isolated judgement by providing universalizable, universal, and 
prescriptive guidelines. But it cannot substitute for judgement 
based on the totality of experience. 
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2, Orthogenesis as Universalize? 
Orthogenesis, qua increasing AUTONOMY with DE¬ 
CENTERING, is universalizable because it works to transcend 
conflict between individuals as unique on the one hand and 
members of society on the other. As they develop, individuals 
become responsive to the needs of others, and society as a whole. 
They de-center from a narrow, isolated view of themselves. 
Society, for its part, becomes responsive to the autonomy of 
individuals. Further, the growing individual learns to promote his 
own autonomy, whereas the growing society learns to promote 
the de-centered social sensibilities of its members. Thus the aims 
of individual and society merge without one simply being 
submerged by the other. 
When autonomous de-centering is valued by everyone, the 
conflict between our unique and communal natures is 
progressively resolved. Increasing autonomy of differing 
individuals to make original choices leads to greater VARIETY 
among people. People are less constrained by the state, or by 
fixed beliefs, to become peasants or doctors or Christians. At the 
same time, however, increasing de-centering prevents variety 
from disintegrating society. Increasingly de-centered individuals 
seek out DIALOGUE with others, even with those of other 
religions, Jobs, or races. Increasing empathy, and the taking of 
others' viewpoints, lead people to autonomously seek agreements 
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which keep their habits and desires from harming others. I may 
want to play music at 11pm on the first floor; you may want to 
sleep on the second floor. Autonomous de-centering leads both of 
us to weigh each claim equally, and seek a creative solution we 
can both accept. 
De-centering from the need for conformity or fixed routine 
breeds tolerance, thus creating more room, so to speak, for the 
varied choices of others. Heterosexuals can learn to respect 
homosexuals; anti-abortion activists can learn to use reason 
rather than invective in their discussions with Planned 
Parenthood workers. Dialogue does not stop at tolerance, 
however. De-centering (in concert with OPENING, another aspect 
of orthogenesis) involves an active effort to know others, to find 
some common ground with them. Variety in turn prevents 
dialogue from lapsing into static conformity. If I live in a 
community of people from many cultures, I can learn new 
languages, break prejudices, and reflect on what is most essential 
about being human. My powers of de-centering expand, as well 
as my power to make varied choices. 
With de-centering, people perceive and respond to the 
common needs of society. People see that their own growth is 
bound up with the growth of others. They want to ensure that 
society is doing its best to promote growth for everyone. 
Autonomy implies a person's power to influence the organization 
of society, and to choose his own way of contributing to society. 
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When universalized, autonomous de-centering is valued within 
our social organizations. Systems of government, economics, 
education, and so forth, encourage autonomy and de-centering 
among people. They assist every person to autonomously advance 
his unique interests and abilities. At the same time, they 
promote dialogue among individuals regarding how their powers 
might be best used to benefit others. 
As Dewey points out (Ch.II, Sec.D3e above), there are bound 
to be conflicts between the individual's freedom to pursue original 
interests and the social need for organization. A talented engineer 
may wish to become a hermit or an eccentric clown just when a 
there is a critical need for a dam to be repaired. Orthogenesis 
does not prescribe a fixed solution to such conflicts. It prescribes 
the direction of change which will tend to overcome such 
conflicts. As society grows, it comes to value the engineer's 
autonomy, and respect the original process of judgement by 
which he has decided to abandon engineering. Others become 
willing to persuade the engineer to change his mind, but only 
through reasoned and compassionate dialogue. They aim to avoid 
coercion, including ostracism. Society also seeks to promote such 
variety and wealth of talent that it can fill the engineer s place 
with little strain (In this sense, it becomes more immune to the 
varied choices of its members). As the engineer grows, he takes 
social needs into account. He may conclude that he can 
contribute most to others through meditation, laughter, or a 
223 
sheer demonstration of non-conformity. He will be open to the 
relevant arguments of others, while remaining immune to 
considerations of mere popularity. When the values of autonomy 
with de-centering, immunity with opening are universalized, 
conflicts are not forestalled, nor are their solutions foreordained. 
But a context is created wherein conflicts are more likely to find 
progressive resolution. 
3. Orthogenesis as Universal 
a. Across Individuals and Cultures 
Orthogenesis describes the universal direction that 
adaptations must take to do away with a problem common to all 
human beings. Dewey (Ch.ll, Sec.Dl above) describes human 
experience as occurring within three contexts. First, there is a 
unique context varying from individual to individual. To know 
precisely what is most growthful for a particular individual at a 
particular time requires thorough and objective inquiry into this 
context. Second, there is a context which the individual shares 
with members of his own culture and his own historical time. To 
know what would be most growthful for Japanese society, or 
Nigerian society, would require us to make essential distinction^ 
between cultures. 
Third, there is a general structure of experience which all 
people share. All people shape and re-shape habits in order to 
interact with changing conditions. All people depend upon others 
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for their emergence as a personality, and are endowed with 
powers of empathy and language to communicate with others. 
Plasticity of habit allows people to learn new ways of 
perceiving and acting as they confront new realities. Children 
learn that objects remain in existence even when they cannot be 
seen. Scientists learn that the earth goes around the sun, even 
when the Catholic Church says it doesn’t. White people learn that 
black people can make compatible co-workers, even when their 
parents taught them otherwise. Yet for all people, this plasticity 
is impeded by ATTACHMENT. We cling to habits even when they 
reinforce conflict with the environment. We shut out interaction 
with the environment that threatens those habits. For example, 
politicians allow deficits to mount rather than break the habit of 
procuring government projects for their own districts. People 
continue to invest power in corrupt politicians rather than take a 
chance on new sources of leadership. 
Our powers of communication enable us to co-operate with 
each other to form civilization. Language, science, music, and so 
forth, are all products of co-operation. Families and social groups 
presuppose some degree of mutual respect and understanding. Yet 
communication is distorted by EGOCENTRISM. One way we 
manifest this is to see ourselves as isolated from one another. We 
turn differences of race, nationality, or religion into reasons to 
attack each other. We constrict the scope of our empathy and 
deny the interdependence inherent in human relations. 
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Orthogenesis is universal because it is an antidote to this 
most fundamental problem in human experience. With growth, 
people open themselves up to a wider view of the environment. 
They put themselves in other people's shoes. They seek ways to 
co-ordinate opposing views within a more essential set of values. 
Differing interpretations of the Koran, for example, get co¬ 
ordinated within the notion that being bombed and gassed is not 
good for anybody. People distinguish habits which reinforce 
conflict with the objective world from those which don't. They 
gain immunity from egocentric, superstitious, and biased beliefs. 
They also gain autonomy to choose more de-centered habits. A 
real-estate developer gives up reaping excessive profits from low- 
income housing at the expense of the people who need that 
housing. Compassion replaces his attachment to money. A 
scientist gives up distorting the results of an experiment so that 
they will conform to a pet theory. The quest for truth replaces 
his attachment to proving himself right. 
Orthogenesis prescribes an immunity from fused, egocentric, 
and narrow habit-attachments. It prescribes an ongoing search 
for more distinguished (differentiated), de-centered habits which 
permit more open and objective interaction with the 
environment. It prescribes the co-ordination (integration) of these 
habits by an increasingly autonomous individual. Yet it cannot 
prescribe, in advance of inquiry, precisely what egocentric 
attachments most require changing for a unique individual m a 
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particular culture. In fact, it prescribes that inquiry into these 
particulars must be thorough and objective so as to avoid 
egocentric or ethnocentric bias. It encourages us to consider, for 
example, that growth in America might begin by educating 
individuals to pledge more allegiance to social welfare, whereas in 
China, stress might be placed on educating government to respect 
individual freedom. Orthogenesis can present universal ethical 
guidelines and still be culturally relative. We can safely say that 
it would be growthful for men in India to abandon the traditional 
practice of burning wives who cannot pay a sufficient dowry. Yet 
an educational program with this aim would need to take into 
account an entire range of cultural factors unique to India. 
We may worry that any ethical principle's claim to 
universality across individuals and cultures harbors an egocentric 
or ethnocentric blindness. We may worry that such a principle 
will fail to respect an autonomous process whereby each 
individual or culture chooses values out of their unique 
experiences. These concerns are themselves orthogenetic in 
nature. Orthogenesis enjoins us to de-center from unquestioned 
cultural conditioning, or from a need to compel others to conform 
without autonomous reflection on their part. It safeguards 
variety by prescribing thorough and objective inquiry into 
individual and sociocultural contexts before designing any 
educational plans. 
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b. Within Individuals 
The value of orthogenesis includes all aspects of human 
growth. I shall make a case for this simply by reviewing 
examples of orthogenesis across a variety of such aspects. The 
reader should refer also to examples given from the work of 
Werner, Piaget, Kohlberg, and Dewey (Ch II: Sec. A3-4, Sec.B2, 
Sec.C3; Sec.D3 above). 
With growth, skills co-ordinate (integrate) an increasing 
array of distinguished elements. A figure skater not only learns a 
complex series of leaps and turns, but can mesh these within a 
larger routine. Autonomy comes from the power to focus upon 
the refinement of some habits within a global act while allowing 
others to proceed without attention. An actor can concentrate 
fully on his expressions of the moment, confident that his next 
line will "come to him" when needed. His power of concentration 
also brings immunity from irrelevant distractions like the crying 
of a baby in the audience. The openness to reconstruction of each 
distinguished habit prevents skill from becoming rigid. The actor 
retains the power to improvise, and to deepen his sense of the 
character during a run of performances. The co-ordination of 
habits allows for a greater opening to the environment. A 
carpenter's autonomous power to create a building goes hand in 
hand with his sensitivity to his tools, his materials, and the 
objective requirements of the project. 
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Emotional growth brings an ability to de-center from and 
reshape emotional impulses and patterns, while co-ordinating 
them with wider social and personal considerations. A child ceases 
to throw a tantrum when asked to share his toys. He drops his 
attachment to controlling all the toys, and constructs new 
enjoyment out of playing with another child. Growth entails 
sensitivity and accessibility to one's emotional experience, which 
becomes more varied and finely shaded. Mike is angry at Fred for 
being slightly late. Upon probing his feelings, he uncovers an 
underlying fear that Fred does not care about him. Instead of 
screaming at Fred, or sulking through the evening, Mike expresses 
his underlying fear to Fred. He does so in a calm way while 
retaining access to his unsettled feelings. Growth brings immunity 
from being at the mercy of one's emotions without closing 
emotions off. It brings de-centered sensitivity to the emotions of 
others, and an enhanced power to express emotions truthfully. 
Cognitive growth frees the individual from egocentric 
distortions and confers the ability to co-ordinate a wide range of 
environmental changes through ideas. A child gains the ability to 
classify objects into a variety of sets and subsets. For example, in 
a box of brown and white wooden beads, he can see that there 
are more wooden beads than brown beads even when there are 
more brown ones than white ones (See Ch.II, Sec.B2b). Cognitive 
growth permits symbolic thinking which avoids magically fusing 
symbols and their referents. A voodoo doll is not seen as an 
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actual part of the person it represents. Cognitive and emotional 
growth are integrated as one seeks an objective perception of the 
world, even if this means reshaping emotionally-charged 
prejudices. Black human beings are seen as they are, and not as 
something between an animal and a person. 
Orthogenesis includes overcoming habit-attachments which 
are chemical as well as psychological. Autonomy and immunity 
from addiction to alcohol, nicotine, or drugs, for example, opens 
the individual’s environment. He need not center his activities 
around obtaining his "fix". 
Extended knowledge of science, history, anthropology, 
mathematics, and so on, creates a more open and less 
sociocentric worldview. Growth brings the ability to see accurate 
connections between events: we can learn from the past two 
World Wars to seek new ways of resolving conflicts in Europe 
today. Growth always involves autonomous control merged with 
de-centered responsiveness. In science, growth must bring not 
only the seeds of technology to control the environment, but 
understanding of the human effect upon a delicate planetary 
ecology. 
With development, moral ideas and feelings become 
increasingly de-centered and autonomous. Unfettered empathy, 
mutual role-taking, and universalizable principles guide 
judgement and action. Egocentrism holds less sway in ethical 
decisions. One becomes more immune from considerations which 
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do not do away with underlying conflict, be they ethnic 
prejudice, narrow personal advantage, fear of others' opinions, or 
fixed social conventions. Social attitudes become more tolerant of 
diversity. At the same time, people seek an essential social 
consensus through democratic dialogue among equals. 
Aesthetic or artistic growth brings the power to connect 
one s sensory experience to ideas, memories, and analogies. An 
author conveys the smells of the beach in his writing by calling 
up images of seaweed and suntan lotion. A mime conveys the 
texture of an imaginary rope. Growth involves an autonomy 
from fixed aesthetic notions, and an openness to original and 
more immediate experiences. At the same time, a tap dancer can 
improvise and create fresh steps within an established form. The 
ability to distinguish yet co-ordinate harmonic, chromatic, 
linguistic, or other nuances increases with growth. Thus the 
artist extends the intimacy and complexity of his communion 
with the environment. As discussed earlier (Ch II, Sec.D3d 
above), artistic growth involves a simultaneous increase in 
originality, stressing the unique vision of the artist, alongside a 
communicability stressing an expression of shared human 
experience. 
Religious and philosophical questioning, with growth, 
becomes more autonomous. It becomes distinguished from 
authority, social conventions, dogma, and even fears about death 
or judgement. The desire to "know God", or oneself, out of one s 
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own experience, becomes more essential, focused, and free from 
egocentric distortions. The removal of doubt becomes a more 
sufficient reason for faith, faith ceases to hinge on the promise of 
other rewards, e g., being reunited with loved ones after death. 
Questioning comes to include all existence, and a wider sphere of 
one s own experiences, even those of an everyday nature. Thus 
one s Questioning about the "larger" things becomes more 
integrated with one's daily experience of the "smaller" things. The 
experiences and teachings of others become increasingly 
appreciated at the same time that one becomes less dependent 
upon them, and more directly attuned to one's own actual 
experience. [3] 
Variety and dialogue express the idea of differentiation and 
integration within the person, just as they do in social relations 
(see Sec.2. above). Growth does not fix upon a single 
adaptational mode; it fosters a variety of experiential pathways. 
At the same time, growth extends one's power to have these 
paths discourse with one another, and become co-ordinated in a 
mutually enriching way. Scientific theory can thus enhance 
aesthetic insight, and vice versa, without one being confounded 
with the other. 
4 Orthogenesis as Prescriptive 
Orthogenesis prescribes a progressive solution to the problem 
of egocentric attachment: this is its function as a value. All 
232 
growth is growth out of egocentric attachment; when beset by 
egocentric attachment, what we ought to do in all cases is grow 
out of it. Three facts are essential to orthogenesis’ justification as 
a value. First, egocentric attachment is a problem. It generates 
conflict between human beings and their environment. Second, 
this problem is susceptible to progressive regulation by 
orthogenesis, which tends to do away with these conflicts. Third, 
orthogenesis cannot be counted on, like gravity, to occur without 
some conscious human intervention. 
Orthogenesis is prescriptive because its justification does not 
rely upon facts which are not essential to its function. Thus, 
orthogenesis is not justified as an "alignment” with the forces of 
"evolution", "nature", or "life", which exist prior to human 
consciousness. Certainly, we may draw poetic inspiration from 
prior evolutionary struggles, especially those resulting in the 
evolution of humanity. Further, the very concept of 
"development" owes much to the Darwinian idea of evolution, and 
the analogies drawn from phylogenesis to human ontogenesis by 
authors such as Piaget. 
Yet life, nature, and evolution are not ethically selective, 
they include bubonic plague as well as butterflies. Nature acts 
according to its own rules when viral infections or human over 
population cause misery. To justify growth through a mere 
appeal to "life" is to abdicate our ethical responsibility to choose 
among life's possibilities. When we appeal to "respect for life or 
233 
respect for the planet as ethical principles, we implicitly mean 
respect for an ecological balance which sustains variety, takes the 
welfare of other life forms into account, and supports human 
development. 
The point is that action to maintain a vast variety of living 
things, and to extend our sympathies to include non-human as 
well as human life, is a progressive adaptation to the bare fact of 
human interdependence with all life. It takes on ethical 
significance because it is an adaptation which requires regulative 
effort in the face of human tendencies towards egocentric 
isolation and attachment to desires (e.g., for unlimited 
consumption) which are objectively self-defeating in an ecological 
context. When we extol "life" or "nature" as an ethical source of 
justification, what we are implicitly appealing to is a vision of life 
as intelligently and compassionately regulated. There is no 
ethically sound way to abdicate the responsibility for choosing 
how to use the human power to regulate, which, after all, is 
just as "natural" a phenomenon as any other. 
Orthogenesis cannot be justified by appealing to nature 
because nature includes too much: what isn't growthful as well 
as what is. Likewise, it cannot be justified or refuted by an 
appeal to scientific descriptions which exclude too much, 
especially untapped efforts of education. A study may show that 
only 2% of a given population show no evidence of racial 
prejudice. This would not justify abandoning growth out of racism 
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as a value. Science has not proven, once and for all, that racial 
prejudice is an ineradicable part of human nature, and that we 
might as well not bother valuing its abolition. Such a judgement 
would fail to include all unexplored educational possibilities and 
sociohistorical arrangements which might overcome racism. Of 
course, any educational program would do well to heed such a 
study, so as to properly gauge the measure of its task. 
Similarly, scientific proof that people develop at a particular 
rate, or in a particular sequence, or under particular conditions, 
has important implications for assessing the value of specific 
educational practices. Educational practices which do not take 
existing facts into account will not promote growth. Requiring my 
5th graders to read Mobv Dick is not likely to open their 
environment to include great American literature. But such 
evidence does not throw doubt upon orthogenesis as a definition of 
the desirable direction of change. 
In fact, the very desirability of orthogenesis should lead us 
to accept "scientific" statements about human limitations with 
respect to its pursuit in a temporary and relative way only. This 
is because the educational means at our disposal, and thus the 
variables affecting these limitations, are themselves subject to 
sociohistorical developments which cannot be completely 
accounted for within a scientific inquiry. Even the outlook of the 
scientists designing the inquiry and drawing conclusions from it is 
bound to be conditioned by such development. What may be a 
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’*given" today, in other words, may become subject to regulation 
tomorrow. Only through constant pressure of inquiry upon 
supposed "givens" can we combat that tendency toward narrowed 




1. I restrict my definition of "given" conditions to those which 
provide the context for a problem, without which the 
problem (e.g., the leak) would have no meaning. These 
include unchangeable conditions which stand in opposition to 
the problem (e g., Joe's need to avoid the rain) as well as 
conditions which represent prior adaptations to the former, 
and thus are required in order to explain the problem-at- 
hand (e.g., the roof). 
Obviously, there may be many other unchangeable or 
unproblematic aspects of a situation which are not necessary 
to lend significance to what is changeable and lacking. Joe 
may prefer red shirts to blue ones; this is simply irrelevant. 
Maybe Joe lives In the desert; this would certainly be 
relevant to whether the leak is a problem at all. But it is not 
needed in order to explain why the leak is a problem; it 
would be more relevant to explaining why it is not a 
problem. If Joe's consumptive mother were coming to visit, 
however, this would add urgency to Joe's need to do 
something about that leak. It would contribute to the context 
of the problem qua problem, and would be considered a given 
condition within the framing of the problem. In order to 
frame a problem inclusively and essentially, we must 
distinguish conditions which meet these criteria from those 
which do not, Just as we must distinguish between the given 
conditions and the changeable ones. 
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2. My definition of egocentrism is to be distinguished from the 
more specific concept of infantile egocentrism found in 
Werner s work, and in much of Piaget’s worK (although his 
looser usage of the term is close to my own). Within 
Werner's psychology, the term egocentrism (See Ch.Il, 
Sec. A3bvi above) is limited to those isolating distortions which 
characterize very early childhood. The inability to take 
another s point of view, even that of a loved one, is due to 
cognitive-structural factors, and even maturational factors, 
which operate relatively independently of 
affective/motivational ones. A child’s egocentric behavior, 
thus defined, is therefore no indication of his overall 
character. Further, since such behavior is relatively 
independent of the nature of the child's social context, it is 
no indication of the "character" of the society. In other 
words, even a loving and well-meaning 2-year-old with 
highly developed parents in a highly developed society cannot 
help but exhibit "infantile egocentrism". 
The distinction between infantile egocentrism and adult 
egocentrism (called egoism by Werner) has been of great 
practical educational importance. It has discouraged the adult 
egocentric act of considering infantile egocentric behavior as 
an indication of general character. Such a distinction leads us 
to define the specific problem of infantile egocentrism 
properly so as to lead to its inclusive and essential solution. 
Thus cognitive and social stimulation in a controlled 
environment, combined with the meeting of basic affective 
and physical needs, might be deemed a more effective and 
appropriate "cure” for infantile egocentrism than moral 
reprobation aimed at a structure of understanding that isn’t 
there. 
My use of the term egocentrism is meant to include M 
distortions which render the organism more isolated from the 
environment, and thus represent a "closing”, rather than an 
"opening", of the organism-environment system. Cognitive 
egocentrism, regressive habits, affective egoism, cultural 
sociocentrism and prejudice, and all other "centering 
tendencies fall within the same inclusive concept. 
This does not blur distinctions between different kinds of 
egocentrism. The progressive solution to a 2-year-old s 
cognitive egocentrism will be different from the progressive 
solution to the egocentrism of an adult bigot. Yet both 
egocentrisms are remediable, and in both cases such 
remediation depends upon human intervention. Thus they 
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are both subject to ethical evaluation: how are they 
problematic, and how ought they to change? In the case of 
the infant, the onus for promoting growth falls upon the 
parent or the society, not upon the infant. Therefore to 
examine the infant's egocentrism through an ethical lens is 
by no means to hold the infant ethically responsible for it, 
whereas we would hold the adult responsible for his bigotry 
(See Ch.IV, Sec.D6 below). 
3. As I stated at the outset (Ch.I, Sec.F above), I make no 
claims for orthogenesis as a definition of "spiritual 
development as a sui generis notion. My purpose is not to 
disparage or deny the existence or value of spirituality. It is 
to avoid reducing questions of faith and direct experience by 
attempting to capture them within a conceptual scheme of 
any kind. 
To the extent that "spiritual development" is defined as the 
global whole of all development which is greater than the 
sum of its parts, then it is served somewhat by a discussion 
of those parts and their interpenetration and mutual 
reinforcement of one another. "Spiritual development" is thus 
addressed by a reference to development in all those realms 
(cognitive, affective, etc.) in which it is seen to be 
immanent. Spiritual matters can also be defined in terms of 
a unique set of questions, such as the meaning of life and 
death or the existence of God. In this case, the notion of 
spiritual development is captured by applying orthogenetic 
criteria to the development of reflections, feelings, and 
cultural-historical assumptions regarding such questions. 
Fowler's "faith stages" (1981) essentially reflect such 
development, as do the examples I have indicated in the 
paragraph preceding this footnote. 
But to the extent that spirituality deals with direct 
apprehension of that which is both ETERNAL and 
UBIQUITOUS, it denotes that which transcends-yet-includes 
the context of change and interpenetration which is the 
fundamental frame of reference for our notion of 
development. Spirituality in this regard is a matter of non- 
symbolic faith and immediate experience. I make no pretense 
of "including" this matter within a conceptual framework 
such as this. 
CHAPTER IV 
THINGS TO CONSIDER WHEN APPLYING THE ORTHOGENETIC 
PRINCIPLE 
A. Introduction 
The orthogenetic principle prescribes thorough and objective 
inquiry to determine what will be most growthful for a particular 
person or group in a unique situation (See Ch.Ill, Sec. A above). 
In this chapter, I use the orthogenetic principle to deduce 
guidelines for what constitutes thorough and objective inquiry. 
Such guidelines can help educators devise plans that effectively 
promote growth. Thus they are both ethically and practically 
significant. [1] 
The guidelines offered in this chapter fall into two 
categories. The first addresses how educators can make ethical 
use of psychological theories and concepts as tools for inquiry. The 
second explores general requirements of thorough and objective 
inquiry into educational problems. 
r Thp orthogenetic Principle Regulates the Use of Psychological 
Assumptions about Development. 
The orthogenetic principle enjoins educators to differentiate 
between the widest variety of growth-pathways for a person, co- 
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ordinating these wherever possible. The educator is therefore 
encouraged to make an eclectic use of psychological models of 
development. One model may describe development as the 
attainment of a cognitive stage. Another may describe it as the 
extinguishing of undesirable behaviors and the reinforcement of 
desirable ones. Yet another may describe growth as re¬ 
experiencing, then being able to choose between, previously 
unconscious feelings and ideas learned in early childhood. 
A given model of developmental psychology usually 
incorporates assumptions about what growth means that set it 
apart from other models. One model may define growth solely in 
terms of a discontinuous leap to a new stage. Another may define 
it solely in terms of a continuous accumulation of behaviors. 
Psychologists use guiding metaphors to orient their inquiry into 
development. For Piaget, the metaphor is biological evolution. For 
Kohlberg, it is philosophical argument. For information-processing 
theorists, it is the computer program. Such paradigms are useful, 
perhaps even necessary, for the scientist. They mark off his 
territory of inquiry, and make precise experimentation possible. 
Yet if there is any useful metaphor for the educator to 
describe the growing person, it is the elephant in the ancient Sufi 
tale of the blind men (Shah, p.25). In this tale, a group of blind 
men hear of a new beast possessed by a royal entourage passing 
through their city. They seek to learn of its nature by placing 
their hands upon it. One, feeling the elephant's leg, concludes 
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that the elephant is like a pillar. Another, feeling its ear, 
concludes that it is like a rug. Yet another, feeling its trunk, 
concludes that it is like a hollow pipe. Each one is partly right, 
yet no one is able to grasp the whole. 
Educators are responsible for the growth of a real and 
complete elephant". So if they use psychological theory to "see" 
the elephant better, they should be ready to grab on to more 
than one place. Educators can use even conflicting theories 
because it is usually possible to “borrow” practical tools from a 
theory without confining oneself permanently to a theory's 
worldview. Thus we can refer to stage sequences or 
reinforcement schedules without being obliged to define growth 
exclusively in terms of either stage advance or outward 
behaviors. 
When applying psychology in educational practice, we 
should consider the different aims of scientists and educators. 
Scientists seek truth through generalizations and probabilities. In 
the psychological sciences, if 90% of the responses in an 
experiment conform to a theory, that may be considered fairly 
strong confirmation of that theory. For scientific purposes, the 
errant 10% may not detract from the general value of the 
theory. Educators, on the other hand, must ethically be 
concerned with each individual. They must be as prepared to 
educate the individual who stumps the theory as they are to 
educate the individual who confirms it. Flexibility to choose 
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among even seemingly conflicting theories may be essential to 
describing what is most growthful for a unique individual. So, 
from an ethical standpoint, educators must avoid the "blindness" 
that accrues from over-reliance on a single model. As Schwab 
comments, in his discussion of education as a "practical art": 
The particularities of the practical, merely by existing, 
constitute one difficult problem for the practical arts. The 
problem is to see them - to take note that each is there 
and to honor it as possibly relevant to our concerns. This is 
difficult because we normally see only what we are 
instructed to look for and we are instructed by theory" 
(1971, p.496); "if education is to be good for 
students. . . educators must attend to the problems posed by 
the inadequacy of borrowed theory: the incompleteness of 
their subjects and the incomplete view which each takes of 
its incomplete subject" (p.50l). 
Schwab seeks to solve this problem through the use of 
multiple theories. He also encourages the educator’s use of an 
"immediate perception" outside theory, and the enhancement of 
his accessibility to such perception (p.497). This is like Werner 
and Dewey’s idea that development in our outlook may rely on 
our ability to return to a more concrete level of perception, one 
less dominated by a set of formal structures. Schwab also points 
out that education is mot informed by psychology alone, but also 
by epistemology, sociology, anthropology, economics, and political 
science (p.50l). 
The orthogenetlc principle gives educators an ethical basis 
for borrowing practical ideas from a variety of theories without 
taking on assumptions within the theory which might inhibit 
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growth. It does this by prescribing metatheoretical assumptions 
which do not inhibit growth. Or it rejects, metatheoretically, 
assumptions which might inhibit growth. The orthogenetic 
principle prescribes that it is ethically prudent to make certain 
assumptions, and to reject others. For example, it is prudent to 
reject the assumption that growth is an inherent tendency, 
because this may cause us to gloss over the outer conditions 
required for growth to occur. 
Of course, empirical research might support an assumption 
that, for ethical reasons, we would rather reject. It might 
indicate, for example, that violence between people is biologically 
inevitable. But the desirability of a non-violent society compels 
educators to place a "burden of proof" (Toulmin, 1981, p.257) 
upon the scientist. For educators to accept violence as inevitable, 
science would have to show that all possible conditions of 
education and society under which non-violence might be possible 
had been accounted for. Such a burden of proof would be 
virtually impossible to meet. Educators’ plans would still be 
influenced by the obvious preponderance of violence in existing 
society. But violence would still be seen as subject to educational 
and ethical regulation. It would not be placed, out of adherence 
to psychological theory, in the untouchable realm of the "given”. 
The point is that orthogenesis can prescribe what it is 
ethically prudent to assume, or refuse to assume, about 
development, in the absence of truly incontrovertible evidence to 
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the contrary. Ethical examination of psychological assumptions is 
key because of the danger that such assumptions may themselves 
work against growth. Wartofsky argues: 
...psychological theories of learning, of growth, of 
development themselves contribute to shape the modes of 
learning, growth, development which they are about 
and. . .therefore, the psychological theorist bears the burden 
of constituting, in part at least, how child development, or 
human development, as an actual phenomenon or practice 
will take place. . .human beings themselves create and 
transform the norms of development and. . .such norms 
effectively influence (though they do not fully determine) 
how infants, children, and the rest of us will, in fact, 
develop" (1986, p.114, emphases in original). 
Wartofsky's claim is not hard to support if we consider how 
such "influence” is exercised. Our assumptions determine what is 
relevant, what is given and what is subject to regulation when 
we undertake our problem-framing inquiry. Considerations which 
we assume to be irrelevant or given will be included neither in 
our inquiry, nor in the framing of the developmental problem to 
be solved. How we frame the problem in turn, as 1 have shown 
(Ch. Ill, Sec.B2 above), determines its proposed solution, which in 
turn guides educational practice. For example, if we assume that 
genetic make-up fixes set limits on a student s mathematics 
ability, we may not bother with educational plans which aim 
beyond those limits. We will assume the limits to be given, and 
inquiry into teaching methods to be irrelevant. 
Within education, the ethical prescriptions of orthogenesis 
take precedence over the emphases introduced by theories within 
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other disciplines. They regulate such theories to ensure that 
orthogenesis is not violated by their application. In this way, for 
example, educators may use behavior modification technique as 
long as they remain committed to the student's eventual 
autonomy from a particular set of extrinsic reinforcers. 
Education that adheres to any one psychological model 
might thwart development by emphasizing emotions only, or 
cognitive structures only, or extrinsic "reinforcements" only, or 
"information-processing" programs only. Educators have an 
ethical interest in refusing to limit themselves to any narrowly 
deterministic view of development, no matter how convincingly 
modeled and supported by empirical study. Psychological 
experiments do not usually offer conclusive proof of the exclusive 
value of a model. When such a burden of proof is placed upon the 
psychologist, we find that his evidence usually presumes 
acceptance of the particular lens through which he looks at 
people. 
The categories of assumptions about development examined 
in the next section are of this type: they are "lenses" through 
which the psychologist looks at development. They are not easily 
susceptible to conclusive empirical confirmation or refutation. As 
Werner points out, for example (1957), whether we see growth as 
a continuous line or as discontinuous spurts depends somewhat on 
what we look for. For each category (e.g., continuity vs, 
discontinuity), I will use the orthogentic principle to prescribe the 
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assumptions which would be ethically prudent for the educator to 
make or reject. 
C.. What Assumptions about Development are Consistent with the 
QrthOttenetic Principle? 
1. Time 
The following guidelines can help the educator distinguish 
assumptions about time which promote growth from those which 
don't: 
* Don't assume that time causes growth. 
Sometimes we refer to the passage of time as if it were the 
agent of growth: "time heals all wounds". We must not forget 
that such a reference to time is figurative only. It is not time 
that causes change, but what happens over time. Time is the 
medium of growth, not its cause. If we assume otherwise, we are 
liable to forgo thorough and objective inquiry into precisely what 
it is that happens during a period of time to produce growth. 
Following such inquiry, we may conclude that a "hands off" 
approach is best. The unplanned encounters we take for granted 
in our culture may do more for an adolescent's emotional growth 
than a series of parental lectures. But without such inquiry, we 
impute vague powers to time which dull our sensitivity to human 
variety. One person's "year" is not another's when it comes to 
growth. Orthogenesis asks us to de-center from a fused, mythic 
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notion of time toward a more differentiated view of what 
happens over time for each individual. 
* Don t assume that growth is irreversible just because time 
is. Athletic skills wither from disuse. Cognitive skills may be 
impaired by disease. A writer who is inspired in his 30's may lose 
his spark in his 50's. If we take growth to be irreversible, we will 
be less alert to how subsequent influences may undo it. 
* Don't assume that the past influences the present in a 
fixed way. 
To have a meaningful notion of habit or continuity in 
development, we must assume that the past influences the 
present. Yet this "past" may influence an individual differently 
over time. As Lewin points out: 
"the psychological field which exists at a given time contains 
also the views of that individual about his future and past. 
The individual sees not only his present situation, he has 
certain expectations, wishes, fears, daydreams, for his 
future. His views about his own past and that of the rest of 
the physical and social world are often incorrect, but 
nevertheless constitute, in his life space, the 'reality-level' 
of the past" (1943, p.303). 
Orthogenesis prescribes that we differentiate between a 
person's "life-spaces" at different times. We should not assume 
that the past exerts a fixed "hold" upon a person that we can 
take granted: "the method of determining the properties of a 
situation by testing them at that time avoids the uncertainties of 
historical conclusions" (Lewin, p.304). A child may be terrified of 
dogs, as a result of a past experience, but also as a result of his 
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ideas about that experience, and about himself. Yet he may then 
have a positive experience with a dog that not only changes his 
attitude about dogs in the present, but his view of his past 
experience. If all the adults around him avoid testing whether his 
phobia is still in force, and assume that it is, this may weaken 
the child’s developmental gains. 
* Don't assume that normative chronologies of growth can 
replace individualized inquiry into each unique situation. 
To safeguard the autonomy of the individual, and variety 
within the society, we must consider variations in growth-time 
between individuals. We must inquire thoroughly and objectively 
into the particularities of each individual in each new situation. 
Educators may make use of normative chronologies for the sake 
of convenience, or to take cultural norms into account. We 
might, after reflection, decide it was better to let a child begin 
organized sports at age 7 with all his friends even if, cultural 
norms aside, he would be better off waiting until age 8. Yet 
undue devotion to theoretical chronologies may stifle the direct 
and many-faceted observation of particular people in particular 
situations. 
* Assume that consistency over time serves as one test for 
development. 
Orthogenesis entails the autonomous power to shape and re¬ 
shape habits which do away with conflict with the environment. 
To constitute development, an adaptation must attain the status 
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of a habit: it must be consistent over time. (Although not all 
habits are developmental!) To quote Bronfenbrenner: 
development involves a change in the characteristics of a person 
that is neither ephemeral nor situation-bound; it implies a 
reorganization that has some continuity over both time and 
space" (1979, p.28). Time measures continuity; it is thus a useful, 
though insufficient, indication of the autonomy conferred by a 
habit. For example, if a child can refrain from hitting someone 
for a year, this shows more growth than if he can only refrain 
for a week. 
* Assume that rhythm and timing play a role in growth. 
Growth may be affected by the length of time previous 
habits have been in place. The amount of time available for 
education, the amount of time changes take, or the timing of 
some changes in concert with others may all influence 
educational choices. Even the student's perception of the flow of 
time can be taken into consideration. Our view of the role of time 
in development should sensitize us to such variables. In all cases, 
time is looked at as a flexible medium to be "worked with" in the 
pursuit of development, not as something exerting an inherently 
good or bad force in all situations. 
* Don't make fixed assumptions about how limits on time 
place limits on growth. 
Anderson (1957) sees time as an "inhibiting" force in 
development. Our limited lifespans force us to choose among 
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developmental pathways. We don’t have time to develop every 
skill there is. Also, the development of some habits may work 
against the development of others. If I spend the first fifty of 
years of my life becoming a great chess player, this may cramp 
my ability to become a great weight-lifter during the next 
thirty. This introduces the element of selection into development 
(see Sec. D7 below).- Anderson perceives time as exerting a 
narrowing force upon development, due to "consecutive binary 
choices" that must be made. 
The need to select among growth pathways may be 
inevitable. Yet if the educator sees time limitations as exerting 
too "narrowing" an influence, he is liable to forestall creative 
adaptations to these limitations. We don't always know what the 
limits of what people can do in a given time span are. Our very 
life expectancies are changing with time. With sociocultural 
development, and development of the art and science of 
education, future generations may come to learn in an 
exponentially more rapid and flexible way. We may radically 
alter our current notions of "career", "lifespan", or time itself. 
Further, being obliged to choose between growth-paths due 
to time limits is not merely "narrowing" or inhibitory. The need 
to be selective can enhance growth by leading a person to make 
wise choices. It drives a person to ask: "What is most growthful 
for me at this time? With limited time to grow, what kind of 
growth is most inclusive of and essential to my welfare and that 
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of others? One may not have the time to learn many skills. One 
may still grow, along perhaps more essential lines, by seeking the 
originality of expression and losing-of-self through profound 
concentration that comes with mastery of any single skill. Part of 
the educator s job is to use time constraints to encourage not 
merely narrower goals, but deeper ones. 
2. Form and Content; Inner and Outer Change 
Both Werner (1937) and Dewey (1946) stress that 
development should be measured simultaneously and equally with 
respect to inner and outer results. Inward "forms" (thought 
structures, habits, stable emotional attitudes) are held to arise 
only through transactions with the world and adaptations to the 
"content” of outer consequences. So inner form and outer content 
are seen as interdependent. Werner, Piaget, and Kohlberg 
emphasize the differentiation of form from content. They do this 
to combat the idea that development can be assessed by merely 
observing outward behaviors without reference to what these 
mean to the subject. Dewey places more emphasis on an 
integrated view of inner and outer results when assessing growth. 
What assumptions about the relations between inner habits 
(including rational "forms" or structures) and their larger social- 
environmental consequences are most conducive to promoting 
orthogenesis? 
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Orthogenesis is progressive change in the transactions 
between an individual and his environment. Changes are assessed 
according to whether they confer increasing power to co-ordinate 
yet remain open to that environment. How can this be done 
without referring to how the individual affects his environment, 
including his social environment? Yet orthogenesis is also assessed 
by whether changes confer increasing autonomy from the 
environment, coupled with an ability to make essential 
differentiations within it. How can we do this without reference 
to a set of inner abilities (habits, ideas, thought structures, skills, 
"programs", etc.) evidenced through discussion, emotional 
expression, reason, and other "subjective" information? The very 
ability of the individual to provide such information about his 
own experience is something which, if it were missing, would call 
the subject's autonomously de-centered personality into profound 
question. 
Orthogenesis aims at harmonizing the subjective and 
objective worlds without syncretically fusing them. So we must 
see both inner and outer changes as essentially relevant in 
assessing growth. Reference to inner habits prevents a 
preoccupation with outer behavior that devalues the autonomous 
reflection of the individual and his subjective power to co¬ 
ordinate environmental distinctions. Reference to outer 
consequences prevents a preoccupation with rationalization, and 
deductions about development based on speech, which devalues 
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the person's power to open up to and act upon his environment 
to objectively render it more conducive to his own and others* 
welfare. 
As Werner, Piaget, and Kohlberg stress, similar outer 
consequences might be the result of different underlying habits. If 
we pay attention to reasons given for actions, we are less likely 
to draw erroneous conclusions about inner abilities from a look at 
situation-bound behavior alone. On the other hand, it is precisely 
the inconsistent, inadequate, and irrelevant nature of behavior 
that tips us off to a lower level of inner development than speech 
would indicate. We may believe a teenager obeys a rule because 
of the principle behind it. He may even understand the principle, 
and be able to explain it. It is only when his parents go away for 
the weekend, and the rule is broken, that we discover how much 
his adherence to the rule really depended on heteronomous 
factors. 
The educator should be prepared to test both inner and 
outer signs of growth. As long as educators pay attention to both 
inner and outer consequences, they can draw upon inner- 
oriented theories like Piaget's and Kohlberg's as well as outer- 
oriented ones such as behaviorism. The different problems posed 
by individuals may make the tests or tools provided by one 
preferable to those of the other. For a student who 'behaves 
well", but whose autonomy from extrinsic reinforcement is in 
doubt, a Kohlbergian approach may be more useful. For a 
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student who "knows" the good but cannot "do" it consistently, 
psychotherapy or behavior modification aimed at the extinction of 
unconscious or reason-resistant habits might be indicated. 
An approach to development consistent with the ethical 
prescription of orthogenesis differentiates inner habits, or 
deductions about them made from rational speech, from outer 
results. This way we do not automatically predict outer 
consequences from subjective accounts, nor subjective experience 
from outward behavior. At the same time, we seek development 
in the integration of inner habits and their outer consequences. 
We assume that over time and across situations, development of 
the one is bound up with the development of the other. Therefore 
the educator must employ a "binocular" vision in this respect. 
5. Adaptation 
I define adaptation as behavior (including thought, feeling, 
and other internal action) aimed at resolving problems in 
organism-environment interaction. Orthogenesis is adaptation 
which is progressive, which tends to do away with the root of the 
problem. The organism is not defined as an envelope of biological 
organs or a list of mental events. Nor is the environment defined 
as a fixed set of physical objects or social practices outside the 
epidermis. Organism and environment are seen as opposite yet 
interdependent poles within an ever-changing universe. That 
which is the organism, or individual, is that which regulates the 
256 
environment. The environment is anything being regulated by 
the organism. We need not isolate, once and for all. a fixed 
entity which is ultimately "in charge" of the organizing and 
regulating. 
Human organisms have the power to regulate the 
environment intelligently, using special capacities for learning and 
communication. Following Dewey's metaethics, the domain of 
ethics arises from this power. To be consistent with orthogenesis, 
our idea of adaptation should open up the scope of what we 
consider to be environment, of what can be potentially regulated. 
It should not rule out in advance, for example, the idea that we 
may regulate the functioning of our own organs, or the activities 
of the mind itself. 
Looked at this way, the question of whether the organism 
should accommodate to the environment or whether it should 
attempt to assimilate or alter the environment to fit "itself" is off 
the mark. The pertinent question is: Which aspects of the 
environment are the essential and inclusive source of the 
problem, and therefore require regulation? Should we build a 
road through the mountain, or should we stop being in such a 
hurry to get to the other side? Should I get an easier job so 1 can 
sleep more? Or should I keep the job, and take up a meditation 
practice which will train my body to sleep less? Relatively 
"internal" environmental factors and relatively "external" ones 
affect and, over time, mirror each other. My exhaustion mirrors 
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the sloppy work, getting done on the job. Thus we can assume 
that it will be a rare problem that can be inclusively and 
essentially framed without reference to both kinds of factors. 
Now the trick, of course, is that how we frame problems 
depends on our judgement about what is subject to change in a 
situation as opposed to what is not. It also depends on our 
judgement, to be borne out or not by subsequent events, as to 
what changes will really eliminate conflict. We may decide that 
our desires, if executed, will create growth, and that we ought to 
regulate outer conditions which obstruct them. Or we may decide 
that our desires themselves require regulation if growth is to 
occur. But if we consider everything as potentially an aspect of 
the environment to be regulated, without egocentric attachment 
to a particular set of thoughts, desires, social arrangements, etc., 
then we will be less hindered from an inquiry which considers 
and weighs all factors without bias. Such a view of adaptation 
itself contributes to a de-centered autonomy from the 
environment, whether internal or external. 
4. Equilibrium and Disequilibrium 
Both equilibrium and disequilibrium have a place within 
development. For Piaget, "equilibration" is a dynamic cycle which 
includes the child's puzzlement when faced with the 
contradictions in his own thought, as well as his satisfaction upon 
arriving at an unshakeable logical conclusion. For Dewey, growth 
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involves a rhythm" between "loss of integration with 
environment and recovery of union" (Ch.l, Sec.D above). 
The educator should not assign any inherent value to either 
equilibrium or disequilibrium. The question is how the balance 
between stability and mobility in habits, security and 
uncertainty, acceptance of things as they are and desire to 
change them, etc., affect and reflect the individual’s overall 
relationship with the environment. In some cases growth may 
suffer from an excess of equilibrium, and in some cases it may 
suffer from an excess of disequilibrium. 
With orthogenesis, the co-ordination of distinguished habits 
allows for both equilibrium and disequilibrium. Growthful 
disruption of some habits can occur within a context of other 
habits which don't need to be disturbed. For example, emotional 
composure allows one to embrace intellectual uncertainty or 
social change. Well-organized work routines can run smoothly in 
the face of necessary emotional turmoil. The measure of 
development is the degree of integration and differentiation, and 
not the degree of equilibrium per se. [2] 
5 Constructivism and Interactionism 
We may not know exactly how construction of habits 
through interaction with the environment takes place. But for 
orthogenesis to mean anything, the educator must assume that it 
can take place. Unless the student can learn to construct habits, 
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choose how he will respond to environmental happenings, and 
choose which happenings he will respond to at all, the idea of 
autonomy or immunity from the environment is voided. If, on 
the other hand, we assume that change is pure construction, and 
that interaction" is mere fuel for a pre-programmed unfolding, 
then de-centering and opening are likewise emptied of 
significance. 
The educator may consider a variety of theories as to how 
interaction occurs between a student's habits and the habits of 
others, not to mention cultural or geophysical realities. But in 
order to respect both autonomy and de-centering, the educator 
must consider the student's own constructive powers, as well as 
the interactive influence of new environmental forces. 
6. Stages and Structures 
The orthogenetic principle requires the assumption that 
people can construct habits which integrate activity. Though not 
all habits are developmental, all development involves habit The 
only way educators can know that growth is happening, not 
random change or reflex, is to note whether behavior falls into 
some kind of a habit-pattern. To quote Bronfenbrenner: 
"To demonstrate that human development has occurred, it 
is necessary to establish that a change produced in the 
person's conceptions and/or activities carries over to other 
settings and other times. Such demonstration is referred to 
as developmental validity" (1979, p.35). 
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When we assume that many habits change more or less 
together with time, that they fall into a pattern with a common 
and essential core, and that this core determines a broad swath 
of conceptions and/or activities", we have the makings of a 
theory of developmental STAGES. Psychological theories vary as to 
the claims they make for such stages. Piaget and Kohlberg 
maintain that stages are more than mere typologies; they reflect 
holistic underlying thought-STRUCTURES which exert a powerful 
regulatory influence upon global thought and action. On the one 
hand, a structure sets definite limits to what can be thought or 
achieved at a given stage. On the other, the highest structure 
attained acts to bring all thought and action into conformity with 
it. 
What assumptions about stages and structures support 
orthogenesis, and which do not? Let us first examine how 
thinking in terms of holistic stages and underlying structures can 
promote growth. 
Stage and structure theories heighten awareness of patterns 
in behavior. They emphasize the possibility of integrating habits, 
of transferring gains in one area to another. If a student can 
imagine what a grouping of blocks will look like from a different 
angle, maybe he is ready to imagine how an argument looks 
from his friend's point of view. They provide a point of departure 
for hypotheses about what a student, given his ability in one 
area, will be able to do or not do in another. They alert us to the 
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value of higher-order integrative abilities as a counterweight to 
the mere accumulation of isolated task competencies or bits of 
information. They encourage us to check "outer” manifestations of 
development against the student's "inner" conceptions (See Sec. 
B2 above). 
Structural theories like Piaget's enable us to look for 
systemic rules governing growth. One proposed rule is that all 
possibilities for adaptation within an existing structure are 
exhausted before a new structure is elaborated. Another rule is 
that structures within a system are specialized to deal with 
certain kinds of problems. Each structure buffers others against 
problems outside their "fields". Thus autonomic nervous 
structures handle problems every second without disturbing 
conscious thought. One can compose an original tune while taking 
a cultural structure of tones and rhythms for granted. Another 
rule is that structures extend themselves, forming new habits 
which conform to and confirm them. Once we know how to 
industrialize one nation, we seek to industrialize others. Through 
this very process of extension, the environment is changed, 
posing new problems like pollution and over-population. Thus 
structures, through their own action, contribute to the 
exhaustion of their adaptive possibilities, encouraging the 
elaboration of new structures. 
Stage and structural theories sensitize us to discontinuous 
leaps in development. They prepare us for the possibility that 
261 
new habits may be constructed rapidly once a stage-threshold 
has been crossed. Thus they deter assumptions about the future 
pace of growth based on past or present behavior. They also 
promote the educator’s de-centering by leading him to consider 
how people at different stages see the world differently. 
Stage and structural theories, however, can be easily 
misused by educators. Exclusive focus upon a single stage 
typology may stunt awareness and valuing of orthogenetic 
changes not included within that typology. Educators should not 
use stage hierarchies for a convenient but undifferentiated 
ranking of individuals or societies as "more developed" or "less 
developed". The hierarchies used by psychologists, for scientific 
purposes, are not meant to reflect the full range of ways in 
which people may develop. Misused by educators, they may 
distort dialogue between individuals by encouraging the idea that 
the "more developed" have little to learn from the "less 
developed". Further, as Toulmin (1971) points out, stage 
hierarchies may embody unquestioned sociocultural norms, and 
thus contribute to sociocentrism when applied to education. As he 
argues elsewhere (1981), stage sequences imply a "unique 
destination" for development. Educators must be prepared to 
revise their long-term goals for growth in the light of individual 
variety and new environmental challenges, including new 
psychological discoveries. 
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Educators must not use the "stage acquisition" idea to 
assume, prior to inquiry, that a student’s actions will match his 
words, or that his actions will match across different situations. 
Also, structural theories such as Piaget’s and Kohlberg's assume 
that stage acquisition is irreversible. The educator should not 
assume that certain abilities cannot wither from disuse or 
destructive influences. He should be ready to inquire whether 
students are retaining gains over time. 
Finally, educators should assume that changes can be 
growthful without being defined in stage or structural terms. 
Stage changes, assuming these exist, may confer a higher degree 
of co-ordination to a set of habits. But improved skill in 
basketball may be ethically justified as growth just as much as 
acquisition of Kohlberg’s Stage 3. Further, growth must 
ultimately be measured by the full sweep of a person’s 
experiences and actions in a social context. It cannot be defined 
by a "score" on a formal and artificial test of stage acquisition 
7. Psvchodvnamics 
A PSYCHODYNAMIC theory is one that allows for internal 
conflict between a variety of habits and habit-structures. It also 
allows for the possibility of interaction and mutual influence of 
these varied habits and habit-structures. 
Stage theories emphasize the integration of habits by a 
person's highest acquired rational thought-structure. 
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Psychodynamic theories, on the other hand, emphasize the 
ongoing influence of habits not dominated by such a structure. 
Some of these habits may work against development. Emotional 
traumata, sociocultural conditioning, fixed beliefs, or addictions 
involve habits which are irrational, unconscious, unquestioned, or 
even actively repressed. They control behavior without being 
ethically regulated themselves. 
On the positive side, a coexisting variety of habits and 
habit-structures may mean that there are several modes of 
intelligence which can be used to solve problems. This view, 
suggested by Werner (1957, p.138, 145) has been more recently 
emphasized by Gollin (1981) in his argument for a "multimodal" 
view of development. It includes the possibility that aesthetic, 
spatial, sensory-kinesthetic, empathic, poetic, or other forms of 
intelligence may be co-ordinated with more rationally reflective 
forms within creative problem-solving activity. It provides a 
check against egocentrism within formal thinking by balancing 
such thinking against other modes of experience. 
Many developmental theories allow for a psychodynamic 
view. Psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic models assume that 
cognitive-emotional beliefs and habits formed in childhood can 
cause irrational distortions within otherwise rational adults. 
Mechanistic and behaviorist models assume that non-reflective 
conditioning or neuro-sensory-linguistic "information processing 
predispositions influence reasoning abilities. Contextualist and 
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dialectical models assume that reason and worldview are shaped, 
frequently in an unconscious way, by historical and cultural 
factors. 
Cognitive stage theories like Piaget's and Kohlberg's put 
reason itself back in the developmental driver's seat. The 
educator s job, however, is to promote reason's co-ordinating role 
without taking it for granted. He must assume that reason can 
fall prey to rigid habits, emotions, or social taboos. He must be 
ready to take account of irrational (or pre-rational) influences 
within ostensibly "rational" behavior and speech. Further, he 
must be alert to the possibilty of enriching co-ordinative reason 
through access to non-verbal and non-formal modes of 
intelligence. 
8. Continuity and Discontinuity 
Educators should be sensitive to both continuity and 
discontinuity in development. Continuity means that each present 
moment has roots in the past and in turn influences the future. 
Reflection upon continuity prevents the educator from looking at 
adulthood as magically cut off from youth. For example, a 
passive childhood is not assumed to be adequate preparation for 
an active adulthood. Sensitivity to continuity encourages the 
educator to search the past for explanations of anti- 
developmental habits. We have a better chance of curing a 
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teenager s violence if we understand its roots in childhood 
deprivation . 
If we stress continuity too much, however, we may 
constrict our vision of what is possible. We may ignore 
properties.. .which cannot be described in terms of earlier 
behavior, irrespective of whether it takes a few days or a few 
years for the transformation to take place" (Anderson, 1957, 
p.4l). We may, as Kagan (1986) argues, harbor a "liberal" bias 
for gradual social and personal change as opposed to more radical 
alterations (p.77). Or, he says, we may overemphasize the 
control of the past upon the present and future, and fail to 
distinguish new qualities (pp. 69-71). If we ignore the possibility of 
radical developmental transformation for a person, we may 
diminish the chance that it will occur Or, by ignoring 
discontinuous shifts which have already occurred, we may engage 
in irrelevant and even detrimental practices. 
Cirillo and Wapner conclude a discussion on value 
presuppositions in developmental psychology (1986) by pointing up 
the tensions between theories stressing continuity and those 
stressing discontinuity: 
"Kagan objected to the emphasis on continuity to the 
exclusion of discontinuity and categorical distinctions in 
common developmental conceptions, Gilligan to the notion 
that certain ’advances' replace prior modes of functioning. 
It seems to us that such criticisms cancel one another out 
when we try to combine them or that their proponents, 
despite the tone of agreement, are in conflict with one 
another" (p.162). 
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Yet the educator is not obliged to resolve this conflict by 
choosing sides. Indeed, if he is to do even partial justice to the 
whole elephant", he must be ready to use theories which 
contradict one another. Certainly if something as elemental as 
light can be considered now a wave, now a particle, how much 
more complicated a view must we be prepared to take of the 
human being! 
The educator must consider both the possibility that prior 
habits or habit-structures can continue to operate despite the 
creation of new structures, and the possibility that the new 
structures represent a qualitative, even radical, transformation 
of a person’s capacities. This permits us to ask what kinds of 
relations between old and new habits are growthful. New habits 
are more growthful if they permit access to experience of old 
habits. The ability to re-experience even a destructive habit 
opens the student's environment, and lets him take the role of 
others who are at the mercy of that habit. On the other hand, 
new habits are more growthful if they co-ordinate old ones. Even 
positive prior habits will benefit from integration with the 
student’s most global purposes in a social context. Thus the 
childlike sense of wonder can be enhanced, not throttled, by the 




A multilinear outlook on development assumes that there 
are many different pathways of growth. Such an outlook 
promotes growth by encouraging variety among and within 
individuals. Growth in artistic ability, formal reasoning, 
empathy, practical skill, and many other paths are recognized 
within a multilinear view. Dialogue between people who have 
emphasized varying paths contributes to the de-centering of each 
person. A multilinear view frees us from sociocentric values. 
Americans should grow in social awareness as well as in freedom 
of personal choice. 
On the other hand, emphasis on multilinearity should be 
complemented by an effort to see how all the various lines of 
desirable and consistent change conform to the orthogenetic 
principle. Multilinearity is in vogue at present among 
developmental theorists. Psychologists such as Kagan (1983, 1986), 
Gilligan (1986), and Gollin (1981), have taken aim at the unilinear 
theories of Piaget and Kohlberg. Attempts to posit a universal 
basis for dialogue amidst variety are not as popular. Psychologists 
fear committing the sin of sociocentrism (See Kagan, 1986, pp.76- 
77). The point of de-centering, however, is to allow 
communication between people that have taken divergent 
adaptational pathways. The idea that people should learn from 
and respect growth-paths which are not stressed in their own 
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culture is itself based upon the universal value of autonomous de¬ 
centering. 
lil-Immanence 
Immanence is the assumption that there is some kind of 
self-re&UlatQrv tendency of the organism to develop While 
environmental interaction may be necessary to "fuel" 
development, the organism inherently tends to interact with the 
environment in such a way as to produce development. 
This is not an ethical assumption for the educator to make. 
Development has no meaning as an ethical solution to the 
problem of egocentric attachment if we assume that this problem 
will be solved without any kind of conscious regulation (See 
Ch III, Sec.B2 above) To hold development to be immanent 
vitiates its function as a value. 
The educator need not assume that planned intervention 
(i.e., education) is always required for development to take 
place. But his role Is to inquire, in particular cases, into wM 
kinds of interactions with the environment will promote 
development and which ones will not. He should not assume, in 
advance of inquiry, that education won't be necessary. Following 
inquiry, he may opt for a "hands off" rather than a "hands on" 
approach. But he should assume that education may be required 
The educator should not assume the inevitability of either 
Droaressive or regressive change. He should hold firm to the 
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possibility of growth without taking it for granted. He should 
assume that thorough and objective inquiry is necessary to 
determine the kinds of interactions that will be developmental in 
a particular case, and to determine his own appropriate role. 
11. Final State 
A final state is a state past which no further development 
is possible or desirable. Once we posit a final state, development 
becomes a matter of decreasing the "distance" from such a state. 
Here I agree with Dewey: 
"There is something pitifully juvenile in the idea that 
'evolution', progress, means a definite sum of 
accomplishment which will forever stay done, and which 
by an exact amount lessens the amount to be done, 
disposing once and for all of just so many perplexities and 
advancing us just so far on our road to a final stable and 
unperplexed goal" (in Gouinlock, p.94). 
General and long-term goals in education serve an 
important function. They orient and create a context for our 
more specific and immediate goals. Holding democratic society as 
a general and long-term goal orients the short-term goal of 
teaching children to express their opinions in a school meeting. 
Borrowing a term from Dewey, I refer to all goals, across the 
spectrum of short-term to long-term, and specific to general, as 
ENDS-IN-VIEW. 
To foster orthogenesis, the educator must remain aware 
that our larger ends-in-view, although they constitute an image 
of the future, are rooted in our perceptions of the present These 
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perceptions are themselves subject to growth. Our visions of the 
future must be ethically judged according to how they shape the 
present, since it is only in the present that growth can occur In 
this way, what we usually consider to be "ultimate ends" 
actually function as means or plans for promoting growth in the 
present (Cf. Dewey, 1939, p.53). 
On the other hand, larger ends-in-view will only be 
approached by our more immediate activities. Instead of seeing 
the more immediate activities as "means", we can see them as 
miniature ends-in-view, to be co-ordinated at each step with 
larger ends-in-view. Thus, what we usually think of as "means 
and ends" can be seen as a PROBLEM-SOLUTION SYSTEM in which 
larger and more immediate ends-in-view are mutually co¬ 
ordinated. A vision of how math is used by an autonomous yet 
socially responsible adult in modern society might be co-ordinated 
with the kinds of math experiences that give 10-year-olds more 
autonomy and awareness in their environment. Education is thus 
guided by an imagined trajectory of problems and solutions 
between the present and the future. This trajectory is not fixed, 
but itself subject to development as a result of new experiences, 
reflections, and insights. 
To assume a final state is to assume that students grow, 
but not educators. Educators assess development in terms of how 
close students come to the particular state attained or desired by 
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the educator. But this state is not open to ongoing revision in the 
face of interactive experience with the student. 
To rely upon a fixed idea of a final state of development is 
to be attached to one's existing perceptions. It shuts out the 
possibility that new visions may emerge out of a changing 
present. It freezes not only the future, but the present as well It 
also discourages a multilinear view of growth (see Sec.9 above). 
For example, we might see industrialized society as a fixed 
terminus of development for "less developed" nations, which are 
seen as "less developed" by measure of their distance from this 
terminus. But such a view ignores other pathways of progressive 
change which might solve problems for non-industrialized 
nations, but which do not lead to them becoming identical to 
industrialized ones. It discounts the enormous social and ecological 
problems created by industrialization. It prevents us from seeing 
industrialized nations as "less developed" compared to some end- 
in-view which would progressively solve these problems. It 
obscures the possibility that such nations might learn lessons 
from alternative pathways taken by their non-industrialized 
cousins. 
The educator should allow for the possibility that which 
each new solution, each new plateau of development, new vision 
is opened up so that more inclusive and essential problems may 
be framed: 
"Indeed every genuine accomplishment instead of winding 
up an affair and enclosing it as a jewel in a casket for 
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future contemplation, complicates the practical situation. It 
effects a new distribution of energies which have henceforth 
to be employed in ways for which past experience gives no 
exact instruction. Every important satisfaction of an old 
want creates a new one; and this new one has to enter 
upon an experimental adventure to find its satisfaction 
From the side of what has gone before achievement settles 
something. From the side of what comes after, it 
complicates, introducing new problems, unsettling factors” 
(Dewey, in Gouinlock, p.94). 
12. Analogies and Comparisons 
Analogies and comparisons are two-edged swords from an 
ethical point of view. Where they alert us to essential 
considerations, they are beneficial. Where they constrict or 
rigidify our inquiry, exclude essential distinctions, or include non- 
essential similarities, they are harmful. 
A functional analogy between the painting activity of a 
small child and that of a master artist may lead us to value the 
child's creative efforts more completely. It suggests that the 
child's efforts are as important to the child's development as the 
master's efforts are to the master's. Although we might then 
choose to spend more on the paintings of the master, we might 
be inclined to spend equal amounts to ensure that both child and 
master obtained the opportunity to paint. On the other hand, an 
analogy between the rebellious behavior of the small child and 
that of the adolescent might obscure crucial qualitative 
differences between the two. If the imposition of external 
restrictions proves growthful for the small child, we might be 
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tempted to limit ourselves to the same approach for the 
adolescent. The value of Piaget’s theory for educators in this 
regard is precisely that it points out the functional similarities in 
the two rebellions while emphasizing their structural differences. 
Even more than analogies, comparisons between people at 
supposedly different "levels” of development present a subtle and 
difficult set of ethical issues for educators. The hierarchical 
ranking of people along some developmental ladder has the 
potential for both good and bad consequences for development 
itself. 
Comparisons can remind us that development does not 
happen for each individual in isolation, but within a social 
context. Our very ideas about possible ends-in-view derive from 
our observations and comparisons of many people. With no 
framework of comparison between people, it is hard to imagine 
how we could generate these ideas. Comparison with Helen Keller, 
for example, expands our notions about what is possible for others 
with multiple sensory disabilities, thereby transforming our 
guidelines for what is ethically desirable. 
That which is NORMAL, purely as a statistical expression of 
existing conditions, stripped of any eulogistic meaning, is bound to 
have an effect on an educators' assessment of how the social 
context influences problems and possibilities. Different 
considerations may arise in the education of a child who cannot 
read in a group of children who can than in the education of a 
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child who cannot read in a group of children who likewise cannot. 
In our ethical effort to prevent norms which are "context 
dependent" from becoming "value laden truisms" (Gollin, 1981, 
p.249), educators run the risk of ignoring the very real influence 
that being "normal" or "abnormal" may have upon development. 
Comparisons can be used to explore this influence without thereby 
locking it into place. The educator's goal is then to put differences 
between people to work in the service of development, and to 
promote de-centered autonomy from the normal when it can be 
differentiated from the desirable. 
The bad consequences arise when we become over-reliant 
upon a limited or fixed set of comparisons. The egocentric 
tendency is to use one's own limited personal and cultural 
experience as a basis for such comparisons. Within a closed 
comparative framework, itself not subject to ongoing 
development, possibilities that exceed the limits of the framework 
may be ignored. It may be assumed that the problems to be 
solved by those on the "low" end of the scale are identical to 
those that have already been solved by those on the "high" end, 
who are usually the ones setting up the comparison to begin 
with. This cuts off development not only for the student, but also 
for the educator, who loses the benefit of discovering new 
trajectories of growth for himself. Gilligan provides an example of 
the dangers of over-reliance upon limited comparisons within 
stage theories: 
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The minute I say there is a sequence of stages, an 
invariant order, and a hierarchical transformation, the 
presumption is I will never learn anything from anyone at 
a lower stage than myself because I've already been there; 
1 ve^ transformed it, I've learned it. They know nothing I 
don t know. At best, the relationship between a higher 
stage and lower stage person is benevolent, noblesse oblige” 
(in Cirillo and Wapner, 1986, p.154). 
Over-reliance upon comparisons between people diverts 
inquiry from the question of what is the best developmental 
"next step” for a particular individual at a particular time. This 
is the essential question for education (See Sec.Dl below). Our 
assessment of development must always return to an assessment 
of the "quality of becoming" within the student’s experience (Cf. 
Dewey, 1916, p.7; 1922, in Gouinlock, p.98; 1938a, p.34; 1950, 
p.141). 
Comparisons to others can orient us to possible ends-in-view 
(without these becoming fixed), and sensitize us to normative 
aspects of the social context (also seen as subject to growth) 
which influence the framing of developmental problems. But such 
assessments are never sufficiently inclusive, since our aim is to 
frame problems and solutions that render a specific individual 
more developed in comparison to where hs. is at present. The 
importance attached to EXTERNAL comparison is derived from its 
implications for the mutual reinforcement of development among 
the members of the group (See Ch.II, Sec.D3e), including the 
student in question at the moment. Comparisons between people 
are useful to the educator in assessing the nature and degree of 
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such contextual reinforcement. But this in turn, must be judged 
according to an INTERNAL comparison between present and past 
behavior and capacities, unique to each person. 
External comparisons may exert a pernicious influence upon 
development when they encourage a view of isolated individuals 
in competition. They are dangerous when they shift the 
educator’s or the student's attention away from the internal 
comparison which is the fundamental measure of development. 
Thus competition, when used for educational purposes, needs to 
be ethically assessed in terms of its contribution to the total 
reinforcement context, which in turn must refer back to internal 
comparison for each individual. 
Comparisons, like all tools of inquiry, are most useful when 
they are essential and inclusive. We should assume that 
development includes a virtual infinitude of pathways. 
Comparisons gain in educational meaning and value in proportion 
to their precision regarding what is being compared. Even within 
a particular pathway, e.g., learning how to write, calling one 
person a "better" writer than another does not, from an 
educational point of view, help out as much as saying that one 
person evokes emotion from the reader better than another, or 
makes better use of rhythm in his prose, and so on. More precise 
comparisons give the student something clearer to shoot for, and 
avoid including elements in the comparison which are irrelevant. 
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In this regard, the worst possible comparisons, from an 
educational point of view, are those which simply label some 
people as "more developed" than others. Unless we can express 
particular rgspgcts in which one person is more developed, 
educational practice has very little to grab onto. Such 
comparisons assume that there is some unilinear continuum of 
development, with some single dominating characteristic, with 
respect to which individuals and even entire societies can be 
ranked! Worse still, the nature of this continuum or its salient 
feature is not spelled out so that it may be refuted. It is rather 
syncretically collapsed into an undifferentiated judgement upon 
the hierarchical "place" of each person or culture. [3] 
It might seem obvious to label adults as "more developed" 
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than children, or industrial societies as "more developed" than 
"primitive" ones. Yet such labels are themselves insufficiently 
developed for the demands of the educator’s job, They also 
jettison, in advance of inquiry, all possibility that there might be 
some respects in which the child might be more developed than 
the adult, or the Bushman more developed than the American. 
BI-POLAR comparisons, such as the "primitive-advanced” 
comparative framework used by Werner, may have value for 
psychological inquiry. But their use by the educator, working 
with particular individuals within particular societies, is of 
rudimentary value at best, and is fraught with ethical dangers. 
This is so even when, as in Werner's model, the comparisons are 
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Quite precise. Bi-polar frameworks assume that the only 
developmental trajectory for the "less developed" pole is to 
become identical to the "more developed" pole. They also provide 
no framework within which the "more developed" pole can be 
seen as "less developed" compared to some "still more developed" 
end-in-view In other words, bi-polar frameworks divert 
attention away from the essential internal comparisons 
mentioned above. Thus the statement "the United States is more 
ethically developed than the Soviet Union" ignores the key 
educational questions: In what direction is the United States 
moving ethically? The Soviet Union7 In what specific respects7 
What would be the most developmental step for each nation at 
this time? How do the respective pathways of the two nations 
mutually reinforce or disrupt further developmental movement 
for both? What can each country learn from the adaptations of 
the other to foster its own development? These are the kinds of 
questions, applicable to individuals as well as societies, which 
form the basis for a fruitful and ethically tenable use of 
comparisons in education. 
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IL-Considerations for Thorough and Objective 
Educational Inquiry 
1. The Educator's Question 
All educational inquiry aims at promoting growth It seeks 
to overcome egocentric attachment through change in the 
direction of co-ordination of distinguished elements in the 
environment; autonomous choice from a de-centered perspective, 
and an opening of the environment alongside immunity to its 
changes. It does this in unique situations by framing problems 
within them that growth can solve Thorough and objective 
inquiry aims at framing problems which are inclusive and 
essential. Such problems include everything that is essential to do 
away with if we are to remove the source of conflict in that 
situation. Likewise they exclude everything that is not essential 
As a simplified example, it makes a difference whether we 
frame a problem as "my teaching methods must enlist the 
interest of this student", or "this student must learn to obey 
instructions". Each problem implies its solution in the first case, 
change the teacher's habits, in the second case, the student's. We 
don't want to frame our problem in terms of the habits of the 
one if the changing the habits of the other is really what s called 
for. In the context of a reading program, with a student who 
knows perfectly well how to obey instructions when the material 
interest him, the first problem-frame might be more inclusive 
v 
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and essential. In the context of a rock climb, where a student 
whose habit of doing things his own way endangers his life, the 
second might cover the ground just fine. In any event, we can't 
know until we have inquired into the ins and outs of the whole 
situation. 
This inquiry may take an infinite number of turns The 
orthogenetic principle cannot substitute for an educator's global 
judgement-in-context in framing problems. But we can deduce 
guidelines for thorough and objective inquiry from it which give 
us a better chance of arriving at problem-frames which are 
inclusive and essential. 
The first guideline is to frame problems with this question 
in mind: What would be the most developmental change for this 
individual at this time, and how can mv actions and perceptions 
contribute to this change? This question respects the cautions set 
forth in Section III above. It includes the possibility that the 
answer will be different for different individuals in different 
cultures at different times. It places the ultimate measure of 
growth within an actual person, and not in some abstraction 
such as "society”. It makes no prior assumptions about fixed 
external comparisons or final states. The search for the most 
developmental change implies a recognition of many 
developmental possibilities, to be selected within a holistic 
overview. It recognizes the educator's role as an ethical one, not 
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merely a scientific one. Finally, it points to the educator’s 
capacity for growth as well as the student's. 
The asking of this question defines the educator's role; 
therefore I call it "the educator’s question". One acts as an 
educator to the extent that this question is at the center of one's 
concerns. 
Since all development is development out of egocentric 
attachment, the educator's question has a corollary. It is to 
ask:In What wav is egocentric attachment most at the root of 
connict-Ior this individual at this time, and how can mv actions 
and perceptions remove it7 To answer this question is to frame 
an inclusive and essential problem. 
The educator's question, with its corollary, provide the 
context for educational Inquiry. The next six topics constitute a 
list of considerations for the content of educational inquiry that 
aims to be thorough and objective. 
2. Sociocultural Context 
Educational inquiry is thorough and objective to the extent 
that it considers the student's sociocultural context both as 
influencing his development, and as potentially subject to 
regulation in the service of development. 
The sociocultural context might be seen as the concrete 
manifestation of interdependence between human beings. This 
interdependence requires, as a matter of bare survival, let alone 
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development, some form of consensus or agreement, whether 
conscious or unconscious (See Ch.II, Sec.D2biii above). Even the 
most bitter enemies conduct their conflicts against a background 
of consensus which is frequently left unquestioned. This may 
include basic matters of living such as the time of day, use of 
numbers, or mutual respect of the rules of the other's language 
Or it may include agreement on a wide range of social customs, 
roles, and values which serve to highlight the point of conflict. 
From birth to death, human beings are enmeshed in a web of 
consensual agreements ranging from the unconsciously habitual to 
the laboriously constructed. 
Bronfenbrenner (1979) sought to construct a model for 
scientific inquiry capable of exploring the effects of sociocultural 
"ecology" upon development. He elaborated a way of analyzing 
contexts into a series of "nested" systems. Educators can use his 
model to examine how different aspects of the sociocultural 
context affect growth. 
The system most immediate to the individual 
Bronfenbrenner calls the MICROSYSTEM: "the pattern of activities, 
roles, and interpersonal relations experienced by the developing 
person in a given setting with particular physical and material 
characteristics" (p.22). Relations between a mother and child at 
home, or a boss and employee at work, are examples of a 
person's microsystem. Next comes the MESOSYSTEM: "the 
interrelations among two or more settings in which the 
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developing person actively participates (such as, for a child, the 
relations among home, school, and neighborhood peer group; for 
an adult, among family, work, and social life). . a mesosystem is 
thus a system of microsystems" (p.25). 
Both microsystems and mesosystems deal with contexts in 
which the student is an active and present participant. The 
EXOSYSTEM, however, "refers to one or more settings that do not 
involve the developing person as an active participant, but in 
which events occur that affect, or are affected by, what happens 
in the setting containing the developing person" (p.25). Thus a 
local school committee makes decisions which affect a child’s 
development even though the child is never present at its 
meetings. Finally, the MACROSYSTEM "refers to consistencies, in 
the form and content of lower-order systems (micro-, meso-, 
and exo-), that exist, or could exist, at the level of the 
subculture or the culture as whole, along with any belief systems 
or ideology underlying such consistencies" (p.26). One thing that 
defines the existence of a coherent sub-culture or culture, 
according to Bronfenbrenner, is the extent to which the settings, 
roles, interpersonal expectations, relations between settings, and 
so on. seem to derive from the same set of "blueprints Thus 
schools, or behavior between store clerks and customers, are 
more consistently similar within the United btates than they ai e 
between the United States and France. 
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Now a thorough examination of these four systems may 
lead the educator to conclude, as a matter of practical strategy, 
that one or more of these systems should be considered as a given 
when framing a problem. He may reach this conclusion even 
while recognizing the negative influence exerted by a contextual 
system upon development. He may teach a student to take a 
college entrance exam even though he objects to the practice of 
giving them. Such a strategic judgement, which may be re¬ 
examined in the light of actual consequences, is at least more 
thorough than one which does not question whether the exams 
are a good thing, or whether the practice of giving them might 
be changed. 
The practice of (and belief in) allocating educational and 
economic opportunities by exams is part of the macrosystem. 
When we see the macrosystem as subject to ethical regulation, 
we increase the likelihood that various lower-order systems, 
which conform to its basic "blueprint", will also be exposed to 
doubt. Questioning basic beliefs about the female role in American 
society, a macrosystemic matter, has affected the nature of 
systems ranging from employment decisions (exosystem) all the 
way to the relations between spouses (microsystem). 
Change within the microsystem, mesosystem, and 
exosystem may be constrained by the macrosystemic blueprint 
It is difficult for a father to spend more time with his children if 
fathers are rewarded in a competitive culture for spending more 
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time at the office. So the educator should not question elements 
of the lower systems while leaving the higher systems immune 
from scrutiny. 
On the other hand, development must be ultimately 
assessed at the mesosystemic and microsystemic levels, where 
the individual whose growth is in question is actually present 
Thus the educator's criticism of broader systems should spell out 
how changes in them will lead to changes in more immediate 
systems. 
As Dewey maintains, we should frame developmental 
problems with reference to sociological as well as psychological 
consequences, since the two views are "reciprocal" (1946, p.233). 
Each person has his own developmental path, but he is also part 
of the environment of others; he affects their development as 
well. Education should promote the mutual reinforcement of 
growth among individuals outlined by Dewey (Ch II, Sec.D3e 
above). Inquiry to this end is thorough and objective to the 
extent that it examines each element of the social environment 
in terms of its contribution to such mutual reinforcement. 
3. The Educator-Student Relationship 
An educator is anyone who has a concern for an 
individual's global development and seeks to orient his actions and 
perceptions so as to promote it. A student is anyone who is an 
object of the educator's concern. The educator-student 
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relationship is not defined in terms of age, schooling, or social 
status. This definition of an educator allows for different levels of 
growth as an educator. It recognizes, however, that the explicit 
desire to foster global development does itself mark a certain 
threshold of growth. 
One s ability to function and grow as an educator would 
seem to depend on having close, multi-faceted relations with a 
student or students. This in turn might depend on the social roles 
occupied by educator and student, and the student's acceptance 
of the educator as such. Yet one might seek to educate thousands 
of students one never sees by writing a book The mother of an 
adolescent might continue to function as an educator even when 
her child has ostensibly rejected her as such. We should make no 
fixed assumptions about educator-student roles prior to inquiry 
into particular individuals and situations. 
In inquiring into the effect of the social context upon 
development, the educator should be careful to include himself as 
part of that context. To be thorough and objective, inquiry must 
assess the educator's own current developmental problems and 
history of solutions to prior problems. The educator should 
consider that he as well as the student is engaged in an ongoing 
series of both progressive and regressive adaptations to his 
environment. 
To promote the student's growth, the educator must look to 
his own, he must be his own educator. The educator grows as he 
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de-centers to take the role of the student and understand his 
actions and views. This enables him to perceive what is most 
growthful for the student, and to determine whether or not 
growth is taking place. The educator grows as he opens up to and 
co-ordinates his external and internal environment. This enables 
him to influence the "objective conditions" (Dewey, 1938, p 45) for 
the student’s growth. Whether he provides a science kit or an 
encouraging tone of voice, the educator’s conscious efforts are a 
key aspect of such conditions. Thus he must ask "how do my 
developmental achievements enable me and qualify me to guide 
this student’s growth?" while also asking how do my 
egocentricities, sociocentricities, attachments, lacks, inabilities, 
etc. render me less able to guide this student's growth?" Such 
self-knowledge is also growthful for the educator. 
Like the scientist, the educator must be alert to the 
influence of his biases upon his results. Toulmin (1981) chides 
Piaget for ignoring how his investigator’s expectations might affect 
the responses of child subjects, which might be seen as attempts 
at "catching on" to the investigator’s own Euclidean notions. 
Toulmin's point is that in a different society or epoch, children 
might come to ’’catch on" to a different set of rules (p.264). He 
argues that false notions of invariant developmental sequence 
may arise out of the experimenter’s sociocentrism. He gives the 
example of Kohlberg’s claim that all children first realize the 
fantasy nature of dreams, and only afterwards realize that they 
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are purely personal. He cites research showing that Nigerian 
children reverse this sequence. The researchers’ speculated that 
communal sleeping arrangements in Nigeria (as opposed to 
isolated arrangements in middle-class America) led the children 
to realize earlier that their dreams were not shared by others 
(p.265). Toulmin asks psychologists to take a "three-dimensional 
matrix" approach, seeing the subject, the researcher, and the 
situation as variable factors in determining research outcomes. 
This advice also applies to education, where the consequences of 
ignoring any of the three variables will be more immediate. 
Now the orthogenetic principle prescribes that development, 
if it continues, must eventually involve seeing one's "own" growth 
as bound up with the effect one has upon the growth of others. 
Whether we are conscious of it or not, adaptation occurs within a 
social context. Many growth-paths may emerge from individual 
and cultural differences. Yet the egocentric attachment which 
blinds us to the socially interdependent nature of growth poses a 
universal problem for development to solve. Therefore, no matter 
what other roles one plays in society, everyone should grow to 
adopt the educator’s role in some form, and take up a concern 
for the growth of others. To emerge as an educator could thus be 
seen as a universal "end-in-view", despite the individually and 
culturally varied series of more immediate ends-in-view which 
might frame problems along the way. 
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This is not to pose a fixed "educator” state as some final 
achievement. To take up the educator's role is the beginning of a 
developmental process as well as a culmination. For example, an 
educator may begin with a concern for his household only 
(microsystem). He may later extend his concern to how the 
entire sociocultural context impedes or reinforces growth 
(macrosystem). Further growth would integrate his concern for 
particular students with his concern for the reinforcement of 
growth within the society that includes those students. 
The educator takes responsibility for the student's global 
development: not just growth in skateboarding or chess, but in 
the ethical co-ordination of all the student's growth-paths. His 
ability to do this relies upon his growth along three general lines: 
1) his degree of conscious concern for his own global development, 
reciprocally shaped by a concern for the growth of others and the 
mutual reinforcement of growth in society; 2) his degree of power 
to conduct thorough and objective inquiry aimed at the framing 
of inclusive and essential developmental problems; 3) his degree of 
power to bring about progressive solutions to those problems. 
These criteria let us articulate the nature of the educator- 
student relationship with less fear of introducing sociocentric or 
other non-essential distinctions. The relationship between 
educator and student is developmental^ unequal, is a 
relationship between "greater" and "lesser" levels of development, 
to the extent that there is a difference between individuals in 
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those three criteria. I may have a great deal to learn from a 
certain 10-year-old when it comes to skateboarding or even 
playing chess, yet this does not equip him to be my educator. On 
the other hand, it means that my greater age, or my possession 
of math skills he doesn't have, are not sufficient to define or 
justify my capacity as his educator. [4] 
The educator must not use the excuse of superiority 
according to the three criteria mentioned to take a permanent "1 
know better than you" attitude, or to permanently commandeer 
the student's course of activity. To adhere to the orthogenetic 
principle, the educator must rather seek to diminish, abolish, or 
even reverse the inequality that exists between educator and 
student along these lines. It is not the educator's aim to see that 
the student adapts along a fixed and specific course set by the 
educator. It is rather to see that the student learns to set his 
own developmental course, based on his own concern for the 
growth of others in reciprocity with his own, his own power to 
conduct thorough and objective inquiry to this end, and his own 
power to execute that course even in the face of obstacles. In 
short, it should be his aim that the student eventually become 
the educator. The educator's efforts to direct or influence the 
student's activities must be justified not only by an objective 
assessment of the educator's superiority along the three essential 
criteria, but also by his intention to decrease this superiority 
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through education. Various means to this end-in-view must then 
be assessed according to whether they do in fact realize it. 
The outcome actually achieved is bound to reflect the 
means used to attain it. So the autonomy of the student, in 
conjunction with a mutual de-centered dialogue between educator 
and student, must be encouraged throughout the education 
process. Yet the student may not begin with much concern for 
his own growth, or for that of others, or with much ability to 
inquire thoroughly and objectively, or to pursue a growthful 
course. Growth for such students, in a given situation, may 
require interventions which contradict a spirit of autonomy and 
dialogue. It may not be best to negotiate nightly with a three- 
year-old about his bedtime; it may be better to decree that 
three-year-olds go to bed at 8pm. But we still must justify our 
autocracy by its effects upon growth in both the present and the 
future. We may note that the child cannot act out of an 
understanding of his parents' need for an evening break, or for 
his own need for rest (and perhaps the security of routine) So 
parents, rather than allow these needs to be at the mercy of the 
child's egocentrism, take temporary responsibility for ensuring 
them. We may note that the child's autonomy in daytime play is 
not dented in the slightest by having an ordained bedtime, and 
that he comes to enjoy the regular bedtime ritual. As for the 
future, we may note that children who obey at age three are not 
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at all hampered in their ability to negotiate at age nine, taking 
their parents needs and their own larger needs into account. 
4. The "Reaction Norm” 
The sociocultural context and the educator-student 
relationship are environmental conditions influencing 
development. Educational inquiry must also take the organismic 
side of development into account. The same objective conditions 
which promote growth for one person may not do so for another: 
"one man's meat is another man's poison". If the organism has 
not constructed habits which enable it to adapt progressively to 
the environment, then such adaptation will not occur. 
Development occurs only when the organism can experience a 
problem, and can regulate its environment in a direction which 
tends to do away with the problem's source 
Conditions may simply not present a problem to a given 
person. In this case, there is no call to adapt in any direction. Or 
conditions may present a problem, but the organism may not 
have the capacity to adapt progressively to it. In this case, 
regressive adaptation would occur. Thus one person with political 
awareness and skills may adapt to noise in his neighborhood by 
organizing community action, while another person without those 
skills might adapt by wearing ear plugs. In the most extreme 
case, lack of ability to adapt would result in death to the 
organism. 
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Piaget (1971, p.286) uses the concept of the "reaction norm" 
(Cf., ibid., adaptive norm") to describe the range of phenotypes 
that may be generated by a given genotype. The genotype has a 
range of possibilities within which it can produce responses to 
varied environmental conditions. We can use the analogy of a 
reaction norm to describe a person's ability to respond 
developmental^ to given environmental conditions. Changes in 
environmental conditions which fall outside the reaction norm 
will not promote development. Parental attempts at mutual role¬ 
taking at bedtime may fall outside their three-year-old’s reaction 
norm. Thus the educator, in asking the "educator's question" (See 
Sec. A above), must also ask: "Do these changes fall within the 
student's reaction norm at this time?" Developmental problems 
are not inclusively and essentially framed if they assume an 
ability to adapt progressively which is not there. 
On the other hand, it is precisely this reaction norm which 
is itself assumed to be subject to development. Thus the educator 
must inquire carefully into each student’s reaction norm. He 
must be prepared to test hypotheses and revise conclusions about 
it. The reaction norm is the boundary between what is taken as 
given and what is taken as subject to regulation in the framing of 
a problem. If the educator assumes the reaction norm to be 
static ("you can't change human nature"), this will have the 
same pernicious effect as the assumption of a fixed sociocultural 
context. The most problematic habits will be considered immune 
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to educational influence. Conversely, to overestimate the reaction 
norm is to assume the student has already learned the very 
thing which needs to be taught. We might assume that children, 
if given more external liberty, will use their time more 
productively. This might be so for some children, but others 
might need to learn, with active guidance, how to use time 
productively in the face of greater external liberty. Without such 
guidance, regressive rather than progressive adaptation might 
take place. 
Students with different reaction norms may all respond 
developmentally to a situation, but in different ways Gilligan (in 
Cirillo and Wapner, 1986, p.32) gives the example of a film about 
the Holocaust seen by eighth-graders. Some of the students 
thought more concretely, others more formally The concrete 
thinkers had greater immediate empathy with the victims in the 
film, but little understanding of its historical context (”It is so 
sad. Why doesn’t someone stop them?"). The formal thinkers 
grasped the historical ideas, yet were less emotionally moved. We 
might frame a different growth-problem for each group to solve. 
Yet a simulation activity might awaken the formal thinkers to 
greater empathy, whereas the concrete thinkers might fail to 
relate a history lesson to the people they saw on film. Each 
problem must account for both the desired direction of change in 
the reaction norm, and the limits to education set by it. 
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The educator aims to aid in the construction of new habits 
while acknowledging the initial limits of the old ones. The problem 
of how to accomplish this can only be solved through ongoing 
experimentation in concrete situations. Theories which predict 
stages or chronologies of continuous or discontinuous reaction 
norm changes should be used only as points of departure for the 
educator's hypotheses, which in turn should be tested by 
experience. The educator must communicate with and observe 
the student to know when the student is on that fruitful 
boundary marking the edge of his power to respond 
developmentally. Repeated experience with many students, or 
with a particular student, leads us to recognize when education 
has gone far enough outside the reaction norm to jeopardize 
short-term development by provoking a regressive response It 
also alerts us to the signs of education which threatens long-term 
development by failing to challenge the student. 
Development extends the reaction norm, and the range of 
situations to which the individual can adapt progressively. Thus 
one person thrown in jail might become mentally ill, while 
another might become more serene, focused, and determined. To 
secure objective conditions which promote growth, therefore, is 
by no means to "coddle" the individual, and render him less able 
to adapt progressively under less ideal conditions. It is rather to 
arrange a series of conditions which repeatedly stretch reaction 
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norm boundaries. This develops the global habit of engaging in 
this kind of stretching (and leaping) on an autonomous basis. 
Destructive influences in the social or physical environment 
can provide challenges which are not sought out, but imposed. 
An extended reaction norm will better enable the individual to 
turn disaster into opportunity. But development itself engenders a 
wider and more refined set of problems. So we need not worry 
that a more growthful social order will produce "weaker" 
individuals. People in the habit of growing will expand their own 
environment so as to stretch their limits. We can also count on 
unplanned environmental changes to present challenges equal to 
(or one or more steps beyond) our power to confront them. 
5. Ends-in-View 
In Section Cll above, I defined the PROBLEM-SOLUTION 
SYSTEM as a series of developmental problems and their solutions 
ranging from the most specific and short-term ones to the most 
long-term and general ones. Within such a system, larger 
problems co-ordinate smaller ones, providing context, visionary 
purpose, and unifying standards. A plan for a non-violent social 
order, for example, might discourage violent steps to obtain it. 
At the same time, new discoveries through immediate 
activity lead us to extend, flesh out, and redefine our long-term 
ends-in-view. Responding to horseplay in my classroom, I might, 
without any purpose other than maintaining order, begin open 
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discussions about such problems with my students. I may find a 
value in those discussions which goes beyond simply improving 
physical conduct. Out of this experience, I may develop a whole 
philosophy and curriculum of democratic problem-solving. The 
larger goal of having a more democratic classroom will in turn 
shape how I organize those discussions next year. The whole 
experience recasts my idea of "order" from one of physical 
obedience to one of solidarity with the group and a commitment 
to working things out. 
Within a problem-solution system, bigger and smaller 
problem-solutions exert dynamic influence on one another 
Thorough and objective educational inquiry takes into account the 
entire problem-solution system, and examines the mutually 
reinforcing Influence of ends-in-vlew at M levels of generality 
and time-scope. 
Any visions of an "educated person" or "educated society", 
to promote growth in the present, must spell out their 
consequences for the framing of more immediate problem- 
solutions. They should attempt to articulate some sequence 
whereby particular problem-solutions will lead to more general 
ones. Further, they must be revised in light of actual outcomes, 
both in the short-term and the long-term. 
This standard reveals inadequacies in the popularly 
conceived goals of "culture", defined as a fixed set of concepts and 
literary-historical references, and of the "educated person*. 
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defined as one who can participate in discourse which takes that 
"culture" for granted. The requisite body of knowledge for an 
educated person is established in advance; education is a matter 
of absorbing this body of knowledge. The agenda may also include 
reasoning skills which enable the student to attach meaning to 
the knowledge, and use it to take part in future discourse But 
the end-in-view is framed in terms of the information. It 
excludes the more essential consideration of spontaneous and 
enlivening conversation based on shared activity, with 
commitment and collective creation as well as information 
stemming from that activity. As a result, approaches based on 
this end-in-view try to imbue culture through isolated study. 
The key student interactions are held to be with a single teacher 
(or a computer!) in a setting divorced from anything the student 
considers pertinent to his own social life The result is that many 
students not only fail to approximate the ideal, but lose interest 
in school altogether. The adherents of this end-in-view then 
decry our social and individual shortcomings. But they do not 
question the inclusivity or essentiality of their end-in-view, or 
see it as a possible cause of educational failure. 
The educator should by all means construct the most large- 
scale and long-term goals imaginable, ones that include the most 
profound dreams and resolve the most fundamental difficulties. 
He must, however, be prepared to check such ends-in-view 
against their actual influence upon immediate practice, and to 
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render them still more inclusive and essential in the light of 
experience. Ideas about where ongoing personal and social 
development can and should lead play a regulative role similar to 
that of ethical principles. They provide definite plans in which 
those principles are expressed. Thus the orthogenetic principle 
finds concrete expression in designs for social institutions which 
promote non-violence, respect for ecology, political and economic 
democracy, individual autonomy, and mutual support. Such 
blueprints are not immutable deductions or fixed teloi. They are 
working constructions which create a context for present 
educational activity, conditioning its scope and sensitivity. 
The educator should not underestimate the benefit of the 
conditioning influence of our most advanced ends-in-view upon 
the whole problem-solution system. If one's aim for a deprived 
group of students is that they become educators, scientists, and 
artists, this is bound to influence practice in a different direction 
than if one’s aim is to "at least enable these kids to function in 
society”. The more growthful aim includes the lesser one, so the 
latter is by no sacrificed to the former. The strategy for getting 
from the immediate situation to the more growthful vision will, 
however, encourage activities and perceptions not included within 
the smaller aim. 
To be able to formulate more growthful ends-in-view, the 
educator himself must keep on growing. The end-in-view which 
creates the context for the entire problem-solution system will 
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only be as advanced as the educator’s ability to envision it. The 
more the educator has some idea of a society in which growth is 
mutually reinforced, and in which people make a great variety of 
contributions, the better equipped he will be to organize 
educational activity which reflects that dream in embryo At the 
same time, however, the more the educator can use larger ends- 
in-view as tools rather than dogma to which he is attached, the 
more able he will be to guard against rigid thinking on the part of 
students. [5] 
6. Responsibility 
So far, I have outlined those domains which the educator 
must take into account as potentially subject to regulation. From 
the "lateral" point of view, these include the sociocultural 
context, the educator himself, and the student's "internal" 
reaction norm. From the "longitudinal" standpoint, this includes 
the interaction between problem-solutions ranging from the more 
immediate and particular to the more long-term and general, 
from the "next step" to the "ideal". 
The educator should be wary of fixed assumptions about 
how all these lateral and longitudinal factors influence each 
other. Theories can alert him to possibilities, things to look for. 
Systematic experiment may sharpen possibilities into probabilities 
Still, the particular nature of education requires an open-minded 
educator engaging in renewed experiment with each individual 
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student. Thus it should be deemed possible to influence the 
student's reaction norm by altering some aspect of the 
microsystem. Yet it should also be considered possible that each 
system retains a resistance to change which "buffers" the effects 
of changes in other systems. A lifetime of growth for an educator 
may exert only minimal influence upon the makeup of a 
macrosystem. Perhaps development will proceed as a continuous 
and gradual emergence of ideals out of small steps. Yet sudden or 
sweeping transformations may erupt out of a shift in context 
created by a new and larger ideal, or by the discovery of a new 
and more effective immediate approach 
Now, to take this entire universe of factors into account is 
no easy task. Even so, this is but the groundwork for the heart 
of inquiry to resolve the "educators' question". To frame problem- 
solutions which prescribe educational activity, the educator must 
select, singly or In combination, which factors are strategically 
most essential at a given time. He must ask, "At this moment, 
should my problem be framed in terms of the macrosystem, the 
exosystem, the mesosystem, the microsystem, my long-term 
goals, my immediate goals, my own powers or deficiencies, or the 
student's psychological 'reaction-field'7 Further, which specific 
aspects of each of these factors require regulation7" 
To answer this question is to determine which factors we 
are going to hold RESPONSIBLE in the framing of our problem. 
"...as the practical problems of education and 
administration of justice clearly indicate, an intelligent 
imputation of responsibility involves the question of where 
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the factors are located that are simultaneously controlling, 
in human action, and also controllable by human 
intervention" (Nagel, 1957, p.24, emphasis in original).” 
The educator's role is to hold factors responsible, as 
objectively controlling the situation, while holding, himself 
responsible, or taking responsibility, for controlling those factors. 
Thus if I hold a child s selfish habits responsible for his fighting 
with a friend over toys, it is within the context of holding myself 
responsible for doing something about those habits. The educator’s 
stance refers back to his own responsibility, literally, his ability 
to respond. This ability is itself not fixed, but subject to 
development. There are no inherent, permanent limits placed 
upon his responsibility. This taking of responsibility is at the core 
of the ethical point of view (See Ch. II, Sec.Dl above). 
We have here a dual notion of responsibility. The objective 
side of responsibility is the effort to hold certain factors 
responsible (in the sense defined by Nagel above) when framing a 
developmental problem: a corrupt institution, an unconscious 
phobia, an inarticulate end-in-view. The subjective side is the 
ethical context within which the educator takes responsibility for 
the regulation of those factors. The educator holds factors 
objectively responsible within the subjective context of taking 
responsibility for them. 
The educator's question always refers to actual human 
beings as students. So even when the educator holds society 
responsible for some problematic situation, he relates his efforts 
303 
to alter the macrosystem to desirable changes in the shared 
perceptions and actions of real people. 
Now the educator seeks to promote the de-centered 
autonomy of his students. This development cannot be sustained 
if the educator takes responsibility in a way that considers 
students to be passive recipients of his regulative efforts. It can 
only proceed if the educator "holds" his responsibility for 
regulating factors in the individual or society as a point of 
departure for the taking of responsibility for those factors by 
those being held responsible by the educator The educator thus 
"holds" for the student (in a compassionately de-centered way) 
that which belongs to the student, and which, if development 
proceeds, the student will progressively "take" up on his own. 
How to transfer responsibility from that held by the educator to 
that taken by the student may well be the central mystery of 
education. 
As the educator develops, he differentiates allocation of 
objective responsibility from blame, disapproval, fault, or 
punishment. Within the educational context, problems are not 
evils to be reviled, but challenges to be met. The educator may 
feel anger, fear, frustration, and the weight of cultural sanction 
in dealing with certain situations: he may feel them to be bad 
and wrong. But if these are to be framed as developmental 
problems, the educator must take his emotional and cultural 
responses into account as factors influencing the developmental 
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outcome. It may be that blame or punishment are necessary or 
expedient techniques for promoting growth in a certain case: this 
question deserves careful empirical inquiry But without such 
inquiry, the disapproval and desire for retribution implied in 
laying blame or finding fault distort efforts to locate 
responsibility. They hinder growth by including elements which 
are not essential to doing away with those factors objectively held 
to be problematic. 
An example of the regressive effect upon inquiry of failure 
to differentiate blame from educative responsibility is the debate 
over whether solutions to poverty are to be found by "blaming 
the victim" or "blaming society". To hold victims of poverty 
(their reaction norms, attitudes, habits, etc.) responsible for 
their plight is simply to say that there are psychological factors 
which are both controlling the problem, and which are 
controllable. In an educational context, the educator holds the 
student responsible within a context of taking responsibility for 
engaging in practice which will lead to the student's own power 
to take responsibility for growth. All this has nothing to do with 
blaming or accusing. It need not arouse the fear of adding insult 
to injury, nor the fear of ignoring social factors responsible for 
poverty. On the social side, to hold society responsible means that 
shared social habits (racial prejudice, economic practice, ethical 
priorities), also control the problem of poverty. These are in turn 
controllable, and the educator holds society responsible within a 
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context of taking responsibility himself for educating others until 
they take responsibility for executing necessary growth changes 
Again, this is different from locating guilt or fault, which may or 
may not help to rouse society in an educational direction. 
What distinguishes the progressive taking of responsibility 
from guilt, blame, or fault is its orthogenetic emphasis upon 
mutual reinforcement and interdependence as opposed to 
egocentric isolation. We try to find others guilty so that we or 
those we favor can be held blameless. At best, fault can be 
shared, with each offender receiving a fraction of a fixed whole. 
What one person gets, the other doesn't get. By contrast, the 
taking of responsibility, like the growth of which it is a 
manifestation, is unlimited and mutually reinforcing in a social 
context. One person can take as much as he wants without there 
being any less for anyone else. The more people take 
responsibility, the more they function as educators, since only 
the growth of others as well as their own can progressively solve 
those factors held responsible for problems. The more people 
function as educators, and develop as educators, the more effort 
is directed to leading others to autonomously take responsibility. 
Since no one can be heteronomously compelled to take up 
autonomous responsibility, education must seek to replace 
unilateral control with dialogic communication. 
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7, Choices 
The considerations outlined in Sections 2-6 above must be 
taken into account if we are to have a thorough and objective 
sense of what the possibilities for growth are in any situation. But 
they do not tell us how to choose among several genuine 
possibilities for growth. 
Some guidance in this can be derived from the educator's 
question and its corollary (Sec.l above). In choosing among 
growth-paths, we should prefer those which are "most" 
growthful, i.e., those which uproot the most pervasive and 
pivotal manifestations of egocentric attachment. By addressing 
these, we release the greatest possibilities for further growth. 
Where situations are overwhelmingly oppressive or problematic, 
it is easier to distinguish these more inclusive and essential paths. 
It is better to help a slave gain freedom than it is to teach him to 
play the violin or even run a plantation 
Yet as conditions become more favorable to growth, 
possibilities multiply. Educator and student are faced with the 
"luxury" of having to choose from among pathways which may 
seem comparably problematic or promising. In making these 
choices, the orthogenetic principle can in no way replace 
individual judgement in the context of a unique situation. The 
best use we can make of it is to deduce from it a taxonomy of 
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considerations to be taken into account when choosing among 
comparably worthwhile paths; 
How can I deepen my experience by building upon 
current strengths? Solving progressively more refined and 
challenging problems within anv endeavor will evoke a profound 
autonomy and de-centering that could not be gained by solving 
problems at a more superficial level across a variety of domains 
* "How can I expand my experience by striking out into 
unexplored territory, and correcting obvious weaknesses?" Any 
life-path, by emphasizing some things over others, will sketch 
out, in relief, as it were, other areas which have been avoided 
No matter what the path, exploring these uncharted waters will 
promote a de-centering from attachments that cannot be had in 
any other way. 
* "What is the present and foreseeable obstacle to continued 
growth which is most general, and which, if overcome by some 
present adaptation, would release the most generally beneficial 
consequences for present and future growth?" Focusing on the 
comparable generality of growth-paths can be an effective way of 
choosing between them. Thus we seek paths which will release 
greater new growth possibilities, as in the above example of the 
slave. Such a consideration may lead one to seek out the most 
enduring and recalcitrant obstacles to growth, whether these be 
in the macrosystem, the microsystem, or one's own deepest 
fears. 
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* What obstacles are more realistically subject to 
progressive adaptation? What steps are most possible for me right 
now? As mentioned above (Sec. 4), one’s own reaction norm and 
that of others must be considered when framing growth- 
problems. This is also a useful consideration in choosing between 
growth-paths. One may perceive a far-reaching problem in 
society or within oneself which, if confronted and solved, would 
create vast new realms of growth. Yet although the danger of 
shrinking from the ideal may be most pressing in one case, so the 
danger of biting off more than one can growthfully chew may be 
paramount in another. Sometimes, having posited the most 
general, difficult, and long-term challenge, one must then 
approach it in smaller increments. To do otherwise would be to 
find oneself in over one's head, faced with no choice other than 
to adapt regressively, thus defeating one's initial purpose. Some 
paths may make this less likely than others. 
* "Which growth-path would most benefit others, and 
society as a whole? Which of my abilities, areas of knowledge, 
and sensitivities are most in demand, or most objectively needed7 
What is it that 1 can contribute that someone else might not be 
able to contribute?" This consideration calls upon one's 
"selflessness", and one's ability to see one's own growth as 
interdependently linked to others within a mutually reinforcing 
social context. 
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Which of my desires and interests are strongest, most 
inclusive of other desires and interests, and most essential to my 
sense of well-being and enjoyment of living?" One may consider 
one s internal environment no less than one’s external 
environment in choosing growth-paths. There may be variations 
in our feelings which can help us choose among growth-paths 
which are all responsive to social considerations. By considering 
such unique shadings of desire, we contribute to society by 
promoting variety within it. 
It is obvious that such considerations do not do the final 
work of judgement for us. When ought we to build upon 
strengths instead of rectifying weaknesses? When ought we to 
take the battle to the most pervasive constraints in society and 
ourselves? When ought we to settle strategically for a lesser 
victory, taking our own limits and those of others into account? 
When ought we to put aside our more personal desires in order to 
serve our fellow human beings, and ourselves less immediately? 
When, on the other hand, ought we to follow our hearts, judging 
that others as well as ourselves will be best served by the quality 
of love that we can bring only to that endeavor which we enjoy 
most especially? 
Choices are clearest when internal or external factors are so 
forceful as to weight principled judgement clearly on one side or 
the other. But in the absence of such forces, choice requires a 
subtle appraisal of one’s own strengths and weaknesses, one's own 
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interests and developmental limits, the needs and developmental 
limits of others, and the influence of the present upon the future. 
To transcend egocentric attachment, we may need to be sensitive 
to where our "growth-edges'* are at a given moment. These 
edges reflect the most long-term and general way in which we 
are most likely to succumb to egocentric attachment, and become 
less open, less interconnected, less free, less in charge. Are we 
most in danger of failing to pursue our powers in a given domain 
to their deepest level? Or are we most in danger of using our 
strengths to build a wall around ourselves, outside which we will 
never venture7 Are we in danger of taking existing social 
conditions as inalterable, or giving in to our attachments and 
assumptions about our own limits? Or are we more in danger of 
expecting too much too quickly from ourselves and others? Are 
we prone to social insensitivity, to ignoring the way in which the 
pursuit of our desires and interests influences others7 Or are we 
out of touch with our own needs, pursuing a course out of a 
sense of "duty" which masks guilt, insecurity, or ignorance? Just 
as we add hot water to a bath which is too cold, and cold water 
to a bath which is too hot, so our growth choices may tend in 
apparently opposite directions depending upon our overview of the 
situation. [6] 
These considerations can only focus judgement-in-context, 
not replace it. A person's power to judge ethically, however, will 
depend on his growth along those universal lines which define his 
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emergence as an educator (see Sec.3 above). These are: 1) his 
ability to see his "own" growth as bound up with the growth of 
others, and with the quality of growth-reinforcement within 
society; 2) his ability to inquire thoroughly and objectively into 
his situation; 3) his power to choose based on the results of that 
inquiry. Choices which sacrifice any of these qualities will, over 
time, prove regressive, since they will not, in the end, work to 
transcend that problem of egocentric attachment at the core of 
the human condition. 
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Notes 
1. I define "education" as practice aimed at intentionally and 
reflectively promoting the global development of the 
individual. An "educator” is anyone who practices education 
The terms "education" and "educator" are not wedded to a 
fixed set of institutions or social roles found in a particular 
culture or time. Anyone can be an educator (See Ch I, Sec C 
above). 
2. Piaget uses the term "equilibration" to denote the 
equilibrium-disequilibrium cycle, as a whole, moving in an 
orthogenetic direction. Equilibration is thus a near-synonym 
for orthogenesis, but one that refers to the particular 
explanatory mechanics of Piaget's theory. 
3. Now within professional educational settings, terms like 
"more developed" or "higher functioning" may be ethically 
used as "shorthand" for an implicit reference to a particular 
set of respects according to which comparison is being made. 
Deliberate ranking of students according to global "level" may 
even serve as a conscious educational tool, designed to 
heighten awareness of and commitment to achieving aspects 
of growth deemed most essential. The use of such professional 
language and such educational methods is ethically sound to 
the extent that it saves time without dulling inquiry, and 
enhances student effort without restricting growth 
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4. The following 
warrant their 
remarks by Dewey are sufficiently relevant to 
entire inclusion here. 
Every experience is a moving force. It3 value can be judged 
only on the ground of what it moves toward and into. The 
maturity °f experience which should belong to the 
adult as educator puts him in a position to evaluate each 
experience of the young in a way in which the one having 
the less mature experience cannot do. It is then the business 
of the educator to see in what direction an experience is 
heading. There is no point in his being more mature if, 
instead of using his greater insight to help organize the 
conditions of the experience of the immature, he throws 
away his insight. Failure to take the moving force of an 
experience into account so as to judge and direct it on the 
ground of what it is moving into means disloyalty to the 
principle of experience itself. The disloyalty operates in two 
directions. The educator is false to the understanding that he 
should have obtained from his own past experience He is also 
unfaithful to the fact that all human experience is ultimately 
social: that it involves contact and communication. The 
mature person, to put it in moral terms, has no right to 
withhold from the young on given occasions whatever 
capacity for sympathetic understanding his own experience 
has given him. 
No sooner, however, are such things said than there is a 
tendency to react to the other extreme and take what has 
been said as a plea for some sort of disguised imposition from 
outside. It is worthwhile, accordingly, to say something 
about the way in which the adult can exercise the wisdom 
his own wider experience gives him without imposing a 
merely external control. On one side, it is his business to be 
on the alert to see what attitudes and habitual tendencies 
are being created. In this direction he must, if he is an 
educator, be able to judge what attitudes are actually 
conducive to continued growth and what are detrimental. He 
must, in addition, have that sympathetic understanding of 
individuals as individuals which gives him an idea of what is 
actually going on in the minds of those who are learning. It 
is, among other things, the need for these abilities on the 
part of the parent and teacher which makes a system of 
education based upon living experience a more difficult affair 
to conduct successfully than it is to follow the patterns of 
traditional education" (1938, pp. 38-39). 
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5. Educators should also consider that the level of development 
(with respect to those factors most pertinent) of the peTson 
m a leadership role can have a decisive effect upon the 
iT,hf JeCt 0HriC3* 0< 3tudent5 A superb basketball coach 
may enable students to skip over difficulties that they might 
wir,enHTntCred Under a 10SS sKllled Exceptionally 
wise and loving parents may enable their child to avoid 
much of the normal upheaval of adolescence College students 
learning physics do not have to proceed through a Ptolemaic, 
then a Coper mean, then a Newtonian notion of the universe 
before proceeding to a quantum-relativistic view, the 
understanding of their teachers conditions their learning 
trajectory. Similarly, nations struggling to attain democracy 
do so differently in a world populated with other democracies 
than the United States did in a world populated by 
monarchies. 
6. Aron (1980) provides an example: 
The extent to which students were dependent or 
independent, co-operative or competitive, is another variable 
which would Influence the way In which deliberation would 
be taught. In situations in which students were generally 
highly competitive, the teacher would do well to emphasize 
the corporate nature of deliberation, and to encourage group 
deliberations. The aim of co-operation, however, must be 
balanced against the aim of developing independent 
judgement. In situations in which students were more docile 
and tended to accept uncritically the opinions of others, the 
teacher would do well to encourage the students to exercise 
and evaluate their own judgements" (p.419). 
CHAPTER V 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER INQUIRY 
I have attempted to relay a grasp of orthogenesis as change 
m the direction of: l) increasing co-ordination of increasingly 
distinguished elements in the environment, 2) increasing 
autonomy of choice coupled with increasing de-centenng of 
perspective, and 3) increasing opening of and openness to the 
environment alongside increasing immunity from its vicissitudes. 
(The idea of integration comprises the qualities of co-ordination, 
autonomy, and immunity. The idea of differentiation comprises 
the qualities of distinguishing, de-centering, and opening. Thus 
orthogenesis is defined as complementary integration and 
differentiation.) 
1 have attempted to justify using orthogenesis as an ethical 
definition of what it means to grow or develop. I have also 
attempted to deduce some implications of the orthogenetic 
principle for educational inquiry. With respect to further work to 
make the principle more useful to educators, two 
recommendations come to mind. 
First, in Chapter IV, Section C, 1 examined various 
categories of ideas about the nature of development found in 
psychological theories. 1 attempted to demonstrate an ethical 
"screening" process for various assumptions. For example, 1 
argued that psychological theories which assume a final state of 
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human development, to be helpful in education, must be co¬ 
ordinated within a view of how such an assumption might 
influence growth. Additional inquiry should apply this screening 
process to other assumptions within psychological theories which I 
have failed to mention. The same process should be applied to 
theories within other disciplines relevant to education: 
anthropology, sociology, and the like. Are there "givens" within a 
theory which remove from the domain of ethical regulation 
matters which might conceivably control growth, and which 
might themselves be controllable7 
Second, 1 have stopped short of presenting narrative "cases" 
showing how 1 might use the principle to aid me in framing an 
educational problem in a global, complex situation. One reason for 
this omission was my unwillingness to add to an already overly 
ambitious project. Another was my concern that such 
simulations would inevitably fail to cover all the variables and 
considerations present in a real situation. Or they would fail to 
convey the role played by individual talent and intuition in any 
actual judgement. Nonetheless, a "case study" approach might 
provide a growthful integration of the considerations distinguished 
in Chapter IV, Section D. Only by employing the principle in a 
cross-cultural series of real and hypothetical situations will we 
get at the "meat" of the orthogenetic framework. Only in this 
way can we discover if it really "works", provoking a broader and 
more effective framing of problem-solutions in all situations. 
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My final observations concern the relationship between 
American developmental science and American education. 
American educators, be they professionals, parents, or others, 
should differentiate between heuristically useful assumptions for 
psychological science and ethically sound ones for education. The 
orthogenetic framework can help educators filter out ethically 
untenable assumptions about development. But this cuts both 
ways. It means that psychologists can make assumptions they 
find useful for pursuing inquiry into the facts of how and why 
people change, without being charged with adversely affecting 
education. 
Sometimes the most fruitful stimuli to psychological 
experimentation and dialogue are one-sided assumptions which 
would be disastrous if uniformly "applied" in an educational 
context. Assumptions that people act like machines, or that they 
re-organize all their habits under the influence of their highest 
acquired thought structure, or that their adult lives are largely 
determined by unconscious influences from their earliest years, 
all have scientific merit. We find out as much by attempting to 
refute them as we do by attempting to sustain them. If research 
based on these or other assumptions highlights undesirable forces 
operating against growth, so much the better. In order to frame 
inclusive and essential problems, educators need to be alerted to 
the worst about human beings as well as the best. A critical 
psychological theory can be a spur to education just as critical 
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social theory can be a tool for social reform. If psychologists wish 
to claim that their findings place eternal limits upon human 
possibilities, this need not rivet the attention of educators with 
clear ethical priorities. 
Differentiating between the scientist's function and the 
educator's empowers educators to take the primary role in the 
formation of educational policy, instead of leaving this matter to 
more specialized scientific experts. Kaplan (1983, 1986) argues that 
it is the job of developmental psychology to define the nature of 
what is desirable for human beings, and then prescribe this as a 
matter of social policy. Kaplan's willingness to take responsibility 
for this task is laudable. In keeping with my previous remarks on 
responsibility, there is an unlimited amount to go around. 
Psychologists should form opinions about education. They should 
speculate on implications for education which they believe are 
indicated by their research findings. Certainly they should 
participate in public debate on educational policy. 
Yet I can't help but feel that Kaplan's assignment of 
prominence to the scientist’s role in prescribing policy, as nobly 
motivated as it is, reflects the gulf in status and authority in 
America between the university professor and the schoolteacher 
or parent. To be fair, it also reflects the vacuum left by 
educators who have not themselves been educated in ways 
commensurate with their responsibilities, and who form policy 
based upon inquiry which is far below the level of thoroughness 
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and objectivity one finds in science. It is no wonder that 
developmental psychologists concerned about the future of 
humanity feel moved to fill this vacuum. One purpose of this 
thesis is to explore means for educators to upgrade their own 
inquiry to a level of development more in keeping with the 
demands of their task. Educators need not rely on policy 
prescribed by psychologists if they have the tools to sort out the 
views of a plurality of psychologies, and make their own policy 
based on more particular assessments of actual situations. 
As it develops, developmental psychology will have an 
increasingly important and constructive role to play in education. 
Its job will be to refine the mind-boggling welter of possible 
adaptations due to interactions between inner and outer factors 
into systems of probabilities. How likely is it that certain kinds of 
interactions in certain kinds of cultures between certain kinds of 
educators and certain kinds of students in certain kinds of 
situations will promote certain kinds of progressive or regressive 
adaptations? The educator can assume that theories based on 
probabilities may break down in the face of individual 
interactions, but at least good theory gives him a place to start. 
If psychologists want to aid education, they can let educators 
contribute to the direction of research by asking them what kinds 
of questions they want answered. Then they can use whatever 
heuristic means are at their disposal to come up with probable 
answers and ways of thinking about them. 
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Everyone has a role to play In taking responsibility for 
human development. Yet using psychological research to tailor 
educational policy is more properly the educators function than 
the psychologist's, although the psychologist's advice may be 
invaluable. It is, after all, the educator who takes responsibility 
for the global development of particular individuals, and for the 
direct consequences of the way problems and policies are framed. 
There is, of course, no reason to prevent any given individual 
from playing both roles over time. In fact, it would be useful for 
more professional educators to have a chance to conduct 
psychological research, and for research psychologists to take time 
to work and think as educators. That way there would be not 
only differentiation between the educator's and scientist's 
functions, but integration as well. 
Unfortunately, the gap in status, training, and expectations 
between research psychologists, and, for example, elementary 
school teachers, cuts the educator out of his proper role. We do 
not expect elementary school teachers to indicate research 
priorities, create policy, evaluate and adapt psychological 
research, or define long-term growth-pathways. In our culture, 
educators only accede to such roles as their connections to 
students become more distant, as they inhabit the student's 
exosystem rather than his microsystem, becoming 
superintendents and college professors rather than parents, 
counselors and schoolteachers. Our culture works against the 
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possibility of policy being made by those in the most direct 
position to implement it and be affected by it. Thus it is no 
surprise that psychologists are ready to exert their accustomed 
authority, and fulfill the educator’s role for him 
Science seeks general laws within specific aspects of the 
world. Education, by contrast, seeks the most particular laws 
which apply to that most general of things, the actual human 
being. If research psychologists really want to empower 
educators, and respect the limits of science as applied to 
education, they would do well to heed the advice given by George 
Shultz during the Iran-Contra" scandal. His view was that if 
those gathering the information (in his case the CIA) begin to 
appropriate the task of making or prescribing policy, problems 
result. On the one hand, the intelligence tends to be biased to 
reflect the policies favored by those assembling it. On the other 
hand, policy recommendations are influenced by a view of the 
situation biased and limited by the preoccupation with gathering 
certain kinds of information. It is simply not as broad an outlook 
as that of the politician who must weigh a greater variety of 
situational factors. Finally, it is the politician and not the 
intelligence agency who is ultimately accountable for the results 
of policy. 
Insofar as research psychologists make policy 
recommendations based on their philosophical reflections, their 
concern for human welfare, and their larger experience, they are 
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acting as educators. Insofar as they seek to generate 
authoritative pronouncements based upon their research, 
however, and upon their social prestige as scientists, they risk 
disempowering the educator, and usurping his proper function 
Since this is surely not their intent, it is my hope that 
orthogenetic ethical theory can be one tool for establishing a more 
balanced relationship between education and developmental 
psychology. 
For such a relationship to flourish, those whose direct 
interactions within families or institutions suit them for the 
educator s role must take on this role. They must become 
educators as well as teachers, managers, parents, counselors, 
nurses, and so on. Once the concern for the student's global 
development is raised, the ability to conduct thorough and 
objective inquiry should be developed. With this in progress, 
educators should reorganize the settings in which they practice to 
enhance their impact upon growth. Schools, workplaces, 
hospitals, prisons, homes: all have the potential to become truly 
educational contexts. 
Within such contexts, the partnership between the educator 
and the scientist (and not only the psychologist, but the 
sociologist, economist, political scientist, anthropologist, etc.) can 
come to fruition. The scientist can provide a controlled, focused, 
and systematic kind of inquiry which is bound to escape the 
educator dealing with the global array of human possibilities and 
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conflicts. The educator’s inquiry can provide a frame of reference 
which is both more holistic and more sensitive to individual and 
situational peculiarities. He can thus suggest essential directions 
for scientific inquiry, and co-ordinate a plurality of scientific 
findings within larger ends-in-view. Periodic role changes 
between educators and scientists would be growthful for each, 
allowing for a more de-centered and co-ordinated perspective 
A more integrated yet differentiated scientist-educator 
relationship would mean increasingly intimate dialogue and 
mutual influence with retained respect for essential and useful 
role distinctions. Scientists could consider the educational effect of 
their very experimentations-and-observations-in-context. Just as 
educational contexts could provide real-life laboratories for 
scientific advance, so scientific research could incorporate 
educational aims. Bronfenbrenner advances the notion of the 
"transforming experiment" which "involves the systematic 
alteration and restructuring" of the sociocultural ecology "in 
ways that challenge the forms of social organization, belief 
systems, and lifestyles prevailing in a particular culture or 
subculture" (1976, p.41). 
The transforming experiment provides a vehicle for 
educators and scientists to act as partners in the organization of 
social institutions which consciously promote growth. The 
orthogenetic principle can provide educators with a powerful tool 
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to orient effort in the direction of creating such institutions This 
is the challenge that was set forth by Dewey: 
or^rowth^ ^Cn,t4t^ °f the moral Process with the processes j ^ lsf realiz^d, the more conscious and formal 
education of childhood will be seen to be the most 
economical and efficient means of social advance and 
reorgari^ation and it will also be evident that the test of 
I ? 0i adult llfe 15 their effect furthering 
continued education. Government, business, art, religion, 
all social institutions have a meaning, a purpose. That 
t0 Set freC and devel°P the capacities of human 
ndividuals without respect to race, sex, class or economic 
status. And this is all one with saying that the test of their 
V+U+JS ex^en^ which they educate every individual 
into the full stature of his possibility. Democracy has many 
meanings, but if it has a moral meaning, it is found in 
resolving that the supreme test of all political institutions 
and industrial arrangements shall be the contribution they 
make to the all-around growth of every member of society" 
(1950, p.147). 
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